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The economic advancement that society has experienced in the past two centuries is largely 
based on a carbon intensive development model. This is now causing a vexing problem because 
the exploitation of fossil fuels is a leading cause of global climate change. As developing 
countries advance energy-intensive developmental agendas, a more sustainable approach is 
necessary to facilitate growth without the accompanying negative environmental externalities 
inherent to the business as usual approach. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the 
relationship between market-based incentives (MBIs) for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
the underlying host country context. The main research question is: How does host country 
context affect MBIs in developing countries? The theoretical framework is drawn from the 
literature on market based environmental policy, and links to the literature on governance in 
areas of limited statehood.  
 The thesis links five distinct empirical papers to present a cohesive body of research. The 
experience of the internationally mandated Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is explored 
via qualitative comparison between China and South Africa, and between Zambia and South 
Africa. A quantitative analysis of utilisation and underlying host country indicators is also 
presented to further understand the antecedents of CDM uptake at the national level. 
Furthermore, South Africa’s nationally mandated promotion of renewable energy is explored. 
This includes a comparison with Germany to highlight how key considerations of renewable 
energy promotion vary between a developed and developing country.  
 The research finds MBIs in developing countries, both internationally and nationally 
mandated, to be highly dependent on the overall host country context. The key aspects identified 
include 1) host country prioritisation of low carbon development; 2) supporting structures and 
policies that generate awareness, build capabilities and encourage private sector participation; 
and 3) access to finance, with a specific focus on cost of capital. The findings support the 
market-based environmental policy literature that suggests an effective regulatory framework by 
the state is a necessary condition for MBIs in developing countries. However it also shows that 
the regulatory framework alone is not a sufficient condition for successful implementation of 
MBIs in the developing world. Consequently, the overall host country context determines private 
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1.1  Context and Motivation  
The rising concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in our atmosphere and resulting changes in 
the global climate are a controversial but increasingly recognised global challenge (Stern, 2007). 
Climate change poses a serious threat to economic advancement in developing countries, 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Limiting the long-term average temperature increase to 
two degrees Celsius, commonly correlated with carbon dioxide (CO2) parts per million (ppm) of 
450, has been established as the consensus mitigation target to maintain a stable climate (IEA, 
2008, 2011; Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). Unfortunately, achieving this threshold is becoming 
more and more unlikely as we are collectively locking into an emissions scenario that is 
estimated to go well beyond the target 450 scenario. The World Energy Outlook 2011 ominously 
predicts the following: 
“Four-fifths of the total energy-related CO2 emissions permissible by 2035 in the 
450 scenario are already ‘locked-in’ by our existing stock (power plants, 
buildings, factories, etc.). If stringent new action is not forthcoming by 2017, the 
energy-related infrastructure in place will generate all the CO2 emissions allowed 
in the 450 scenario up to 2035, leaving no room for additional power plants, 
factories, and other infrastructure unless they are zero-carbon, which would be 
extremely costly” (IEA, 2011, p. 2).  
 The resource intensive development model used since the industrial revolution is 
increasingly recognised as ecologically unsustainable and acknowledged as a key driver of 











implication is that in order to meet the needs of the world’s increasing population without 
exceeding the earth’s environmental boundaries, a more sustainable development alternative is 
necessary, especially for developing countries seeking rapid economic advancement (Rockström 
et al., 2009). De Boer and van Bergen (2012) summarise this conundrum as follows, “If we are 
already living beyond our means but at the same time 3 billion people need to rise out of poverty, 
then the central challenge of our age must be to decouple human progress from resource use and 
environmental deterioration” (p. 4).  
“Virtually all aspects of economic activity – individual consumption, business 
investment, and government spending – affect GHG emissions and, hence, the global climate” 
(Aldy & Stavins, 2012a, p. 45). This makes climate change an unprecedented challenge because 
“incentives for sacrificing the future for the present are often overwhelming” (Daily & Ehrlich, 
1992, p. 761). This creates a “time inconsistency problem between short-term survival strategies 
and longer-term environmental concerns” (Lufumpa, 2005, p. 366). The unfortunate outcome is 
summarised by Hart (1997), “in meeting our needs, we are destroying the ability of future 
generations to meet theirs” (p. 67).  
Locking in an emissions trajectory that could destabilise the climate is especially 
disconcerting for countries with the least ability to cope with the adverse effects of climate 
change because they will be the most negatively impacted (Parry, 2009; Pettit, 2004; 
Someshwar, 2008). This is referred to as ‘climate injustice’ (Comim, 2008) and is worrisome for 
SSA, because it is the world’s least developed region, with insufficient capacity to cope with the 
anticipated environmental shocks (UNDP, 2011). Veit (2010) notes “Africa, with its widespread 
rural poverty, relatively high dependence on rain fed agriculture and chronic energy crises, has of 











Decision makers in developing countries, and particularly in SSA, acknowledge the long 
term risks of climate change but do not consider it a top priority when compared to economic 
advancement and poverty alleviation (Ellis, Winkler, Corfee-Morlot, & Gagnon-Lebrun, 2007). 
The Kyoto Protocol, the legally binding international agreement to reduce GHG emissions, 
provides the rationale why developing countries are not perceived as responsible for taking 
immediate action to reduce their emissions (UNFCCC, 1997). The Kyoto Protocol is based on 
the principle that nations will address climate change, “on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
the developed country Parties should take the lead” (United Nations, 1992, Article 3, paragraph 
1). This provides an explicit recognition that developing countries have little responsibility for 
the historic accumulation of GHG, and therefore developed country shall take the lead in 
reducing GHG emissions (Aldy & Stavins, 2012b).  
Even though developing countries are not considered responsible for addressing climate 
change, reducing their GHG emission levels is increasingly important because developing 
countries are where future growth will occur. The grouping of developed countries referred to as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are no longer the growth 
drivers of GHG emissions as “non-OECD countries account for 90 per cent of population 
growth, 70 per cent of the increase in economic output and 90 per cent of the energy demand 
growth over the period from 2010-2035” (IEA, 2011, p. 1). This trend highlights the urgent need 
for developing countries to begin reducing their emissions if we are to avoid locking-in a 
scenario above the 450-ppm threshold. The anticipated emissions growth in developing countries 











climate injustice and its implications is the motivation for why SSA is selected as the primary 
study area of this thesis. 
A major challenge to taking action on climate change is that the negative externality costs 
associated with GHG emissions are currently not counted. The result is that low carbon 
alternatives are often perceived as prohibitively expensive in comparison to fossil fuel based 
options that are a leading cause of GHG emissions (Schneider & Goulder, 1997; Wigley, 
Richels, & Edmonds, 1996). To overcome this challenge, low carbon alternatives require 
innovative policies and mechanisms to ensure the cost-benefit analysis applied by decision 
makers includes not only financial costs, but also the long-term social and environmental 
externalities associated with each option (Parry, Palutikof, Van der Linden, & Hanson, 2007). 
Incentive mechanisms must also be capable of attracting significant private sector participation, 
as public funding alone is not sufficient to meet the challenge posed by climate change (Unruh & 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006).  
The two main environmental policy intervention options to reduce GHG emissions are 
command and control (CaC) regulation and market-based incentives (MBIs)
1
. CaC regulations 
limit the quantity of allowable emissions by setting environmental standards (performance or 
technology) for each individual source of pollution (Hahn, 1989). Performance standards 
mandate the amount of emissions allowable per unit of economic activity and technology 
standards require a particular emission reducing process or industrial equipment be used (Jaffe & 
Stavins, 1995). MBIs are “regulations that encourage appropriate environmental behaviour 
through price signals rather than explicit instructions” (Stavins & Whitehead, 1997, p. 105). 
                                                        
1 There are numerous terms used for what I refer to as market-based incentives, including market-based instruments, 
market-based mechanisms, incentive-based programs, market-based policy, economic-incentive based policy and 











Options include environmental taxes, marketable permits and subsidies. Environmental taxes are 
designed to “collect from those deemed responsible for pollution” (Fullerton, 2001, p. 230) to 
pay for any necessary mitigation, and serve as a mitigating factor by increasing the cost to 
pollute. The marketable permit approach (also referred to as cap and trade) allocates a finite 
number of tradable emission permits to firms that allow a specified amount of pollution. Firms 
that minimise their total emissions below their permitted level are eligible to trade their unused 
permits to other firms that were unable to sufficiently reduce their emissions. In theory, the 
marketable permit approach is believed to minimise the overall cost of achieving a specified 
level of emissions if “firms minimise their total production costs, and the market for permits is 
competitive” (Hahn, 1989, p. 96). Subsidies, with regard to MBIs, aim to incentivise low carbon 
development activities without stifling economic growth but require a financial subsidy (Parry & 
Williams, 1998).  
Considering that developing countries are not deemed responsible for reducing GHG 
emissions, measures that tax or place an absolute limit on their emissions are often deemed 
inappropriate for developing countries (Babiker, Reilly, & Jacoby, 2000). The rationale is that 
limiting or taxing GHG emissions may hold back economic growth because low carbon 
alternatives are more expensive and less proven than traditional carbon intensive development 
approaches (Bruggink, 2012). As a result, MBIs (specifically subsidies) can be argued as the 
most acceptable option for developing countries to reduce GHG emissions because they do not 
stifle income generation and economic development opportunities (Savedoff, 2011).  
MBIs are considered by many to be an effective means to deliver environmental aims in a 
cost-effective manner (Hahn & Stavins, 1991; Pagiola, Bishop, & Landell-Mills, 2002; Sandor, 











based environmental policy from a developed economy perspective (Bechberger & Reiche, 
2004; Butler & Neuhoff, 2008; Haas et al., 2011; Haas et al., 2004; Szarka, 2006). The literature 
often makes the broad generalisation that the developing world lacks the regulatory capabilities 
necessary to effectively administer a market mechanism (Aldy & Stavins, 2012a; Aldy, Ley, & 
Parry, 2008). For example, Hahn and Stavins (1991) state,  
“Appropriate mechanisms will vary depending on relevant government agency’s 
resources and capabilities. Much of the work on markets and emission taxes 
assumes that there is a reasonably sophisticated environmental control agency that 
can administer incentive-based programs. This may be a reasonable assumption 
for many industrialized nations, but is probably the exception, rather than the rule, 
in developing countries. The design of incentive-based instruments that require 
less administrative expertise and fewer resources to implement could facilitate 
more and better applications” (p. 14). 
In addition, Sawin (2006) points out that, “specific national characteristics, particularly within 
developing countries, can play an important role in determining barriers from one country to the 
next” (p.73). Specific barriers facing developing countries are predicted to include poor 
infrastructure, long travel distances, low technical capabilities and low literacy rates (Martinot et 
al., 2002). Additional concerns assumed to increase perceived investment risk in developing 
countries are political, regulatory and market stability (Sawin, 2006). However, the literature is 
lacking specific analysis of the underlying drivers of MBIs within developing countries (Aldy & 
Stavins, 2012b).  
The need for a strong regulatory framework for MBIs to work, as highlighted in the 











emerging literature on governance in areas of limited statehood (Börzel & Risse, 2010; Risse & 
Lehmkuhl, 2006; Risse, 2010). According to Lehmkuhl and Risse (2006), areas of limited 
statehood can occur within nation-states if they have limited ability to effectively implement and 
enforce policy. In these situations, alternative non-state actors can play a role in filling the void 
left by the state (Börzel, Héritier, Kranz, & Thauer, 2010). With regard to MBIs, the state must 
play a role, to varying degrees, in establishing the policy and regulation of an incentive 
mechanism but relies on the non-state actor to implement the activities that reduce GHG 
emissions. This is called “governance with government” within the literature relating to 
governance in areas of limited statehood and is the explicit link to market-based environmental 
policy (Börzel & Risse, 2010).  
Two main MBIs applicable to developing countries are explored, the internationally 
mandated Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and nationally mandated renewable energy 
promotion. These are selected because they are the only GHG reducing MBIs that are currently 
being implemented specifically within SSA (Arens et al., 2011; Nganga, 2012). The CDM is a 
project-based offset mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol that allows eligible developing countries 
to host projects that generate and sell emission offsets to developed countries (UNFCCC, 1997). 
The CDM was established with the dual objective of helping developing countries achieve 
sustainable development while lowering their ‘business as usual’ emissions. In order to do so, the 
CDM provides a subsidy in exchange for verifiable carbon credits that represent reductions in 
emissions that would have not otherwise occurred. The intent of the CDM is that the 
international climate regime, led by developed countries attempting to meet their legally binding 
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, will fund and regulate the CDM projects, 











rational firms will take advantage of any “profitable opportunities for innovation” including an 
abatement subsidy such as the CDM (Porter & Linde, 1995, p. 99). In reality, this has not 
happened as the CDM has resulted in inequitable utilisation across eligible developing countries, 
and utilisation is especially low in SSA (Arens et al., 2011; Boyd et al., 2009; Byigero, Clancy, 
and Skutsch, 2010; Jung, 2006). This gives rise to a compelling question of why is such a 
theoretically attractive MBI that is internationally mandated, regulated and funded so unevenly 
distributed across the developing world. A full analysis of the CDM is presented in this thesis 
(see papers 1, 2 and 3).  
Similarly, incentives for renewable energy promotion are being implemented at the 
national level, in both developed and developing countries. Governments within SSA, plagued 
by chronic energy shortages, have begun exploring ways to increase renewable energy supply 
within their overall energy mix (Nganga et al., 2012, Pegels, 2010). Renewable energy 
promotion differs from the CDM in that the host developing country pays the required subsidy 
(as opposed to developed countries).  
Renewable energy is typically promoted using either a demand driven or price driven 
strategy (Haas et al., 2004). Within the demand driven strategy, the state sets a target of 
renewable energy supply to be achieved within the overall energy supply, typically through 
quotas on electricity suppliers through a system of tradable green certificates (Menanteau, Finon, 
& Lamy, 2003). This is less applicable to developing countries because the structure of the 
power industry is predominantly characterised by monopolistic government run utilities, as is the 
case in most of SSA including South Africa (Eberhard & Gratwick, 2011).  
Due to the limited applicability of demand driven strategies in SSA, price driven 











characterised by the state setting a price that is intended to reduce uncertainty and attract 
investment. The best-known mechanism is the renewable energy feed in tariff (REFiT), whereby 
a premium tariff price (either fixed or competitively bid) is established through long-term power 
purchase contracts (Huang and Wu, 2011). A fixed price REFiT has been effectively used to 
exceed renewable energy targets in a number of developed countries, most notably Germany 
(Janet and Martinot, 2011). After initially considering a REFiT for South Africa, a competitive 
bidding process was implemented whereby prices are determined through a staged competitive 
bidding process called the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement 
programme (REIPPP). Renewable energy promotion in South Africa is compared to the German 
experience in this thesis (see papers 4 and 5). 
Aldy and Stavins (2012b) recently called for research to focus on innovative ways to 
incentivise emission reductions in developing countries. This indicates a clear gap in the 
literature on market-based environmental policy resulting from a relative absence of research on 
1) what constitutes an effective host country environment for MBIs in developing countries, and; 
2) the role of the state in ensuring success of MBIs in developing countries. The gap identified in 
the literature is the motivation for why this thesis explores MBIs in developing countries, with a 
particular focus on the host country context.  
1.2 Objective and Research Questions  
The overarching objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of MBIs in 
developing countries. I aim to make a theoretical contribution to the literature regarding market-
based environmental policy by clarifying which aspects of the host country context are 
particularly important to the effectiveness and efficiency of MBIs in developing countries. It is 











countries can facilitate alternative approaches capable of meeting today’s needs without 
destabilising our climate. 
In line with the objective of this thesis, the following are the research questions that the 
empirical papers of this thesis collectively investigate and answer.  
Main Research Question: 
How does host country context affect MBIs in developing countries?  
Subordinate questions: 
 How has the CDM performed to date and why? What are the key considerations influencing 
CDM utilisation or non-utilisation across developing countries? What are the key host 
country macro indicators influencing the utilisation of the CDM?  
 What are the key considerations for renewable energy promotion in developing countries 
versus developed countries? How do financial considerations affect the success of MBIs? 
Using electricity as a key example, how does statehood impact the cost differential between 
electricity supplied by renewable energy sources and the existing tariff structure?  
1.3 Summary of Papers 
This is a single-themed cohesive PhD thesis that includes publications comprised of five inter-
linked papers that individually and collectively speak to the main research question. The main 
research question motivates and links each of the empirical papers into a cohesive body of 
research. Each empirical paper directly investigates one or more subordinate research questions, 
collectively responding to the main research question.  
I conceptualised, planned and implemented the five empirical papers as part of this PhD 











experience of South Africa and China (co-authors Farai Kapfudzaruwa, Lin Na and Shirley 
Matheson). Paper 2 provides a comparative case study of the CDM in South Africa and Zambia. 
Paper 3 is a quantitative analysis of regional dispersion and country antecedents for utilisation of 
the CDM (co-author Umesh Kumar). This paper adopted deductive hypothesis testing based on 
arguments inducted from papers 1 and 2. Paper 4 proposes an index-based model to estimate the 
cost of capital for renewable energy projects in South Africa. Paper 5 expands on the work of 
paper 4 with a comparative case study of the South African and German experience incentivising 
renewable energy, focusing on how the host country context (with particular emphasis on level 
of statehood) affects cost of capital, and the corresponding impact on the viability of MBIs. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the overarching research question and sub-questions give rise to the 
research question(s) focused on in each of the papers. 
 
Figure 1.1: Research Questions Link to Empirical Papers 
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Collectively, the papers provide a single-themed, cohesive thesis linked by the main 
research question that makes a theoretical contribution to understanding the role of MBIs in 
developing countries. The following is a concise summary of the each of the papers and their key 
arguments, which in turn gives rise to the overarching, collective arguments of the thesis. The 
full empirical papers are included in Section 3.  
1.3.1  Paper 1 
A Comparative Policy Analysis of the CDM in South Africa and China 
The first paper is a qualitative comparative case study of CDM experiences in South Africa and 
China. The paper addresses the subordinate research question regarding CDM performance to 
date, exploring key considerations and underlying drivers that influence CDM utilisation.  
China and South Africa were selected as the case study countries because both are 
considered emerging economies but have vastly different experiences engaging the CDM. South 
Africa and China’s economies are heavily reliant upon fossil fuel based development approaches 
so theoretically both provide significant opportunities to leverage the CDM to reduce emissions 
through renewable energy or efficiency gains. However, experience to date indicates that South 
Africa only accounts for 0.9 per cent of the worldwide registered annual certified emission 
reductions (CERs), whereas China has dominated the market, generating 54 per cent of the 
annual worldwide CERs (Fenhann, 2011). This demonstrates that CDM alone cannot drive the 
transformation toward a low carbon pathway. The analysis in this paper reveals that a strong 
industrial and energy policy of the host country government plays a crucial role in the 
engagement with the CDM. The paper also finds that active engagement by key government and 
private sector stakeholders, as well as the presence of a friendly business environment positively 











This comparison provides insight into how China has set national and regional policy that 
is supported by the CDM. Such policy measures are complementary to the CDM and increase its 
utility as an MBI. Until recently, South Africa has not provided similar policy support to 
encourage CDM usage, which has resulted in low participation. The paper points out the need for 
complementary policies and integrated support to overcome hesitancy to engage with new and 
unproven MBIs such as the CDM.  
1.3.2  Paper 2  
MBIs in South Africa and Zambia: A Comparative Analysis of the CDM 
 
The second paper is also a qualitative comparative analysis of the CDM with the geographic 
focus on Southern Africa. The paper explores why, in theory, such an attractive incentive 
opportunity has been so under-utilised in Africa. The paper compares the experience of the CDM 
in South Africa and Zambia. These two Southern African countries were selected because of 
their varying levels of statehood, South Africa being an emerging, middle-income economy, 
while Zambia is classified as a least developed country (LDC).  
General challenges affecting the CDM were identified in the literature to be awareness, 
capacity, eligibility and access to finance (Arens & Kreibich, 2011; Bowen & Fankhauser, 2011; 
Karani & Gantsho, 2007). The paper then compares how these overarching issues specifically 
impact the CDM experience in South Africa and Zambia. The paper finds that complexities 
relating to awareness, capacity, eligibility and finance have different implications at the national 
and local level. The paper engages the subordinate research questions by identifying precisely 











1.3.3 Paper 3 
MBIs in Developing Countries: Geographical Dispersion, Antecedents and Implications of 
the CDM 
 
The third paper continues to explore the CDM by performing a quantitative analysis of how the 
CDM has performed to date throughout the developing world. The paper uses descriptive 
statistics to assess the state of CDM dispersion and continues with regression analysis to identify 
the factors influencing the utilisation of the CDM. The analysis uses the CDM projects per capita 
as the dependent variable instead of absolute CDM projects. This accounts for the differences in 
scale across the eligible developing countries by levelising the countries by their population, 
making a country comparison relevant. Levelising by population, as opposed to an economic 
indicator, is deemed appropriate with regard to climate change because the “location of 
emissions of greenhouse gases has no effect on the glob l distribution of damages” (Stavins, 
1997, p. 7).  
The independent variables and the rationale for their use are summarised in Table 1.1. 
Each indicator is described in detail and cited in paper 3. The indicators were selected based on 
the findings of papers 1 and 2, as well as drawn from the academic literature. An inherent 
challenge in this research is to identify appropriate and valid macro indicators that are not highly 
correlated. To address this, the analysis applied a plus or minus 0.700 correlation threshold in 
order to avoid any distorting multicollinearity issues (Farrar and Glauber, 1967). 
Table 1.1: Independent Variable Summary based on Paper 3 
Variables Rationale Citation 
Foreign Direct Investment per 
capita, Gross Domestic 
Product per capita, Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation per 
capita  
(World Bank Statistics) 
CDM projects are privately 
funded and attracted by 
countries with complementary 
financial resources.  
Paper 2; Jung, 2006; Byigero 
et al., 2010; Dinar et al., 2008; 
Dolsak and Bowerman, 2007; 
Lütken, 2008; Niederberger, 











Fossil fuel based emissions 
per capita and Carbon Dioxide 
Intensity  
(Carbon Dioxide Information 
Analysis Center)  
CDM gives monetary value to 
emission reductions, 
correspondingly the market 
searches for the highest 
volumes at the lowest cost. 
Paper 1; Ellis et al., 2007; 
Wang and Firestone, 2009; 
Flues, 2010 
Ease of Doing Business 
Ranking (World Bank / IFC) 
Business and economic 
environment is an important 
factor in determining the host 
country level of risk for CDM 
projects. 
Paper 1 & Paper 2; Oleschak 
& Springer, 2007; Baffoe-
Bonnie & Khayum, 2003 
World Governance Indicators 
(World Bank) and Political 
Instability Index (Economist 
Intelligence Unit)  
Governance affects CDM 
procedures such as evaluation 
criteria and approvals. 
Political risk decreases 
investment and increases cost 
of capital, negatively affecting 
CDM implementation.  
Paper 1 & Paper 2; Ellis et 
al., 2007; Newell, 2008; 
Nhamo, 2006; Jung, 2006; 
Oleschak and Springer, 2007 
Environmental Performance 
Index (Yale Center of 
Environmental Law and 
Policy) & Climate Driver 
Index (Center for Global 
Development) 
High levels of environmental 
and climate risk may create a 
greater awareness to 
proactively address the cause. 
Paper 1; Nussbaumer, 2009 
Human Development Index 
(United Nations Development 
Programme) 
 A country overall level of 
development signals its ability 
to prioritise discretionary 
action such as engaging with 
the CDM. 
Paper 1 & Paper 2; Boyd et 
al., 2009; McGowan, 2008 
 
This paper reaffirms that despite the stated intent of the CDM to have equitable 
dispersion, it has not been utilised across all eligible, developing countries in an equitable 
manner, either from an absolute or levelised perspective. The multi-variant regression analysis 
finds the human development index (HDI) to be the most statistically significant determinant of 
CDM uptake, as well as environmental performance index (EPI) and world governance 
indicators (WGI) to be significantly related to CDM project implementation. The findings of the 
paper suggest that without having achieved a minimum threshold of development, even the most 











size-fits all approach of the CDM is problematic if equity across all participating countries is 
desirable.  
Paper 3 contributes to the overall thesis by providing empirical evidence of how the 
CDM has performed to date by identifying significant relationships between host-country 
indicators and levelised CDM utilisation.  
1.3.4  Paper 4  
An Index-Based Model for Determining the Investment Benchmark of Renewable Energy 
Projects in South Africa 
 
The fourth paper shifts the focus from the internationally mandated CDM to nationally mandated 
renewable energy promotion. The paper proposes an index-based model for determining the 
internal rate of return
2
 (IRR) required by equity investors for renewable energy projects, and 
applies this to the South African context.  
Financial markets act as a benchmark for the optimal level of asset allocation and returns 
based on risk inherent in the economies. Investors require an optimal return on their investment 
given finite resources. In relatively new sectors like grid-connected renewable energy, many 
investors face difficulty in assessing proper return, making them more averse to financing such 
projects. South Africa has significant potential for renewable energy projects (Banks & 
Schäffler, 2006), but an arbitrary choice of the required rate of return for project evaluations can 
negatively affect funding decisions.  
The index-based model presented in this paper proposes that risks inherent to South 
Africa result in an equity IRR requirement of 22.96 per cent. The significance is that level of 
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statehood and associated risks have a significant impact on the financing required to attract 
private sector participants.  
 This paper relates to the overall thesis by identifying and providing a model to assess the 
financing requirements that significantly impact the ability of MBIs to promote renewable 
energy in South Africa, which can be applied to other developing countries.  
1.3.5  Paper 5 
Renewable Energy Incentives across Varying Levels of Statehood 
 
The fifth paper builds on paper 4 to explore the key considerations affecting MBIs for renewable 
energy promotion in developing countries. The paper explores how level of statehood impacts 
the cost of capital for renewable energy projects, which in turn influences the required tariff and 
price differential between electricity from renewable sources as compared to existing fossil fuel 
dominated electricity supply.  
A comparative analysis of hypothetical wind energy projects in South Africa and 
Germany is presented to highlight how varying host country context affects the cost of renewable 
energy. The two countries were selected because they are at different stages of implementing 
price driven MBIs to promote renewable energy. South Africa is an emerging economy with a 
nascent wind energy sector, while Germany is a developed country with an advanced wind 
energy industry.  
MBIs need to provide investors with a return commensurate to the risk associated with 
the activity and its host environment. In most cases MBIs are required to bridge the cost 
differential between traditional fuel sources and renewable sources, and provide assurance that 
private sector, independent power producers (IPPs) will receive a financial return that 











varies by country and is a result of the differential between the current tariff price (typically 
fossil fuel based power generation) and renewable energy costs. A key challenge identified in the 
paper is to determine a price per kilowatt-hour that is the lowest possible cost but is still 
attractive to private sector led renewable energy development.  
The comparison of hypothetical wind farms demonstrates a significant difference in cost 
of capital between Germany and South Africa. Using the index-based model proposed in paper 4 
as of January 2012, Germany’s equity IRR is estimated as 7.30 per cent and South Africa’s is 
estimated as 20.77 per cent
3
. Using financial modelling and publically available data for all key 
inputs, a required tariff rate is estimated to be €9.7c in South Africa and €6.3c in Germany. This 
represents a 54 per cent difference for the cost of wind-based electricity driven mainly by cost of 
capital implications that are in large part based on host country context.  
This paper contributes to the overall thesis by exploring the key financial considerations 
for renewable energy incentives in developed countries versus developing countries. It builds 
upon the proposed model in paper 4 to extrapolate a required electricity tariff rate with the ability 
to attract IPPs. The research provides a better understanding of how to maximise effectiveness 
and efficiency by setting a tariff that will minimise the cost of renewable energy but still entices 
IPPs to develop the renewable energy projects. Paper 5 contributes to answering the main 
research question by explaining how host country environment impacts financial considerations 
and how that in turn affects the overall cost of renewable energy. 
1.4  Theoretical Contribution 
This thesis constructs new knowledge through the identification and suggestion of “plausible 
connections and relationships that have not yet been glimpsed” (Van Maanen, Sørensen, & 
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Mitchell, 2007). I aim to make a theoretical contribution by filling the gap I have identified in the 
market-based environmental policy literature resulting from a relative absence of research in 
developing countries on what constitutes an effective host country environment for MBIs and the 
role of the state in ensuring success of MBIs. Corley and Gioia (2011) define theoretical 
contribution as “a significant theoretical advancement in our understanding of a phenomenon” 
(p. 12). In line with this definition I query the use of market-based environmental policy, 
specifically focusing on the function (effective as a means to an end as opposed to ineffective) 
and generalisation (general as opposed to local phenomenon) of MBIs within the context of the 
developing world (Davis, 1971).  
Policy makers and scholars have suggested that MBIs are an effective and efficient 
approach to reducing GHG emissions (Hahn & Stavins, 1991; Held, Ragwitz, & Haas, 2006; 
Sandor et al., 2002; Schmalensee & Stavins, 2012). However it is also assumed that the 
developing world lacks the necessary regulatory structures and enforcement capability to 
effectively administer an MBI (Aldy & Stavins, 2012a; Aldy, Ley, & Parry, 2008; Blackman & 
Harrington, 1989). I show that this assumption is too general and does not always hold true 
because MBIs are highly dependent on the specific host country context. Papers 1 and 2 argue 
that engagement with the CDM is linked to the host country priorities and requires alignment 
with local capabilities and capacity. Papers 4 and 5 make clear the relationship between the host 
country and cost of capital, which in turn affects efficiency and effectiveness of incentives for 
renewable energy promotion. Collectively these papers highlight that the success or failure of 
MBIs is closely aligned to the specific host country context.  
The empirical papers individually and collectively argue that MBIs cannot be 











regulatory structure is put in place to administer an MBI, as with the UNFCCC regulating the 
CDM, results are varied and inequitable. This highlights that customised MBIs are required for 
different country contexts. Paper 3 highlights that CDM uptake significantly relates to the overall 
level of development attained by the host country, while paper 5 shows how cost of capital 
within the host country significantly impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of promoting 
renewable energy.  
Collectively the papers show that a key factor influencing MBIs is the host countries’ 
level of statehood. This explains why the efficiency and effectiveness of MBIs is reliant on the 
overall host country context, and how the local framework either supports or hinders private 
sector involvement.  
1.5  Paradigm & Methodology 
The post-positivist ideological position is the underlying basic belief system that my research 
most closely adheres to (Cook & Campbell, 1979). This suggests that attaining knowledge about 
reality is always subject to falsification. As a result, it is necessary for findings to be “subjected 
to the widest possible critical examination to facilitate apprehending reality as closely as possible 
(but never perfectly)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). My worldview is also influenced by 
pragmatism, recognising that meaning is derived from the experiences that create the knowledge 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This thesis attempts to be persuasive and interesting by 
allowing the reader, as stated by Siggelkow (2007), “to see the world, and not just the literature, 
in a new way” (p. 21). The research is not confined to either qualitative or quantitative methods, 
allowing for the objective and research questions to determine the most appropriate method for 











The thesis as a whole uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) define the mixed methods approach as “the class of research where the 
researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, 
approaches, concepts or language into a single study” (p. 17). Yin (1981) asserts “the use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of 
research problems than either approach alone” (p. 62). Furthermore, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
(2004) highlight the advantages of a mixed method approach with the following comments: 
“It is an expansive and creative form of research, not a limiting form of research. 
It is inclusive, pluralistic, and complementary, and it suggests that researchers 
take an eclectic approach to method selection and the thinking about and conduct 
of research. What is most fundamental is the research question—research 
methods should follow research questions in a way that offers the best chance to 
obtain useful answers.” (pp. 17-18). 
The mixed method approach was deemed useful for this study because it does not limit the 
methods for fully understanding how and why the host country context affects MBIs. This is in 
line with Denzin’s (2010) mixed- and emergent-methods discourse, which highlights “the critical 
researcher, the bricoleur, the jack of all trades, produces a bricolage based on the use of many 
different interpretive practices and methodological tools” (p. 423). 
This thesis is ultimately a social science inquiry, whereby the case study method is used 
collectively across the five papers to expand the knowledge about how MBIs are emerging in 
SSA through a process of describing, understanding, and explaining. In addition, financial 
modelling techniques that extend beyond social science methods are applied (papers 3, 4 and 5) 











(2001) expand on the embedded case approach and its focus on a single multi-dimensional case 
with the following: 
“In an embedded case study, the starting and ending points are the comprehension 
of the case as a whole in its real-world context. However in the course of the 
analysis, the case will be faceted either by different perspectives of inquiry or by 
several subunits” (p. 2).  
The culmination is primarily an inductive, explanatory study of MBIs and their practical 
implementation, though paper 3 also uses deductive reasoning to test factors identified in papers 
1 and 2 and derived from the literature. The overarching embedded case study design focuses on 
two types of MBIs: 1) the CDM – an international mandated MBI; and 2) the promotion of grid-
connected renewable energy – a nationally mandated MBI. In order to purposefully build the 
theory, these two analytical case studies were drawn from a non-random theoretical sample 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). They were selected because they are MBIs currently being implemented on a 
large scale in SSA, with one mandated at the international level and the other at the national 
level. These two primary case studies serve as distinct analytic units that support the overall 
findings, and generalise my main conclusions (Yin, 1994).  
The theory I am attempting to build is “situated in and developed by recognizing patterns 
of relationships among constructs within and across cases and their underlying logical 
arguments” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). According to Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki 
(2008), “case studies are considered most appropriate as tools in the critical, early phases of a 
new management theory, when key variables and their relationships are being explored” (p. 
1465). Considering the emerging stage of MBI development in developing countries, the case 











The thesis arguments are structured within five empirical papers, each engaging the main 
research question from a different but complementary viewpoint. Figure 1.2 outlines the broad 
methodologies adopted within each of the five papers. 
Figure 1.2: Thesis Methodologies – Collective and Individual Papers 
 
 
Papers 1 and 2 both use a comparative cross country case study approach to specifically 
address the research sub-questions pertaining to CDM performance and key considerations 
influencing utilisation. As discussed in Section 1.4, South Africa is first compared to CDM 
leader China in paper 1, then to LDC Zambia in order to inductively explore the CDM. Paper 3 
utilises a quantitative methodology to show the emerging relationship between levelised CDM 
utilisation and the underlying host country macro indicators. This engages specifically with the 
sub-question asking what country macro indicators influence the utilisation of the CDM. Viewed 
as a collective sub-unit, papers 1, 2, and 3 provide a depiction of how the CDM has been applied 
and the challenges it has faced. 
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Papers 4 and 5 combine to explain how renewable energy promotion is developing in 
South Africa, and specifically how financing considerations inherent to the host country 
significantly impact renewable energy promotion. Paper 4 requires a quantitative method to 
determine the cost of equity financing in South Africa specific to renewable energy. The 
proposed index model to determine cost of equity capital is necessary to perform the comparative 
case study of paper 5 between South Africa and Germany, a developed country acknowledged as 
a world leader in renewable energy promotion. Paper 5 specifically engages the subordinate 
research questions to explore the key considerations for renewable energy promotion in 
developed countries versus developing countries, using cost differential between electricity 
supplied by renewable energy sources and the existing tariff structure as the key example. The 
mixed method approach inherent to papers 4 and 5 results in an analysis of how the underlying 
host country environment significantly impacts the cost and effectiveness of renewable energy 
promotion.  
Specific data collection methods are explained within each of the five empirical papers. 
First of all, an extensive literature and document review was conducted as a means of exploring 
and understanding the current discussions around the CDM and renewable energy promotion, 
both globally and specifically to SSA. The use of multiple data sources was employed to 
triangulate key points and enhanced the validation process by ensuring that weaknesses inherent 
in one approach were counterbalanced via strengths in another (Denzin, 1989; Jick, 1979). To 
mitigate the bias that is associated with interviews, the research used numerous and highly 
knowledgeable informants who viewed and understood MBIs from multiple different 











used to validate data from interviews and relevant literature. Figure 1.3 illustrates the 
triangulation process embedded within this data collection approach. 
Figure 1.3: Data Collection Triangulation 
 
 
The qualitative data sources used throughout the thesis include the following:  
1. All relevant documents were reviewed, including policy documents, feasibility reports, 
environmental impact assessments (specific to renewable energy projects in South Africa), 
CDM project design documents including all South African renewable energy projects and 
available financial models via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) website, reports, meeting notes and position papers, with specific focus 
placed on CDM projects (located in SSA and China) and renewable energy projects (located 
in South Africa and Germany). Statistics were also used from the UNFCCC website (papers 
1, 2), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Risøe CDM project pipeline 











Data (paper 4). Documents and archival data were located from publically available 
databases and sourced from interviewees. All documents have been cited and referenced in 
the empirical papers. 
2. Key informant interviews (papers 1, 2, 5). Interviews with respondents with considerable 
knowledge of the CDM or renewable energy promotion were targeted to gain further insight 
into the perspective of elite stakeholders for papers 1, 2 and 5 (Welch, Marschanpiekkari, 
Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002). To identify interviewees, a list of key CDM stakeholders 
was compiled from CDM association lists, project documents, CDM analysis reports and 
climate related conference proceedings. Furthermore, asking each contacted interviewee for 
additional referrals for information rich key informants proved effective (Mason, 2002; 
Welch et al., 2002). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with open-ended questions to 
give the interviewee the latitude to fully articulate their responses (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002). The interviews focused on a set of targeted questions developed from the literature 
and document review and allowed for elaboration by the interviewee to facilitate discussions 
on a wide range of issues pertinent to the research (Bernard, 2005; Bryman, 1992). To gain 
numerous perspectives, interviews were conducted with government officials, academic 
researchers and private sector representatives, including investors, service providers, CDM 
project developers and IPPs. A list of all interviews, including place and dates, are included 
in Table 1.2.  
3. Observation and analysis of the CDM and renewable energy activities is another source of 
data incorporated in all five papers. Informal discussions and experiences with CDM and 
renewable energy projects in South Africa and Zambia provided insights into practical MBI 











two wind energy projects under development in the Eastern Cape of South Africa (both also 
having applied for CDM), as well as access to the first registered CDM project in Zambia. 
Table 1.2: List of Interviews 
Paper Interviewee Perspective Date Place 
1 & 2 Albrecht Van Ruffen, 
Manager, N-Serve 
Carbon Consulting 




1 & 2 Anton-Lewis Oliver, 





1 & 2 Ed Gluckman, Managing 












1 & 2 Steve Thorne, Director, 
South South North 
CDM Consultant,  
27.11.2009 Cape Town, SA 
1 & 2 Lindiwe Chauke, 








1 & 2 Mandy Rambakos, 
Sustainability Director, 
ESKOM  




1 & 2 Terry Carter, Exclusive 





1 & 2 
Konrad Reuss, Manager, 













1 & 2 Randall Spalding-Fecher, 
Consultant, ECON  
CDM Consultant, 
Researcher 30.11.2009 Cape Town, SA 











2 Julius Daka, 
Environmental Council 
of Zambia (ECZ) 
Government 
Official 15.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
















2 Dr. Mclay Kanyangarara, 





16.06.2010  Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Assan Ng'ombe, 





16.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Nkusuwila Silomba, 
Development Officer, 





16.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Ian Mackintosh, 
Technical Director, 
Zambian Breweries 
Group – Carbon Project 
Project Owner 
17.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 






17.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Professor Francis 
Yamba, Managing 
Director, Centre for 
Energy Environment and 
Engineering  
Researcher 
18.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Dr. Julius Kaoma, 
Manager, Universal 
Mining and Chemical 
Industries Limited 
Project Owner 
19.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Frederick Mulenga, 
Senior Forestry Officer, 




19.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 




20.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 




22.06.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Lemmy Namayanga, 
National CDM Capacity 
Building Expert, Climate 
Change Facilitation Unit  
Government 
Official 
03.08.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Charles Hayward, 
Dunavant Cotton, 
Project Owner 











Operations Director  
1 & 2 Kai Windhorst, Unique 
Forestry, Forestry and 
Carbon Consultant 
CDM Consultant 
04.08.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Gracious Hamatala, 
Dunavant Cotton, Yield 
Programme Manager 
Project Owner 
05.08.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
1 & 2 Neeta Hooda, 
Programme Officer, The 
BioCarbon Fund, World 
Bank 
CDM Investor 
05.08.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 
2 Rob Munro, Manager, 
PROFIT Project 
NGO  
05.08.2010 Lusaka, Zambia 








1 & 2 Ellysar Baroudy, 
Director, The BioCarbon 





1 Michael Van der Meer, 






1 & 2 Anthony Mills, Director, 
AfriCarbon Ltd  
Researcher 
28.03.2011 Cape Town 






2 Søren Lütken, 





2 Andrea Di Angelis, 








2 Anonymous, Developer 













2 Madeleine Rawlins, 
Global Qualifications 
Director, Camco Carbon 
Developer 





2 Massimiliano Varrucciu, 
China Representative, 















2 Stephanie Kwan, 
Manager, Sindicatum 
Carbon Capital 
CDM Consultant / 
Project developer 9.04.2011 
Telephonic – 
Beijing 
5 Klaus Jacob, Free 
University Berlin 
CDM Investor / 
Project manager 
13.10.2011 Berlin, Germany 
5 Dr. Martin Frick, 
Manager, E3G 
Policy Analyst 
21.10.2011 Berlin, Germany 
5 Felix Groba & Johann 
Diekmann, DIW 
Policy Analyst 
18.10.2011 Berlin Germany 











Developer 04.05.2012 Cape Town 




Developer 10.05.2012 Cape Town 
5 Jon Duncan, CSR 





31.05.2012 Cape Town 




21.06.2012 Cape Town 
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Once initial data was collected for each specific paper, the detailed notes from the 
interviews and document review were analysed and grouped according to broad concepts. The 
coding process highlighted emerging themes in the interviews and data, as well as suggested the 
need for additional data. This primary and secondary data gave rise to the theoretical 











workshops and informal interaction with project developers were useful to triangulate the data. 
Table 1.3 lists the conferences and workshops that were attended as part of the overall research 
and data collection.  
Table 1.3: Conferences and Workshops 
Conference/Workshop Place Date 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties 15  Copenhagen, Denmark December 2009 
Carbon Expo 2010  Cologne, Germany May 2010 
Global Conference on Environmental 
Governance and Democracy  
New, Haven, Connecticut, 
USA 
September 2010 
World Bank GHG Mitigation through 
Agricultural Management in Developing 
Countries Workshop  
Washington DC, USA September 2010 
Carbon Markets and their Future: A Social 
Science Perspective Workshop  
Hamburg, Germany November 2010 
Southern African Designated National 
Authority Training Workshop on Issues of 
Carbon Finance and Climate Change  
Livingstone, Zambia February 2011 
Carbon Expo 2011  Barcelona, Spain May 2011 
Association of Environmental Studies and 
Sciences Annual Conference  
Burlington, Vermont, USA June 2011 
FAO Smallholder Mitigation: Whole Farm 
and Landscape Accounting Workshop  
Rome, Italy October 2011 
The Business of Social and Environmental 
Innovation Conference  
Cape Town, South Africa November 2011 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties 17  Durban, South Africa December 2011 
The Business and Governance of Climate 
Change Workshop 
Cape Town, South Africa April 2012 
The International Energy Workshop  Cape Town, South Africa June 2012 
Academy of Management Annual 
Conference 
Boston, Massachusetts, USA August 2012 
Hydropower Africa and Solar Energy 
Africa Conference  
Cape Town, South Africa September 2012 
The Business of Social and Environmental 
Innovation Conference  
Cape Town, South Africa October 2012 
 
Quantitative methods were also employed to further understand the role of MBIs. The 
quantitative analysis in paper 3 uses macro country indicators (each explained in detail in table 











Paper 4 uses a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to propose an index-based model for 
estimating cost of capital in South Africa (Sharpe, 1964). The CAPM model was selected for its 
simplicity and strong theoretical foundation, both key reasons for its widespread use in practice 
(Kaplan and Peterson, 1998). More specifically, it is an effective mechanism to calculate the 
discount rate required for South African renewable energy projects.  
The data used for this are publically available market data, all data is explained in detail 
in Tables 1-5 of paper 4. Lastly, in order to compare wind energy projects in South Africa to 
Germany, publically available data regarding costs of wind farms was utilised in order to make 
an accurate estimation of the cost of wind power in both countries. All data is fully explained and 
referenced in paper 5.  
1.6  Relevance & Rigour  
This thesis is relevant per the definition proposed by Straw (1994), “from a research perspective, 
relevance comes closer to depicting the importance of a finding or idea for the advancement of 
knowledge” (p. 86). The intent is for the research to advance knowledge by making a theoretical 
contribution that has practical implications to further low carbon development in the primary 
study area of SSA, and more broadly throughout the developing world. This thesis is anticipated 
to be of relevance to policy makers, academics and private sector practitioners engaged in 
economic and developmental advancement in SSA. Policy makers, both at the international and 
national level, will find the research of use because it provides a better understanding of the 
relationship between host country context and MBIs. This is useful for future climate change 
policy because it helps to show how specific incentive mechanisms need to be in developing 
countries. Lastly, private sector actors will find this research useful because it identifies and 











be useful for project developers to better understand appropriate benchmarks for evaluating 
renewable energy projects in developing countries.  
There exists within this thesis, as with nearly all research endeavours, degrees of freedom 
that render multiple predictions possible (Campbell, 1975). To demonstrate that the research is 
rigorous, the traditional measures of validity (internal, construct, external) and reliability are 
discussed (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Campbell, 1975). In the remainder of this section the 
question ‘What passes as a rigorous case study?’ (Gibbert et al., 2008) is used as the framework 
to discuss how rigour was purposefully built into the research design.  
Internal validity questions if “logical reasoning is powerful and compelling enough to 
defend the research conclusions” (Gibbert et al., 2008, p. 1446). To ensure internal validity 
within this thesis, a clear overall research framework is established in which the five papers all 
contribute to addressing the main research question. The embedded case studies formed by the 
five empirical papers provide a comprehensive analysis of MBIs from both the internationally 
and nationally mandated perspectives. A logical progression was followed, whereby the previous 
one informed each subsequent paper, and the emerging theory continually refined as more 
information became available and incorporated into the overall body or research (Eisenhardt, 
1989). For instance, papers 1 and 2 used qualitative, inductive reasoning to highlight host 
country indicators that influenced CDM utilisation. These variables were cross-referenced with 
the academic literature and then the suggested relationships explored using quantitative 
hypothesis testing. Paper 5 was also developed by following a logical progression. It uses the 
index-model approach proposed in paper 4 to estimate the equity cost of capital, a key variable 











“Construct validity refers to the extent to which a study investigates what it claims to 
investigate, that is, to the extent to which a procedure leads to an accurate observation or reality” 
(Gibbert et al., 2008, p. 1466). To address this, I verified with interviewees that the conclusions 
reached during the interview were factually correct and in line with the intention of the 
respondent. This verification process occurred at the end of each interview and draft manuscripts 
of the papers were sent to respondents who agreed to review. Furthermore, “different data 
collection strategies and different data sources” were sought to triangulate in order to enhance 
construct validity (Gibbert et al., 2008, p. 1468). Interview notes were cross-referenced with key 
reference materials pertaining to the status of the CDM (primarily publically available 
documentation from UNFCCC) and official documents relating to the evolving REIPPP process 
in South Africa.  
In the case of paper 5, the competitive bidding nature of the REIPPP in South Africa 
restricts the amount of information project developers and financiers were willing to share. As a 
result this had to be addressed to ensure what was being measured, specifically within the 
renewable energy analysis was valid. For example, reliable financial data regarding project 
finance and funding sources were difficult to obtain for review as it is not typically in the public 
domain. Steps were taken to overcome this problem by using a hypothetical financial model and 
verifying critical assumptions to the model via key informant interviews and publically available 
datasets. For example, CDM project design documents are publically available, all project 
documents and accompanying financial models for renewable energy in SSA were reviewed to 
verify my financial model inputs and assumptions. This allowed me to construct a valid and 
reliable depiction of the practical reality without infringing on sensitive competitive information 











External validity is the overall ability to generalise the research results. Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) state that, “central to building theory from case studies is replication logic” (p. 
25). Within case study research, this refers to the accuracy of the generalisation as it moves from 
empirical observations to theory (Yin, 1994). This is particularly important to because it has been 
acknowledged that comparing across countries with significantly different political, institutional 
and economic context can have limitations and potentially result in weak generalisations (Yin, 
1981; Miles, 1979). To address, the thesis research employs the mixed method approach and 
provides a detailed analysis of MBIs from numerous points of view to increase external validity. 
Different frames of analysis include the qualitative comparisons of the same MBI across 
different countries (paper 1, 2 and 5), quantitatively assessing the utility of the CDM (paper 3) 
and using existing market data to estimate cost of capital for renewable energy (paper 4). The 
CDM and promotion of wind energy were selected as subset case studies because they are 
practical examples providing different viewpoints of MBIs, the former being mandated and 
funded by developed countries and the later being domestically mandated and funded.  
Steps were also put in place to reduce systematic and random error to increase overall 
reliability of this research. All research, both qualitative and quantitative, was carefully 
documented to ensure that the analysis could be easily traced and steps replicated. Each paper 
explains key assumptions and the process that generated the findings. Document analysis is also 
carefully referenced to ensure all inferences drawn from materials can be traced to the original 
source. A database of all relevant documents and interview notes, including notebooks on 
observations, has been maintained throughout the entire research process. All interviewees were 











Furthermore, a draft manuscript of each paper has been presented at a conference or 
workshop for peer feedback to further validate the findings. Table 1.4 highlights the conference 
and date that each paper has been presented. 
Table 1.4: Paper Presentations 
Paper Conference Place Date 
Paper 1 Global Conference on Environmental 




Paper 2 Carbon Markets and their Future: A 




Paper 3 The Business of Social and Environmental 




Paper 4 International Energy Workshop Cape Town, 
South Africa 
June 2012 
Paper 5 Business and Governance of Climate 





1.7 Assumptions and Limitations 
There are a number of key assumptions inherent to this thesis. I assume that the interviewees 
willingly provide accurate information with only the intention to contribute to the theoretical and 
practical knowledge of this research. This assumption is based on both the REIPPP programme 
in South Africa and the CDM being competitive amongst private sector participants, therefore I 
assume the interview responses did not include any inaccurate information with the objective of 
increasing competitive positioning.  
From a technical standpoint, within the current state of affairs low carbon development is 
assumed to have incremental costs (actual or perceived) over and above traditional business as 
usual approaches. This is important because the incremental cost is a main reason why incentives 











Furthermore, there are limitations that influence the validity and reliability of the 
research. The reliability hinges on accurate and complete information being accessible. Within 
this thesis, accessing such information is predicated on availability to key informants within 
national governments, international organisations and the private sector and the interviewees 
accurately portraying the relevant information. As discussed previously, this was not always the 
case due to the competitive nature of the REIPPP and steps were put in place to address this 
limitation. Moreover, the research topic is evolving as the research is taking place. This 
represents a challenge in terms of being able to replicate the study results, because policy 
changes will continue to change the underlying setting. To address this, the data collection has 
been fully documented and triangulated (see figure 1.3) to present an accurate depiction of MBIs 
in SSA at the point in time of the research.  
Lastly, I have practical experience working with MBIs in SSA, and in consulting across 
the climate change and development space. This is a positive background in terms of access and 
knowledge of the sector, but it is also a limitation in terms of pre-existing impressions. As a 
result, throughout the research I have been cognizant of the potential for the research to be 
influenced or biased by my preconceived notions from past and ongoing professional 
experiences.  
1.8   Conceptual Framework 
The following outline attempts to describe, understand and explain how this thesis explores the 
role of MBIs in developing countries. Figure 1.4 is the schematic outline of the thesis that 
illustrates the iterative nature of the research and how the motivation and objective are informed 
by the theory. The research questions are an expression of the objective, which is a product of 











the case studies in a continual refinement process that evolves as more information becomes 
available. From this process the findings and synthesis combine to provide a theoretical 












Figure 1.4: Thesis Schematic Outline 
 
The remaining sections of this thesis are structured in the following manner. Section 2 provides a 
detailed discussion and critical review of the relevant literature, including market-based 
environmental policy and governance in areas of limited statehood. The overall intent of the 
literature review is to describe how the research questions are embedded within this debate and 
capable to make a theoretical contribution to the conversation. Section 3 presents the full 
empirical papers. Section 4 is the discussion of the empirical papers. The overall theoretical 
contribution and the policy implications are discussed. Section 5 provides a concluding summary 











1.9   Research Ethics 
I confirm that this thesis conforms to the research ethics required by the University of Cape 
Town’s Graduate School of Business and the Commerce Faculty. Consent for participation in 
this research was clearly explained and obtained from all participants (interviews, observation, 
sensitive document review). The confidentiality of all sensitive data and information has been 
fully protected as specified by participants. Per PhD Rule 6.3I of the University of Cape Town 
Handbook 3 – I confirm this contribution is my original work, and I have acknowledged any and 
all extracts from the work of others. Lastly, I certify that the thesis is an honest and accurate 















2.0   Literature Review  
The aim of this section is to provide a review of the literature on market-based environmental 
policy and governance in areas of limited statehood. In accordance with the structure of this 
thesis, further literature review of the specific MBI mechanisms explored is included in the 
empirical papers.  
2.1  Market-Based Incentives for Environmental Protection 
The primary goal of environmental protection is to ensure a safe and liveable environment for all 
(Parry et al., 2007). To achieve this, pollution needs to be limited to tolerable and sustainable 
levels without stifling societal development. Broadly, the academic literature contributing to the 
theory of market-based environmental policy is focused on finding efficient and effective ways 
to deal with pollution deemed unfavourable to society.  
Firstly, in order to fully discuss market-based environmental policy it is necessary to take 
a step back to review the history of the theory within academic literature. As far back as the late 
nineteenth century, Sidgwick (1887) wrote “there are some utilities which, from their nature, are 
practically incapable of being appropriated by those who produce them or would otherwise be 
willing to purchase them” (p. 406). This is of relevance, even to the contemporary debate 
regarding global climate change, because Sidgwick continued with an example that keeping up 
forests has a known benefit to rainfall, in his words “the advantage is one which private 
enterprise has no tendency to provide; since no one could appropriate and sell improvements in 
climate” (Sidgwick, 1887, p. 407). From this he outlines an underlying problem that market-











“private enterprise may sometimes be socially uneconomical because the 
undertaker is able to appropriate not less but more than the whole net gain to the 
community of his enterprise; for he may be able to appropriate the main part of 
the gain of a change causing both gain and loss, while the concomitant loss falls 
entirely upon others” (Sidgwick, 1887, p. 408) 
Pigou (1920) followed by introducing the concept of ‘incidental disservices’, defined as 
situations in which “marginal private net product is greater than marginal social net product”
4
 (p. 
139). Sidgwick’s above inference and Pigou’s concept of incidental disservices encompass what 
is commonly referred to as negative externalities. Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2004) further define 
externality as “an economically significant effect of an activity, the consequences of which are 
borne (at least in part) by a party or parties other than the party who controls the externality-
producing activity” (p.37). Externalities are important because without proper regulation they 
have the potential to become, to varying degrees, market failures that contribute to the 
deterioration of our natural environment. In what can be seen as coming full circle to Sidgwick’s 
ideas, a century later Stewart (1991) summarises how, in theory, externalities can result in 
market failures with the following:  
“Private market decision makers also often ignore the social and environmental 
impacts of their actions. Many markets provide incentives to producers of goods 
and services to satisfy consumers' desires, but fail to incorporate in the prices of 
producers' production inputs and commodity outputs the environmental costs that 
                                                        
4
 Marginal social net product is defined by Pigou (1920) as the “total net product of physical things or objective 
services due to the marginal increment of resources in any given use or place, no matter to whom any part of this 
product may accrue.” The marginal private net product is defined with the example “i.e. prior to sale—to the person 











the polluter, as well as other negative effects of resource use, impose on society at 
large” (pp. 549–550). 
Over the years, much of the debate has focused on how to address externalities in an 
efficient and effective manner. Numerous theories have been put forth for consideration because 
when it comes to protecting the environment “the decision problem actually faced by policy 
makers is more complex, involving tradeoffs among multiple objectives and real and frequently 
binding constraints” (Hahn & Stavins, 1991, p. 2). This makes clear that environmental 
protection measures must be viewed in relation to all other pressing concerns and priorities 
facing policy and decision makers. What have emerged are the two main policy options for 
addressing externalities, CaC instruments and MBIs, with hybrids of the two falling in between. 
Next a brief summary of CaC instruments is provided, as they are the often-cited alternative to 
MBIs.  
CaC instruments are characterised by “performance standards, such as requirements that 
firms not emit more than specified amounts of pollutants per unit of economic activity; and 
technology standards, such as requirements that particular industrial equipment or processes be 
employed” (Jaffe & Stavins, 1995, p. 45). Theoretically, performance and technology standards 
are meant to allow polluters flexibility in meeting the prescribed standard, however in reality the 
onus of demonstrating compliance usually limits the options to mitigate pollution to particular 
technologies (Stewart, 1991).  
CaC measures are often criticised because they are perceived to produce “uniform, 
inflexible standards that result in high compliance costs, restrict innovation, discourage efficient 
use of resources, and require detailed central planning of economic activity” (Stewart, 1991, p. 











standards have been effective in achieving some established environmental goals and standards, 
they tend to lead to non-cost-effective outcomes in which some firms use unduly expensive 
means to control pollution” (p. 45). Furthermore, CaC instruments have also been criticised as 
too authoritarian, lacking the “incentives for firms to go beyond the level of abatement stipulated 
by the regulation” (Rivers & Jaccard, 2006, p. 224).  
CaC was the instrument of choice for environmental regulation until approximately thirty 
years ago when market-based environmental policy started to gain prominence as a practical 
alternative to CaC (Hahn, 1989; Huber, Ruitenbeek, & Seroa da Motta, 1998; Jaffe & Stavins, 
1995). Within the literature and practice, there was a growing consensus that MBIs (including 
taxes, marketable permits and subsidies) are more effective and efficient than other policy 
options (Aldy & Stavins, 2012; Schmalensee & Stavins, 2012; Sandor, Bettelheim, & 
Swingland, 2002; Stavins, 1997). MBIs fundamentally differ from CaC instruments in that they 
attempt to “alter price signals to ensure that polluters face direct cost incentives to control 
emissions” (Stavins, 1997, p. 6). In theory, efficiency and effectiveness are achieved “because 
these market-based instruments have the effect of inducing decision-making units (typically 
firms) to choose control levels at which their marginal abatement costs are the same, overall 
pollution abatement costs will, in theory, be minimized” (Stavins, 1997, p. 6). The end goal of 
this approach is to maximise the difference between social benefits and social costs, which is 
intriguing to economists, as well as policy and decision makers attempting to prioritise protecting 
the environment in relation to all other societal needs and priorities.  
Pigou (1920) is often credited with starting the market-based environmental policy 
discussion by suggesting that pollution could be effectively dealt with by applying corrective 











environmental taxes have been coined, should be applied “at a rate equal to the pollutant’s 
marginal environmental damages” (Fullerton, 2001, p. 225). Subsequent neoliberal critics of 
Pigou’s neoclassical argument point to its lack of practical utility and believe the interventions 
proposed are unnecessary. Critics claim Pigou’s analysis relies on the theoretical situation of 
perfect competition and proposes an optimal allocation of resources which is effectively 
impossible to calculate in reality (Baumol & Oates, 1971; Baumol, 1972). This is further 
illustrated by Knight’s (1924) critique of Pigou’s work as too simplistic because “assumptions 
diverge in essential respects from the facts of real economic situations” (p. 586). He continues to 
point out that this field is highly subjective because determining the precise externality amount, 
producer and appropriate distribution “belongs to ethics as much as to economics” (Knight, 
1924, p. 583).  
In response to the initial criticism of Pigou, the theoretical discussion has tended to 
evolve toward practical application in order to engage what Knight (1924) called real economic 
situations. Of particular interest to this thesis is the contribution by Meade (1952) in the article 
titled ‘External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation’. In this influential 
article Meade distinguishes between various types of externalities and the respective return to 
individual industry and society. His analysis explores the utility of MBIs across different 
scenarios. First he explores external economies and institutional constraints arising from unpaid 
factors of production, using the well known example of the market failing occurring between 
bee-keeping and apple-growing because the full value of services incidentally provided to one or 
the other external economy is not accounted for and therefore unpaid (Meade, 1952). 
Theoretically incentives can address this type of market failure and it does not pose a problem to 











debated, from highlighting that an unpaid factor by one party can be considered an ownership 
externality (Bator, 1958), to disputing Meade’s underlying conjecture that these failings may be 
rectified through a “political market in the form of corrective taxes, subsidies or other regulatory 
activities” (Johnson, 1973, p. 50).  
Secondly, Meade extends the focus from market players to the precise physical and social 
impacts of collective market activity with the description that an “atmosphere is a fixed condition 
of production which remains unchanged for all producers in the industry in question without 
anyone else doing anything about it” (Meade, 1952, p. 61). To clarify this point, Meade 
leverages Sidgwick’s foreboding forestry example to demonstrate how afforestation is beneficial 
to rainfall, and therefore contributes to an atmosphere that is equally positive or negative, to all 
farmers within the specific region. The key distinction from the unpaid factor example is that 
“the subsidies (or taxes) required to promote (or discourage) the creation of favourable (or 
unfavourable) atmosphere are net additions to (or subtractions from) society’s general fiscal 
burden” (Meade, 1952, p. 67). Meade makes a powerful point that is analogous to the present 
day challenge of global climate change, where activities such as fossil fuel based power 
generation and land-use change are considered a negative burden to Meade’s theoretical 
atmosphere and our actual atmosphere.  
Meade’s contribution is significant to market-based environmental policy because it 
distinguishes between differing externality scenarios and persuasively suggests that different 
approaches to address each situation are necessary. Meade (1952) concludes that “external 
economies or diseconomies may not fall into either of these precise divisions and may contain 
features of both of them” (p. 67), which serves as a warning against broad generalisation and the 











Coase (1960) further contributes to market-based environmental policy by challenging 
the view that any measure to remove perceived externalities is unequivocally desirable, 
indirectly highlighting the necessity of efficiency and effectiveness. The Coase theorem, as it is 
coined, “is considered by many to provide the theoretical underpinning for ‘free-market’ 
solutions to environmental problems” (Hahnel & Sheeran, 2009, p. 215). Coase advocates for a 
free market, property rights approach for solving negative environmental externalities, whereby 
bargaining between the affected parties can be an efficient solution, assuming transaction costs 
are negligible. Coase promotes the need for evaluating externalities in its entirety to determine 
the reciprocal nature of the problem. He implies that this may assist in avoiding the creation of a 
problem worse than the one being fixed. Coase (1960) concludes with a word of caution that 
when dealing with externalities “we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the 
various social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or of a government 
department), as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system” (p. 44).  
Building on Coase’s argument, Kapp (1963) argues that institutional arrangements give 
rise to the social costs caused by externalities, and therefore can be addressed by institutional 
reform and economic policy. Next, Dales (1968) proposed transferable ‘pollution rights’ be 
issued by government and sold to the highest bidder, thereby putting a market value on pollution 
to further environmental protection at a lower overall cost than standard CaC instruments. The 
idea is to put a price on the right to pollute via tradable permits to ensure that “pollution most 
cheaply avoided would be prevented, and the most expensive to control suffered” (Winch, 1969, 
p. 323). This is a key contribution because it is seen as the theoretical underpinning for 











A persuasive case has also been made for the flexibility of MBIs to catalyse technological 
innovation. Porter and van der Linde (1995) find that well designed incentives can trigger 
innovation offsets that can typically cover the cost of compliance. Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 
(2004) also make the case that MBIs “foster cost-effective technology innovation and diffusion” 
(p. 35). MBIs, it is explained, can provide a strong incentive for the private sector to adopt better 
pollution controls if sufficient low-cost technology or processes are available and can be adopted 
(Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2002).  
The preference for MBIs gained further support by the well-documented United States 
emissions trading mechanism put in place to address sulphur dioxide (SO2) pollution. The SOx 
market, as it was called, was so successful that it decreased SO2 emissions by 43 per cent 
between 1990 and 2007 at one quarter the original cost estimates (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1998; 
Lazarowicz, 2009, p. 7). This lent a practical example to the preference for market mechanisms. 
However, subsequent research has called into doubt the apparent success of emission trading 
schemes including the SOx market (Lane, 2012; Lohmann et al., 2005). Recent research has 
further pointed out that much of cost-efficiency of the SOx market was the unanticipated result 
of unrelated events such as prior railroad deregulation (Schmalansee and Stavins, 2012).  
Subsequent to the perceived success of the SOx market, the Kyoto Protocol adapted a 
market-based approach to reduce GHG emissions via the UNFCCC. GHG emissions pose a 
particularly vexing problem to address and assign accountability because “climate change is truly 
a global commons problem. The location of emissions of GHGs has no effect on the global 
distribution of damages" (Stavins, 1997, p. 7). To address this in an equitable manner, the Kyoto 
Protocol is based upon a principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ where 











and therefore responsible to take the lead in addressing climate change (UNFCCC, 1997). A two-
tiered system has been put in place with differing roles and responsibilities for industrialised 
nations and developing countries. Industrialised countries are legally bound to reduce their 
carbon emissions as measured in 1990 below an agreed upon amount, known as the countries 
cap. Countries are incentivised to reduce below their cap by being allowed to sell any emission 
reductions below their cap, denominated in tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e). Developing 
countries are not legally bound to reduce their emissions but are nevertheless eligible to create 
project-based emission offsets to be sold to industrialised countries under the CDM.  
The CDM was established as a MBI with the dual objective of helping developing 
countries achieve sustainable development while lowering their business as usual emissions, and 
assisting industrialized countries to meet emission reduction commitments. Under the CDM, 
projects that reduce GHG emissions and contribute to sustainable development, as defined by 
each participating country, can generate CERs, a tradable permit in the international carbon 
markets. The CDM can effectively be thought of as a ‘Pigouvian’ subsidy used to price carbon 
via a market-based instrument. Overall, CDM has been effective in the creation of emission 
reduction credits, evidenced by over one billion credits being issued by developing countries by 
the end of 2012 (UNFCCC, 2012). However, the CDM has also been criticised for being limited 
in geographic distribution (Boyd et al., 2009; Byigero, Clancy, & Skutsch, 2010), insufficient in 
achieving environmental aims (Lohmann, 2008), inadequate in achieving its stated sustainable 
development objective (Pearson, 2007) and fraught with corruption (Bond, 2012; Böhm, 2009). 
Moreover, research that explores CDM from a political economy perspective points out that, 
“offsetting produces highly unequal geographies that link permits to pollute and international 











reduction projects in the South” (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, 9.147). Newell (2012) 
emphasises the role of power in creating the geographical inequity by stating, “the politics and 
organization of carbon markets also need to change to ensure that finance flows to projects, 
sectors and regions where it is most needed, where alternatives do not exist, and where support 
will likely enable lower carbon transitions” (p. 138). Papers 1, 2, and 3 provide further review of 
literature specific to the CDM.  
Similar to the internationally mandated CDM, domestic incentives to promote renewable 
power generation have also gained theoretical and practical prominence. The rationale for 
renewable energy promotion, especially in developing countries, is based more on the need for 
economic development, job creation and energy security than emission reductions (Sawin, 2006). 
A number of strategies have been implemented to promote renewable energy, each requiring 
significant involvement by the state. To this end, an ongoing debate over which approach is the 
most competent focuses on price versus demand strategies (Blackman & Harrington, 1999; Haas 
et al., 2004). Core to the argument is the acknowledgement of the need to, “offer a reasonable 
risk-return ratio to investors and … minimise the total costs for society” (von Flotow & Friebe, 
2011, p. 9).  
Price driven strategies are characterised by the state setting a price that is intended to 
reduce uncertainty and promote renewable energy development. The most commonly used price 
strategy is the REFiT, whereby “utilities must purchase all renewable power for sale and in 
return receive a premium” (Huang & Wu, 2011, p. 1). The acceptance of REFiT, primarily in 
industrialised countries, is evidenced by the fact that by 2012, “65 countries have implemented 
some form of a REFiT, driving 64 per cent of global wind installations and 87 per cent of global 











demand driven strategy. An example is the state imposing a quota system similar to emission 
trading, whereby electricity suppliers are required to generate a certain amount of renewable 
energy, or buy tradable permits sometimes called renewable energy credits (Menanteau, et al., 
2003). Literature regarding renewable energy promotion is explored in further detail in Section 3 
(papers 4 and 5).  
 Market-based environmental policy has increasingly moved into practice and the 
literature has also veered toward a practical persuasion with the focus on global climate change. 
How to address GHG emissions has become the prominent topic within the climate change 
debate. There has been an increase in academic literature regarding environmental policy from 
the “sudden interest by mainstream economists in environmental issues brought about by 
concerns regarding global climate change” (Hahn & Stavins, 1991, p. 4). Evaluating and 
comparing price (e.g. taxes or subsidies) versus quantity (e.g. standards and caps) instruments is 
the focal point. Nearly forty years ago Weitzman (1974) asked the following question that has 
come to dominate the literature, “is it better to fix the total amount by a quantity or price control 
mode?” (p. 490). His contribution attempts to ascertain which method is superior for 
“implementing a plan” and recognises “in the presence of uncertainty, price and quantity 
instruments transmit central control in quite different modes” (Weitzman, 1974, p. 482). A key 
takeaway from Weitzman’s work is that the treatment (policy instrument) significantly depends 
on the ailment (type of pollutant).  
Stavins has been central in shaping the debate while maintaining a rather agnostic stance 
toward the question posed by Weitzman (Hahn & Stavins, 1991; Stavins, 1998; Stavins, 1997). 
Aldy and Stavins (2012a) summarise attributes between the primary two options of price or 











because it provides more certainty regarding costs, however neither provide the same level of 
environmental effectiveness as the emissions trading approach which constrains total emissions 
by supplying a limited number of tradable permits. Others have contributed by demonstrating 
situations where one instrument proves more effective than the other. For example Newell and 
Pizer (2003) advocate for price instruments to deal with CO2 build up over time. Parry and 
Williams (1999) claim, “the superiority of emission taxes and emission permits over other 
instruments can hinge on whether these policies generate revenues that are used to reduce other 
distortionary taxes” (p. 347). In another example, Hahn and Stavins provide the stark reminder 
that “not all systems are feasible in a technical, legal, economic, or political sense” (1991, p. 4). 
Aldy and Stavins (2012) further point out that economic considerations are not the sole 
determinate in a course of action with the statement, “political-economy implications of the costs 
associated with various policy instruments give public officials strong incentive to identify and 
select policies and instruments with minimal perceived costs” (pp. 54-55). Again, similar to the 
initial environmental policy literature, the more contemporary research also highlights that there 
is no one-size-fits all solution to addressing environmental problems.  
An acknowledged blind spot in MBI literature is that it has been primarily focused on 
developed countries that have the capabilities to implement and enforce environmental 
regulation (Aldy & Stavins, 2012a; Aldy et al., 2008). Hahn and Stavins (1991) recognise the 
potential limitations inherent to developing countries administering and enforcing MBIs, and 
suggest “the design of incentive-based instruments that require less administrative expertise and 
fewer resources to implement could facilitate more and better applications” (p. 14).  
The lack of MBI research within the context of developing countries is not a trivial 











and liveable climate is to be maintained, then efficient and effective mechanisms for reducing 
GHG emissions will be needed. Aldy and Stavins (2012b) further support this notion by calling 
for proposals capable of meaningful emission mitigation in developed and developing countries 
within their respective capabilities, emphasising the urgency of their call with the statement, 
“this is a time for innovative proposals for future international climate-policy architecture, not 
for incremental adjustments to the old pathway” (p. 1044).  
The above review of market-based environmental policy has suggested that aligning any 
MBI to the host country context can improve MBI efficiency and effectiveness. The subsequent 
sub-section explores governance in areas of limited statehood in relation to the theoretical 
framework of this thesis.  
2.2  Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood 
The literature related to governance in areas of limited statehood is useful to the theoretical 
framework because it explores what happens when the state is not solely capable of providing 
public good. With specific regard to MBIs in developing countries, the aspect of the literature 
pertaining to “governance with government” is particularly useful for exploring the respective 
roles of the state and the private sector for implementing activities that reduce GHG emissions 
(Börzel & Risse, 2010). This is useful because it provides a framework to explore the state’s role 
in establishing and administering MBIs within the developing world context. 
Peters and Pierre (1998) state, “governance, as are all models of public service, is derived 
from the political culture within which it is embedded. The emergence of governance therefore 
will appear in different institutional forms in different national contexts” (p. 233). This is 











bodies, and significantly influenced by the institutional forms of the country in which they are 
made available. The remainder of this section provides a summary of the governance in areas of 
limited statehood literature as it relates to this thesis.  
  First, limited statehood as used within the governance literature does not refer to a lack of 
international legal sovereignty, as defined by Krasner (2009) as “practices associated with 
mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence” 
(p. 179). What the concept does refer to is a lack, to varying degrees, of domestic sovereignty, as 
defined again by Krasner (2009) as “the formal organization of political authority within the state 
and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own 
polity” (pp. 179–180). Risse (2010) explains further with the comment, “areas of limited 
statehood concern those parts of a country in which central authorities (governments) lack the 
ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions or in which legitimate monopoly over the 
means of violence is lacking, at least temporarily” (p. 4). As an example of limited statehood, 
Börzel et al. (2010) point out that even in South Africa where legal standards and regulation are 
quite advanced, capacity for implementation and compliance is often lacking. All countries in 
SSA demonstrate some degree of limited statehood so it proves a useful concept for 
understanding potential governance configurations affecting MBIs in SSA.  
Risse (2010) defines governance as “the various institutionalised modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective 
goods” (p. 9), and further explains “this changes profoundly under conditions of limited 
statehood” (p. 10). The result is, within areas of limited statehood, hierarchical governing is often 
not feasible, resulting in other modes of governance emerging out of necessity (Vogel, 2009). 











severely constrained. The lack of enforcement capability also erodes the state’s shadow of 
hierarchy, or ability to threaten governmental intervention to ensure compliance with voluntary 
agreements, that in theory promote public good (Héritier & Eckert, 2007). “Whether complying 
or not complying depends on how likely it is that legislators will implement their threat and how 
they would do so” (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 2). As a result, developing countries with 
limited ability to threaten or enforce state action may rely (usually by default) on functional 
equivalents to fully consolidated statehood if they are to meet the “classical responsibilities of 
the state, from the creation of economic stability and the guarantee of minimal social security to 
public health, education, and, today, the maintenance and the creation of a clean environment” 
(Liese & Beisheim, 2010, p. 10).  
What has emerged is “non-hierarchical modes of governance, where non-state actors 
participate in the formulation and implementation of public policy” (Mayntz, 2003a, p. 1). 
Examples of this include corporate social responsibility and fair trade standards (Hamann, 2012; 
Mayer & Gereffi, 2010). The growing trend of non-hierarchical governance is likely here to stay. 
Mayer and Gereffi (2010) elaborate on this with the following: 
As globalization progresses, particularly as the larger developing country 
economies mature, it is both likely and desirable that some significant part of the 
private governance innovations be institutionalized within the national 
governments of those countries. In the longer run, this would provide more 
effective, stable, and representative governance for the global economy (p. 20). 
However, acceptable conditions for engaging non-state actors to participate in provision of 
public good are necessary. Börzel and Risse (2010) point out that “functional equivalents to 











state actors to engage in the provision of collective goods” (p. 126). The result is that non-
hierarchical modes of governance can be viewed across an overlapping continuum of governance 
by, with and without government.  
First, governance by government is the epitome of the fully consolidated, hierarchical 
state, and may include international regimes but retains the focus on state-actors (Hasenclever, 
Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997; Krasner, 1984). This includes varying degrees of participatory 
governance, where non-state actors participate in the discussion (publicly or privately) that leads 
to policy decision-making (Heinelt, 2002), but rulemaking and enforcement still remain the full 
responsibility of the state actors. Second, “governance with government” depicts a range of 
public-private partnership (PPP) options (Börzel & Risse, 2007; Liese & Beisheim, 2010). In 
theory, PPPs develop as the state consults with non-state actors to determine which entities (state 
actors, non-state actors or a combination) are best suited to manage and mitigate risks associated 
with provision of public goods. The rationale for PPPs is summarised with the following 
statement, “involving non-state actors in the provision of collective goods not only allows 
tapping into their cognitive and financial resources but also helps to ensure effective 
implementation” (Börzel & Risse, 2010, p. 126). Other types of “governance with government” 
are voluntary agreements, or societal self-regulation by non-state actors, arising from either 
expressed delegation from the state or as a response to the state’s shadow of hierarchy (Heritier 
& Rhodes, 2011; Mayer & Gereffi, 2010). Third, governance without government is the polar 
opposite of hierarchical control, whereby private self-regulation has little or no public 
involvement (Peters & Pierre, 1998), or in the more extreme “anarchy” case when the state 
collapses (Menkhaus, 2007). Figure 2.1 from Börzel and Risse (2010) illustrates the multi-level 












Figure 2.1: Multi-Level Governance Continuum 
Source: Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2010). Governance without a state: Can it work? Regulation & 
Governance, 4, p. 116. 
 
MBIs are implemented within the “governance with government” category (Börzel & 
Risse, 2010). It is important to highlight that governance of MBIs, with specific reference to 
areas of limited statehood, operates in a way that “hierarchical control and societal self-
regulation are not mutually exclusive. They are different ordering principles which are often 
combined, and their combination, self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy, can be more 
effective than either of the pure governance forms” (Mayntz, 2003b, p. 32). Moreover non-
hierarchical modes of coordination, no matter their form, are often embedded in hierarchical 











In areas of limited statehood, “two scope conditions provide incentive structures to 
ensure that non-state actors engage in effective and sustainable governance in areas of limited 
statehood: the risk of anarchy and highly institutionalized settings” (Börzel & Risse, 2010, p. 
122). Examples of what has induced non-state actor contribution to governance in areas of 
limited statehood include “the threat of external intervention, the pressures of the international or 
local community, or efficiency gains and competitive (dis) advantages” (Börzel, 2012, p. 6). 
With regard to MBIs in developing countries, what has induced business organisations to 
participate in both the CDM or the South African REIPPP programme is the viability of the 
business opportunity, either via efficiency gains or competitive advantage.  
The state still has an important role to play if non-state actors are going to participate in 
the delivery of public goods. There is a requirement for at least a minimum level of capabilities 
by the state actors to coordinate modes of non-hierarchical governance. This is supported by 
Héritier & Eckert (2007), who state there is a need for “a looming shadow of hierarchy in the 
form of control by governmental actors or robust incentives for agents in order to sustain the 
self-regulatory effort and obtain satisfactory results” (p. 114). Börzel (2012) further explains the 
need for the basic functioning state with the following:  
“A lack of administrative, financial, cognitive and human resources not only 
weakens the credibility of state actors to unilaterally adopt and impose costly 
policies (shadow of hierarchy). It also prevents them from acting as reliable 
partners to non-state actors in the provision of common goods and fosters a fear of 
agency capture, making state actors reluctant to engage with more resourceful 











All MBIs, to varying degrees, require state involvement. Prag, Briner and Hood (2012) 
found that MBIs “require effective governance within the institutional structure and throughout 
decision-making processes” (p. 7). Furthermore, Newell and Paterson (2010) highlight that 
transformation away from the current dependence on carbon based development needs to be 
driven forward by aligning actors, interests and coalitions. As a result, if MBIs are to be effective 
particularly in SSA, it can be deduced that the state must possess at least the ability to coordinate 
and enable non-state actors to manage and implement the provision of public goods. For example 
the CDM requires the host country to approve the project based on the host country’s definition 
of sustainable development, and the REIPPP programme in South Africa is fully implemented 
(i.e. establish procurement regulation, manage bidding process, provide additional funding 
required for the REFiT) by the state. However if the state is not viewed as capable of performing 
their role in making an MBI successful, the uncertainty and risk may become too high for 
promising projects to become a reality.  
As explained in this section, the ‘governance with government’ aspect of the literature 
related to governance in areas of limited statehood is the explicit link to market-based 
environmental policy (Börzel & Risse, 2010). This is why governance in areas of limited 
statehood provides a useful theoretical framing that helps explore how host country context 
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3.0  Empirical Papers 
This section includes the full manuscripts of the five empirical papers of this thesis. Each paper 
contributes to the overall research objective, individually addressing a key area of inquiry 
indicated in subordinate research questions and collectively contributing to the overall research 
question of how does statehood impact the efficiency and effectiveness of MBIs.  
3.1 Paper 1: A Comparative Policy Analysis of the Clean Development Mechanism in South 
Africa and China 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The CDM is a market-based approach under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, designed to 
provide financial incentives for developing countries to voluntarily contribute to emission 
reduction efforts and promote sustainable development (UNFCCC, 1997). China and South 
Africa both ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, and are eligible to implement CDM projects and 
to trade CER credits through the international compliance and voluntary carbon markets. Due to 
the nature of the CDM as a market-based approach, it is logical that project development favours 
low cost opportunities within large ‘smokestack’ industries (such as engineering, energy 
production or manufacturing that is heavily dependent on fossil fuels), preferably in host 
countries with political stability, well functioning domestic institutions and investment security 
(Jotzo & Axel Michaelowa, 2002a, p. 10; Jung, 2006; Okubo & Axel Michaelowa, 2010b, p. 31).  
As of March 1
st
 2011, 2 867 projects have been registered globally by the CDM 
Executive Board (EB) at the UNFCCC, with expected CERs representing 798 million tCO2e per 
year. Whilst the emergent economies of China and South Africa both have attributes deemed 










  61 
in reality the distribution of the projects indicates a significant disparity in CDM uptake between 
the two countries. As illustrated by Table 3.1, China has supplied a significant number of CDM 
projects and generated a majority of CER volume, whereas South Africa, the leading CDM host 
country in Africa, has thus far played a negligible role.  









Issued projects  956 411 43.0% 6 0.6% 
Issued kCERs  553,223 302,375 54.7% 1,794 0.3% 
Registered projects  2,867 1,241 43.3% 19 0.7% 
Registered kCERs  1,985,016 1,129,922 56.9% 16,348 0.8% 
Total CDM  
pipeline projects  
5,935 2,418 40.7% 37 0.6% 
Total CDM pipeline 
annual kCERs  
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CER / Population  - 0.33 - 0.12 - 
CDM Consultants 1,624 271 16.69% 17 1.05% 
CDM Consultants / 






























Notes:   
1. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
2. United Nations Population Division. 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 
Revision. New York, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
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3. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Environmental Sciences Division, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, United States. 
Table 3.1: CDM project and CER Comparison  
Source: UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database (01 March 2011) 
Even when taking into account the significant size differences between China and South Africa, 
it remains that South Africa has lagged behind in leveraging the CDM, albeit less extreme than 
comparing absolute CDM projects or CERs. After comparing CDM uptake for differences in 
gross domestic product (GDP), population and emissions, China continues to have higher 
normalised utilisation of CDM than South Africa in terms of estimated CER per $1,000 GDP 
(0.09 to 0.02), CER per person (0.33 to 0.12) and estimated CERs per kilo tCO2e emitted (67 to 
14).  
It is the authors’ intent to analyse the development of the CDM market in China and 
South Africa to better understand how domestic policy affects market-based incentives to 
mitigation climate change. This article explores the underlying policy drivers of the Chinese and 
South African experience in order to compare and contrast what has supported or hindered CDM 
uptake. At the same time, hopefully the lessons learnt from this analysis of CDM in Chinese and 
South African can be useful for policy makers in other developing countries to facilitate a more 
effective implementation of the CDM or other market-based incentive mechanisms.  
Exploring the CDM experience of China and South Africa is of particular interest 
because both are considered emerging industrialised economies with high emissions relative to 
other developing countries. Also, both countries are part of the voluntary BASIC (aka Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) country forum that coordinates for international climate change 
negotiations and cooperates on mitigation and adaptation actions (DEA RSA, 2010). On the 
other hand, significant differences exist between China and South Africa’s population size, 
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paper to the country context in which they operate. It is not the intent to imply policy and 
measures of China or South Africa should be implemented elsewhere as each country has unique 
social, environmental, political and economic determinants.  
3.1.2 Methodology 
This paper utilised a mixed method approach to allow for a comprehensive analysis of data from 
different sources (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The 
methodological and investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1989; Jick, 1979; Kimchi, Polivka, & 
Stevenson, 1991; Thurmond, 2001) employed various methods including an in-depth desk top 
review, descriptive statistics analysis, structured and semi-structured interviews and field 
observations. The use of multiple data sources to triangulate key points regarding CDM in South 
Africa and China enhanced the validation process by ensuring that weaknesses inherent in one 
approach were counterbalanced via strengths in another (Denzin, 1989; Jick, 1979). For example, 
to mitigate the bias that is associated with interviews, the research used numerous and highly 
knowledgeable informants who viewed and understood CDM from different perspectives. In 
addition, the descriptive statistics and field observations were used to valid and confirm data 
from interviews and relevant literature.  
An extensive literature and document review was conducted as a means of exploring and 
understanding the current discussions around CDM, both globally and specifically to South 
Africa and China. Both academic literature and grey materials including policy documents, 
reports and position papers, were reviewed. Descriptive statistics regarding number and type of 
CDM projects, and corresponding CERs generated, were obtained from the UNFCCC website 
and the UNEP Risøe CDM project pipeline as of March 1, 2011 for analysis (Fenhann, Staun, 










  64 
To further develop a first-hand understanding of the drivers and constraints to CDM 
uptake in both China and South Africa, structured and semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key informants. To identify interviewees, a list of key CDM stakeholders in 
China and South Africa was compiled from CDM association lists, project documents, CDM 
analysis reports and conference proceedings. Furthermore, asking each contacted interviewee for 
additional referrals for information rich key informants proved effective (Mason, 2002; Welch, 
Marschanpiekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002). The interviews focused on a set of targeted 
CDM questions and allowed for elaboration by the interviewee to facilitate discussions on a wide 
range of issues related to CDM policy (Bernard, 2005; Bryman, 1992).  
An initial round of key informant interviews were held in China and South Africa during 
2009, followed by a second round of interviews in 2011. For the China research component, 
interviews were conducted with 24 interviews with European Companies operating in China, 
five local project developers, two investors, three researchers and two officials representing the 
Designated National Authority (DNA). For the South African research component, interviews 
were conducted with two DNA officials, nine project developers, two Designated Operating 
Entity (DOE) representatives, four research consultants and three representatives of a financial 
services firm. 
Lastly, the researchers have direct experience working in CDM in China and across 
Africa. The authors have been actively involved with the implementation of the EU-China 
Facilitation project and the development of the Africa Carbon Credit Exchange, as well as 
participation in CDM related conferences and workshops. The authors collective work 
experience has informed this research by ensuring the research is aligned with the evolving 
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3.1.3 CDM: General Background 
All developed nations, aside from the United States, have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and 
committed to legally binding measures that set a ceiling or cap on allowable emissions released 
in the atmosphere (UNFCCC, 1997). The 37 industrialised nations that signed the Kyoto 
Protocol committed to international and legally binding reductions on average of 5.2 per cent 
against 1990 levels over the first period commitment period from 2008 – 2012 (Gupta & 
Bhandari, 1999). These targets are expressed as levels of allowed emissions over the first 
commitment period. In order to assist countries in meeting their obligations when national 
reduction measures fall short, three market-based mechanisms are available under the Kyoto 
Protocol: International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and CDM. International 
Emissions Trading allows countries that have unused allowed emissions to sell their excess 
capacity to other countries that are over their targets. Joint Implementation allows countries with 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to transfer or develop emission reduction units from an 
emission-reduction project. This applies to all Annex B countries (developed countries with 
legally binding emission caps) but has primarily been associated with the former Soviet states 
that have significantly reduced their emissions over the 1990 baseline as a result of moving away 
from central planning to market based economies after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Lastly, 
developing countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol do not have binding emission 
reduction targets but are able to participate via the CDM. The CDM allows the Annex B 
countries to purchase a limited amount of GHG certified emission reductions from projects in the 
non-Annex I countries (developing countries without emission caps), providing a flexible 
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The market-based approach of carbon trading, as supported by market theory advocates, 
is perceived to reduce carbon emissions at the lowest overall cost to business or society, either 
through efficiencies, trading or offsets (Sandor, Bettelheim, & Swingland, 2002, p. 1608; 
Stavins, 2002; Yeoh, 2008, p. 190). It has been argued that the design and use of the market-
based CDM is more effective at achieving its goal of reducing mitigation costs and less effective 
in achieving the dual aim of contributing to sustainable development (Ellis et al., 2007; Figueres 
& Streck, 2009; Fuhr & Lederer, 2009; McGowan, 2008; Nussbaumer, 2009; Olsen, 2007; 
Pearson, 2007; Resnier, C. Wang, Du, & J. Chen, 2007; Sutter & Parreño, 2007). Issuance of 
CERs as of 1 March 2011 supports this claim as a clear initial preference is evident for 
“smokestack” projects with short lead times and low costs, as 72% of issued CERs as of 1 March 
2011 are generated by industrial gas projects (Fenhann et al., 2011). However, the overall 
percentage of CERs expected until 2012 by these industrial gas project types is expected to 
decrease significantly to 27% (Fenhann et al., 2011). Furthermore, evaluating sustainable 
development impact is fraught with complications as it is dependent upon the varying definitions 
of sustainable development, which was deliberately to be defined by the host country and has a 
tendency to underestimate broader effects of CDM to the host country, such as general climate 
change awareness (Fuhr & Lederer, 2009).  
The operation of CDM requires significant institutional involvement at different levels, 
which must balance bureaucracy with speed and transparency in the production of credible 
offsets (Lovell, 2010, p. 361). At the international level, the CDM EB oversees CDM policy 
making and activities, including project registration and issuances of credits, under the authority 
and guidance of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. The CDM EB relies on accredited 
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as well as verify the validity of generated credits prior to issuance of CERs. At the national level, 
the DNA reviews submitted CDM projects and approves or rejects them based on the integrity of 
the proposed emission reductions and the locally defined definition of sustainable development. 
The institutional CDM capacity is important as research has shown host country CDM 
procedures, specifically policy and an efficient DNA, are a determinant to CDM investment 
(Jung, 2006, p. 553; Nhamo, 2007).  
3.1.4 CDM in China 
Overview 
China signed the Kyoto Protocol on 29
th
 May 1998 and it was ratified on 30
th
 August 2002. 
Subsequently, China has become the largest host country for CDM projects and CER supplier to 
the international carbon market. As illustrated in table 3.1, 2 418 Chinese projects have been 
developed or are currently in the CDM development pipeline as of 1 March 2011, including 1 
241 projects registered. The expected average annual CERs from the Chinese CDM projects is 
over 436 million tCO2e, representing nearly 54.7% of the worldwide total annual expected CERs 
(Fenhann et al., 2011).  
Project scope 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, current CDM projects in China cover a wide range of industrial 
types. Renewable energy projects, including small hydropower, wind power and biomass, 
represent a dominant share of existing CDM projects, in terms of both project number and the 
quantity of expected annual CERs. Energy efficiency is the second largest area for CDM project 
development, coming from various industrial sectors including steel, iron and power industries. 
Furthermore, a majority of the energy efficiency CDM projects are for their own power 
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project types have emerged recently, including the solar energy utilisation, PFC, sulfur 
hexafluoride and transport, which are a result of new methodology development. 
 
Figure 3.1: Pipeline Projects & Anticipated CERs Generated to 2020 in China 
Source: (Fenhann et al., 2011) 
Early on in the Chinese CDM experience, hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) and Nitrous Oxide (N2O) 
projects were considered as ‘low-hanging fruits’, due to the large amount of CERs from a single 
project and the relatively low per unit investment. However, from the beginning of 2009, there 
are no new HFC projects being developed, with the last HFC project registered in April 2009. 
The growth of N2O projects has also slowed, with only four new projects added to the pipeline 
since October 2009. This is mainly due to the HFC and N2O project potential in the Chinese 
market being exhausted. In addition, the marketability of these controversial projects was greatly 
reduced in January 2011 when the European Commission banned companies from using HFC 
and N2O credits in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) after 1 May 2013, citing 
concerns regarding environmental integrity, value-for-money and inequitable geographical 
distribution of these project types (European Commission, 2011). However, while this ban has 
generated considerable debate regarding the future supply of CERs, the ban only applies to 
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should they decide to use such credits in sectors not currently covered by the EU ETS for 
compliance against national targets. 
CDM management in China 
Largely driven by the main policy making body, National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), there are a large number of Chinese governmental authorities directly 
involved in the management of CDM projects including the National Leading Group on Climate 
Change (NLGCC), the National CDM Board (NCB), and the CDM Project Management Centre 
(NDRC, 2005). The institutional structure for CDM management is a vertical management 
system. The NLGCC, consisting of 20 ministries, oversees the national CDM policies, 
regulation, standards and supervises the National CDM Board. The NCB is responsible for 
reviewing CDM projects, reporting to the NLGCC on the overall progress of CDM project 
activities, and making recommendations on amendments to the CDM operation regulations and 
procedures based on emerging issues (NDRC, 2005). China’s DNA is part of NDRC, which is 
under the supervision of the NCB and responsible for receiving CDM project application 
documents, implementing the CDM administrative procedure and issuing the Letter of Approval 
(LoA) for the qualified CDM projects, and implementing specific CDM activities.  
In addition, the CDM Fund Management Centre is a key institution within the Chinese 
CDM management structure. It is sponsored by the Ministry of Finance and manages the funds 
collected from the CER revenue fees charged by the government, which is to be used to meet its 
broader climate and sustainable development objectives (Lundin, Sanctuary, Chunxiu, & Liping, 
2009). As of October 2010, the estimated contribution to the China CDM Fund was 279 million 
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CDM regulation in China 
The regulatory framework for CDM implementation is outlined in the Chinese government’s 
‘Measures for the Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects’ 
(NDRC, 2005; NDRC, 2011). This serves as the main legal basis for the CDM implementation in 
China, including guidance on the eligibility of the projects, the application requirements, the 
approval procedure of the DNA, the priority areas of sustainable development, and the CER 
revenue-sharing policies.  
Only Chinese enterprises are eligible to apply for CDM projects and only locally owned 
(at least 51% majority ownership) companies are allowed to own CDM projects in China. The 
Chinese government included this regulation to protect local enterprises’ ability to participate in 
the CDM activities. However, according to a survey of European enterprises operating in 
China’s CDM market (Hongwei, 2009), this eligibility requirement is considered as a major 
barrier for foreign investment and technology innovation in China.  
The CDM project owner is required to submit to the DNA the following documents: the 
Project Design Document (PDD), certification of enterprise status (enterprises license), general 
description of projects, the Engineering Feasibility Approval from NDRC, and the environmental 
impact assessment approval from the Environmental Protection Administration (NDRC, 2005). 
The project owner is also required to present the Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement 
(ERPA) or purchase intent, and the consultant service contract for review. The CER price agreed 
to in the ERPA is one of the elements to be reviewed and a minimum price, or pricing floor, is 
given as a ‘guideline’. One argument for the price floor is that the GHG emission reduction 
resources are considered state-owned in China and in the early stages of CDM the local project 
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guidance on CDM pricing in China can have a positive impact stabilising the international 
carbon market and give project owners clarity on potential CDM revenue streams. Although 
there is no clear framework to define which type of project will contribute the most to 
sustainable development in China, priority areas for CDM development include energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and methane recovery and utilisation, which is consistent with the 
country’s overall climate change and energy policies.  
Prioritisation of the CDM development is implemented and enforced through the CER 
revenue-sharing policy. According to the Chinese CDM regulation, the Chinese government 
owns GHG emission reduction resources and the CER revenues generated from the specific 
CDM projects shall be jointly owned by the project owner and the government (NDRC, 2005). 
This statement allows the government to charge certain percentages of the CER revenue from the 
different types of CDM projects. According to the different priorities set in October 2005, the 
government therefore collects fees at different levels from the CER revenues, based on the 
principles below: 
 65% for projects involving HFC and perfluorocarbon (PFC) emission reductions; 
 30% for projects involving N2O emission reductions; 
 2% for projects in priority areas and forestry projects.  
In reality, the Chinese CER revenue-sharing scheme has not served as a major deterrent to HFC 
projects because of high profitability of this project type, even when factoring in the high 
taxation rates. Also, the low taxation on priority areas does not appear to have a negative effect 
on the current CDM project development trend, whereby the number and the expected annual 
CERs of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects represent large shares of the overall 
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Recently, Chinese regulators have adjusted the CDM tax scheme on project types 
perceived to be negatively affected by the taxation. In a move to align Chinese regulation with 
changing market conditions, the levied tax on PFC and N2O projects was altered per an August 
2011 revision to Chinese CDM regulation (NDRC, 2011), resulting in the following tax levies 
which supersede the above tax guidance for these project types: 
 10% for projects involving PFC emission reductions – reduced from 65%; 
 10% for projects involving N2O emission reductions – reduced from 30%. 
These changes reflect the flexibility of the Chinese regulators who can and will make significant 
changes to the revenue sharing scheme, as they deem necessary to incentives utilisation. It 
remains to be seen if these new low taxation rates will have an effect on the value of PFC and 
N2O projects.  
3.1.5 CDM experience in China: Key drivers and obstacles 
Key drivers 
As one of the most successful CDM markets, it is useful to identify the unique drivers. Our 
research has found the following points to be particularly salient drivers of CDM development in 
China. 
Firstly, stakeholder capacity building in the early stages at various levels is commonly 
viewed as a key driver that has facilitated CDM in China. For example, before the market began 
to grow in China, Government directly worked with project owners to encourage CDM uptake 
and ensure sufficient local capacity, as local authorities were anticipated to play a decisive role 
(Zhao & Michaelowa, 2006). One of the most successful of these initiatives has been the 










  73 
Ministry of Science and Technology with the mandate to provide consultancy services to 
projects including capacity building; financial access and advice; matchmaking with foreign 
developers; and information and support throughout the project process. In addition to the 
increased capacity, this was critical to increase the confidence of foreign players in the market at 
a time when the domestic capacity and understanding of the CDM was perceived as very weak 
(Schroeder, 2009). 
Secondly, the DNA is often credited with having high standards with respect to project 
appraisal and rigour. The DNA has also successfully streamlined the submission process within 
existing industry regulation, which requires much of the same documentation, thereby 
minimising the additional burden on project owners. Also, the IRR benchmark for demonstrating 
financial additionality for power projects was established to be “8% of the total investment or 
10% of the equity”, which has helped to reduce project approval uncertainty (NDRC, 2006).  
Stakeholders find the domestic approval process relatively clear and predictable with 
respect to timing and application requirements. Project owners can be generally confident that 
projects that have passed the DNA approval process will also pass the UNFCCC approval stage. 
This has provided a degree of certainty to project owners and developers, where long project 
cycles have resulted in large gaps between project development and financial return.  
Furthermore, the government has closely aligned its own credibility with Chinese CDM 
projects and advocates on behalf of the interests of the CDM market. For example, when the 
CDM EB called into question the financial additionality of Chinese wind projects in light of new 
feed-in tariffs in late 2009, NDRC responded with a report in their defence (CREIA, 2009), and 
later publically criticized the ruling as “irresponsible” and “unfair towards Chinese projects” 










  74 
Thirdly, the Government has been successful in guiding the market according to its own 
sector priorities. There has been a clear top-down flow of information from strategic policies, 
such as the 11th and 12th five-year plans, but also at the working level through instruments such 
as the Provincial CDM Centres. In 2006, the Renewable Energy Law was formulated to promote 
the development of renewable energy in China. Furthermore, the Government’s 2007 Medium- 
and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable Energy established specific renewable targets 
by 2020. The domestic energy conservation and emission reduction programme has also been 
intensified with various energy efficiency projects being launched. These domestic policy trends 
have been well matched with the CDM market development. One reason for this is the 
significant uptake of CDM by large-scale state-owned enterprises and investment groups that 
were already actively involved in similar project development in line with these policies.  
The Chinese hydropower industry illustrates CDM aligning with overall Chinese 
development priorities. The sector had benefited from strong private investment growth since 
privitisation in the early 1990’s. The sector offered good returns, but by 2006 low feed-in tariffs 
presented an increasing risk to the current investors and government investment had cooled over 
concerns with financial sustainability (Bartolucci et al., 2008). However, hydro projects were 
still in line with China’s overall energy development goals and by November 2006 were able to 
apply as CDM projects. The sector already had the necessary equipment and expertise in place 
from over a decade of growth that facilitated a smooth transition into the CDM market and after 
5 years growth hydropower projects now represent 41% of the China CDM pipeline (Fenhann et 
al., 2011).  
Fourth, our research shows that CDM in China has consistently been attractive to foreign 
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efficiency and volume. Specifically, the overall market structure and size in China, as well as 
robust GDP growth, averaging 10.6 between 2006 and 2010 (Hannon, Lui, Walker, & Wu, 
2011), has provided an excellent environment for the CDM.  
The booming Chinese economy is in part being catalysed by a robust financial system, 
which is also found to be a key determinant for CDM success. Research has shown that most 
underlying project finance for CDM is funded unilaterally by the host country and not by the 
Annex I countries (Lütken, 2008; Lütken & Michaelowa, 2008). This has created a situation 
whereby China is able to leverage its growing economy and financial sector to unilaterally 
develop a large number of CDM projects. For instance, the rapidly increasing power generation 
capacity and the large-scale production of cement, steel and iron has provided opportunities for 
renewable energy and energy-efficiency CDM projects in the power sector and energy-intensive 
industries.  
Furthermore, China provides opportunity for high volume and replication. Without 
exception, CDM developers interviewed attribute China’s success to market potential, political 
stability and the ability to effectively economise on project development costs. In particular, 
stakeholders recognised the benefit of publically available government calculated grid emissions 
factors (GEF) in facilitati g project development for grid-connect renewable energy projects. 
Stakeholders have found that in other countries, where this is not available, this is a significant 
additional cost and complexity to project developers, enough to stall development for projects in 
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Although the rapid CDM development in China is often viewed as a success based on number of 
projects and CERs generated, there are various issues that have negatively affected CDM and 
could be improved upon.  
Firstly, the institutional and policy framework in China during the early stages, that were 
useful in facilitating CDM as it legalised the transactions and shaped the market, is increasingly 
viewed to be a constraint. For instance, as a result of the national ownership regulation, foreign 
stakeholders are reluctant to participate in high technology transfer projects, thus limiting the 
development of certain CDM sectors. Moreover, the long project life cycles amidst a dynamic 
market have highlighted a new project risk. It is widely recognised that Chinese policy, not CDM 
incentives, is the main driver behind projects in the renewable energy sector, which brings 
additionality into question (Lewis, 2010; Wang & Chen, 2010). Sectors such as wind and 
biomass have experienced rapid development, to the extent that the Government has issued 
industry regulation, such as in feed-in tariffs reductions, which have risked the viability of new 
and ongoing CDM projects (He & Morse, 2010; Yang, Nguyen, De T’Serclaes, & Buchner, 
2010).  
Secondly, an appropriate guideline to direct CDM towards a greater focus on sustainable 
development is currently missing in China. As a market-based mechanism, CDM orientation can 
be focused on the market players’ interests to the detriment of sustainable development. The 
DNA has the responsibility to guide the CDM towards sustainable development of the host 
countries and should develop comprehensive criteria for sustainable development at the early 
stage of CDM development. Since the CDM is continuously evolving and is a learn-by-doing 
process, the CDM guidance should remain flexible in order to address the emerging issues. The 
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formulated in 2005 and have been amended in 2011 to reflect the changes in the market. It may 
require further modifications to enhance the sustainability criteria of CDM in China.  
Thirdly, the CDM process itself has also proven to be a significant obstacle to CDM in 
China in a variety of ways. The CDM timeline is viewed as too long, and thus presents a 
significant investment risk, especially on projects, which require high initial capital investments. 
The Chinese government has attempted to mitigate this risk by requiring all projects secure CER 
purchase agreements prior to applying for a LoA. However, interviewees consistently agreed that 
the long timelines and delays in the administrative process still resulted in significant financial 
loss.  
Fourth, uncertainty surrounding the international climate change negotiations has also 
become a significant obstacle of CDM development in China. This has resulted in a significant 
loss of confidence in the market, with most investors becoming reluctant to develop projects in 
sectors where revenues would not be realised before the end of the current crediting period. Such 
negative indications on the future direction of CDM have significantly cooled the market and 
some investors are already exploring exit strategies. 
Lastly, a sentiment is emerging that CDM is no longer sustainable in China. This is due 
to both the uncertainty of international political dialogues and the constraints of its own 
institutional arrangement both at UNFCCC and domestic level. As a result, China is now 
developing new systems, including a potential domestic carbon-trading scheme, in which the 
Climate Change Department of NDRC is highly involved and other CDM stakeholders operating 
in China are actively looking for opportunities to be involved. Due in large part to the CDM, the 
required expertise and systems to establish a domestic cap and trade system are in place, 
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standard has also been established, with its first voluntary credits sold in March 2011 to a 
domestic buyer (Peters-Stanley, 2011). The increasingly ambitious Chinese climate targets of the 
12th Five Year Plan (FYP) covering 2011-2015 point towards a potential phasing in of market 
mechanisms such as domestic carbon trading pilots (Hannon et al., 2011). However our research 
showed that stakeholders are cautious about the international credibility of any domestic scheme 
and do not expect any of such mechanisms to materialise within the next 5 years. To date there 
has not been any firm commitments from the Chinese government mandating a domestic 
compliance scheme, and such announcements are unlikely until there is further guidance on the 
international approach to addressing climate change after the end of 2012.  
3.1.6 CDM in South Africa  
Overview 
South Africa affirmed accession to the Kyoto Protocol on 31 July 2002, entering the Protocol 
into force on 16 February 2005. While other BASIC countries have successfully harnessed the 
potential of CDM to varying extends, South Africa has consistently been a laggard since CDM 
inception. As of 28 January 2011, only 192 CDM projects have been submitted to the South 
African DNA, consisting of 155 Project Idea Notes (PINs) and 37 PDDs. Of the 37 PDDS, 19 
have been registered, four having issued CERs and 18 are at different stages of the project cycle 
(DNA RSA, 2011).  
The project types submitted to the DNA are illustrated in Figure 3.2, indicating a high 
percentage of renewable energy, energy efficiency, fuel switch, cogeneration and waste 
management. However, when viewing the CER potential from the projects approved by the 
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renewable energy and energy efficiency have not had much success so far in moving beyond the 
initial PIN stage. 
 
Figure 3.2: South African CDM Project Pipeline 
Source: (DNA RSA, 2011)  
CDM management in South Africa 
The DNA, within the Department of Energy, has the legal mandate to oversee the CDM in South 
Africa under Section 25 of the National Environmental Management Act. Since its inception in 
2004, the main task of the DNA has been to assess potential CDM projects, to determine whether 
they “assist South Africa in achieving its sustainable development goals and to issue formal host 
country approval where this is the case” (DNA RSA, 2004). The DNA has also been playing an 
important role in providing support to project developers and promoting CDM in South Africa to 
potential investors primarily because the private sector and investors have not been proactive in 
promoting CDM (interview with L Chauke, 28 October 2009). To overcome these challenges the 
South Africa Clean Development Mechanism Industry Association (SACDMIA) was launched 
in 2007. The intent of the association is to provide a platform for CDM industry stakeholders to 
promote their common interests, that is, “CDM investment promotion, capacity building, and 
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(Van Den Berg, 2007). Unfortunately, the SACDMIA has thus far not been effective or active in 
promoting CDM in South Africa. 
CDM regulation in South Africa 
Project developers or owners enter the CDM project approval process through voluntary 
screening or mandatory submissions. The voluntary screening provides the DNA with an 
opportunity to carry out an initial screening of the project and provide feedback to the developer 
on the likely performance of the project against approval criteria. The mandatory submissions 
require all projects to submit a detailed description via a PDD and an application form to receive 
a letter of approval from the DNA. The DOE should already have validated the PDD at this 
stage. The PDD is posted on the DNA website for public consultation for a period of 30 days. 
The DNA will then provide a recommendation based on the consultation and its evaluation 
process and then the DNA steering committee provides comments. Based on the comments from 
the committee, the DNA makes its final decision on the approval of the project. 
Unlike in China, the South African DNA has a set of defined sustainable development 
criteria that guides the evaluation of the projects. These criteria are guided by the South African 
government’s definition of sustainable development: “the integration of social, economic and 
environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision making so as to ensure that 
development serves present and future generations” (DNA RSA, 2004). Despite having this 
definition and guidelines, a DNA senior official noted that it is difficult to “measure the social 
development impact within CDM” (interview with L Chauke, 28 October 2009). Therefore, the 
DNA encourages the N2O projects in South Africa that have minimal positive impact to social 
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official explained that if the number of N2O projects increases, the DNA will consider imposing 
a tax on these CDM projects, as is the case in China.   
3.1.7 CDM experience in South Africa: Key drivers and obstacles 
Key drivers 
While CDM in South Africa has not generated a large number of projects to date, there are 
positive aspects within the established policy and structure that could serve as the foundation to 
increase South African CDM uptake. The following points are positive elements the research has 
identified within the South African CDM experience. 
Firstly, the South African DNA is well organised and highly regarded both domestically 
and internationally. Our research has indicated the South African DNA is doing an effective job 
administering the CDM limited pipeline. Stakeholders interviewed consistently regarded the 
DNA highly and believe sustainable development is a top priority.  
Secondly, the South African economy is based on a high emission structure providing 
ample possibilities for CDM projects. Similar to China, South Africa has one of the highest 
GEFs in the world, estimated in January 2011 to be 1.048 (Takahashi & Ninomiya, 2011). Such 
a high dependency on coal-based power, and a growing demand for electricity provides an ideal 
baseline scenario for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects, creating significant 
potential for CDM projects (Du Toit, 2009, p. 49). While there has been slow uptake to date in 
these sectors, increasing electricity tariffs and improved renewable energy technologies are 
increasingly making renewable energy projects more cost-competitive, theoretically increasing 
the likelihood of implementation. In addition, there is potential for the CDM to support the 
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additional new capacity of 17.8 gigawatt (GW) of renewables and 8.9 GW of other generation 
sources, including cogeneration (DoE RSA, 2011). 
Thirdly, there is a strong base of local project developers with the technical expertise to 
develop projects in South Africa. While most other countries in the Southern Africa region have 
few if any local groups with the expertise to successfully develop a CDM project, South Africa 
has capable project developers and CDM service providers. For example, the 2010 request for 
information for the pending South African REFiT programme received 384 responses from IPPs 
identifying approximately 20 GW of renewable energy and 4 GW of cogeneration projects at 
various stages of development (DoE RSA, 2010). 
Key obstacles 
There is a great deal of hesitancy and uncertainty regarding the perceived risks of CDM in South 
Africa. Throughout the research, the following issues emerged as recurrent obstacles to greater 
CDM uptake in South Africa.  
First, potential South African projects owners in the public and private sector have a 
perceived lacked of the vision required to fully harness CDM opportunities. This is compounded 
by a lack of governmental capacity, public awareness and overall education regarding climate 
change and CDM. The public sector has been hesitant to take on additional responsibilities of 
developing CDM and the private sector is reluctant to take on the risks associated with investing 
in CDM projects. While local expertise is available in South Africa to navigate the intricacies of 
the CDM process, organisations that would own the CERs have not possessed the ability to 
identify quality opportunities and corresponding benefits, resulting in little uptake of potential 
CDM projects. In addition, the carbon markets are complicated and continually evolving, thus 
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to the conservative business environment in South Africa, few project champions have emerged 
to date. As a result, the critical mass required to propel the CDM market forward has not been 
generated. 
Second, the overall complexities of the CDM market have been a disincentive to both 
public and private entities in South Africa. The uncertainty surrounding the CDM market, 
including fluctuating market prices and little post-2012 clarity, has created a situation whereby 
the upfront investment to access the CDM is a major deterrent to moving projects forward. The 
long approval process and concerns regarding if a project will be registered also contributes to 
hesitancy of potential project owners to engage in the process. There is also a need for increased 
flexibility of existing approved methodologies from the CDM EB. If an existing methodology 
cannot be leveraged, the cost of developing a new methodology was cited during our stakeholder 
interviews as a prohibitive factor to CDM, and while “BRIC countries have developed numerous 
CDM projects, this does not mean that the opportunity automatically extends to South Africa” 
(DNA RSA, 2009, p. 13).  
The third main obstacle identified is the financing of CDM projects, both underlying 
project finance and finance to create the carbon asset. Even though an implicit intent of the 
Kyoto Protocol is to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) for emission reduction projects, 
CDM experience has shown that the onus “rests almost entirely on investors in developing 
countries being willing to put up the financing for the projects, that through the generation of 
CERs help developed country emitters avoid having to make such investments” (Lütken, 2008, 
p. 85). Depending on project type, the income from the CERs is usually not sufficient to cover 
the overall project costs. As a result, there is a need to find debt or equity financing which can be 
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return is not guaranteed until the CERs are delivered unless sold ex-ante, often at a significant 
discount. As a result, CDM financing can easily become an afterthought, which can only be 
leveraged after underlying project finance is organised.  
Compounding this problem has been the financial crisis; high domestic lending rates and 
the perceived higher risk of African-based project finance has made funding even more scarce 
due to the current risk adverse investment climate (Interview with K Reuss, 30 October 2009). 
To elucidate, the average lending interest rate in South Africa from 2006 – 2010 was 12.2%, 
compared to 6.0% in China (World Bank, 2010). This translates into high-required equity IRR 
for South African projects as compared to other regions of the world, which acts as a further 
hurdle to project implementation. For example, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA) has conservatively estimated the benchmark project IRR for renewable energy projects 
to be 12% and the equity IRR at 17%, representing a high investment hurdle when compared to 
the tariff rates for power in South Africa (NERSA, 2009).  
In addition, the high cost of validation and lack of South African DOEs is a major 
bottleneck to CDM projects. All project developers contacted during our research indicated 
issues with DOEs as a major problem in South Africa due to cost and availability. Validation 
costs, which vary by project type, represent a significant investment by project developers or 
owners. To gain a sense of validation costs, in early 2011 six DOEs were contacted to request 
quotes for validating South African wind projects, validation quotes ranged from €20,000 to 
€37,000 equivalent plus travel expenses from overseas. Additionally, there is only one accredited 
African DOE based in South Africa, most are European or Asian organisations with costs usually 
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The fourth major obstacle our research has identified is the lack of meaningful 
governmental support for low carbon development in energy production or industry (Cloete & 
Robb, 2010; Winkler, 2010; Winkler & Marquand, 2009). This is exemplified by the dependence 
on high-emission coal based power through the monopolistic parastatal Eskom. The South 
African White Paper on Renewable Energy (DME RSA, 2003) set a target to produce 10,000GW 
hours from renewable energy sources (mainly from biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro) 
by 2013; the report also deemed this target to be economically viable through subsidies and 
carbon financing. To date, only three renewable energy CDM projects have been registered and 
no subsidies on the scale required to meet the target have been disbursed, leaving South Africa’s 
modest renewable energy target significantly off-track to meet its 2013 goal. This is a significant 
point of departure for South Africa in comparison to the global CDM experience, where 
renewable energy projects represent 62% of the overall CDM pipeline (Fenhann et al., 2011). 
As South Africa’s primary energy producer and buyer, Eskom is the key player to lead 
both renewable energy and energy efficiency projects but has done little, internally or externally, 
to galvanise the renewable or CDM industries. While electricity cost is increasing on an average 
of 25% per year from 2011 – 2013, it is still considered among the lowest cost in the world at a 
standard average retail cost of 52.30 rand cent per kilowatt-hour (kWh) (DME RSA, 2008; 
Eskom, 2011; Pegels, 2010). The South African economy is significantly influenced by the 
minerals-energy complex, which has depended on access to long-term, power purchase 
agreements for cheap electricity (Baker, 2011). As a result, low cost coal-based electricity 
contributes to a slow uptake of CDM because the financial incentive and viability for energy 
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In order to reverse this dearth of renewable energy in South Africa, NERSA released in 
March 2009 the REFiT regulatory guide (NERSA, 2009). The initial REFiT guidance document 
appointed Eskom, the centralised, single energy buyer in South Africa, as the Renewable Energy 
Purchasing Agency and initially set 2009 tariffs by renewable energy technology (see Table 3.2).  
 
Technology 2009 REFiT (R/kWh) 2011 REFiT (R/kWh) 
Wind  1.25 0.938 
Small hydro 0.94 0.671 
Landfill gas 0.90 0.539 
CSP – w/o storage 2.09 1.938 
Table 3.2: South African REFiT  - Phase I Technologies 
Source: (NERSA, 2011) 
While the REFiT has the potential to help incentivise grid connected renewable energy and 
subsequent CDM development (Couth et al., 2011), its impact is severely restricted because the 
amount of renewable energy to be added to the grid is capped based on allocated funding. 
Furthermore, since the REFiT announcement in 2009, the market has been faced with continual 
uncertainty and delays. Further compounding the problem has been a lack of transparency by 
NERSA, which in March 2011 changed the amount of electricity to be purchased by technology 
and significantly reduced the initially released REFiT pricing as shown in Table 3.2. Then in 
August 2011, REFiT was cancelled in favour of a competitive bidding process. This has created 
a difficult business environment for developers and a hostile investment climate for investors 
because business models were previously based on the 2009 REFiT guidance, specifically the 
higher tariff rates.  
Furthermore, Eskom has not successfully engaged with CDM for its own electricity 
generation or efficiency measures. Initially there was great excitement in 2004 at Eskom when 
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registration process immediately tempered enthusiasm for CDM. This is confirmed by looking at 
Eskom’s direct CDM experience: the parastatal submitted three PINs to the South African DNA 
in 2006 and one in 2007, comprising two renewable energy and two energy efficiency projects, 
of which none have submitted PDDs to the DNA due to lack of underlying funding for the 
projects (DNA RSA, 2011). Eskom’s lack of willingness to engage directly with CDM or 
provide a conducive environment for IPPs demonstrates a need for greater coordination between 
the policy and development framework and key entities such as Eskom and NERSA. 
3.1.8 Analysis  
By comparing the policy drivers behind the CDM experience of China to South Africa, a 
complex picture emerges with many influencing factors. Our analysis draws out a number of 
contributing CDM elements, which we believe have allowed China to thrive and South Africa to 
lag behind. However, we acknowledge that the explanatory power of this comparison is limited 
due to the distinctly different socio-political, environmental and economic makeup of the two 
countries.  
We found that the overall industrial and energy policies of the government play a 
significant role in the uptake of CDM. Additionally, the active engagement by key governmental 
and private sector stakeholders, and a business environment conducive to CDM significantly 
impacts utilisation of the mechanism.  
National Policy Driven 
Moving from the traditional carbon intensive development approach to a low carbon trajectory is 
extremely difficult, requiring clear policies and incentives to reduce the risk of this change and 
encourage private sector participation. Overall policy must prioritise low carbon development 
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CDM experience has demonstrated that aligning overall development policy and priorities is the 
fundamental factor driving emission reduction projects, with CDM serving as a tool for moving 
the government’s prescribed agenda forward. As such, CDM is most effective when streamlined 
with national development and climate change policy because it follows a lower emission 
development agenda, not the other way around.  
This is best exemplified by the renewable energy sectors in China and South Africa. Both 
countries have an increasing demand for power but their actions to meet this growing demand 
have taken completely different approaches, with a profound effect on uptake of CDM. Through 
supportive government policies and mandates, China has effectively promoted a rapidly 
expanding renewable energy sector on the supply side and massive industrial energy efficiency 
measures on the demand side. In contrast, CDM experience demonstrates South Africa has made 
little progress in reducing emissions on either the power supply or demand side. South Africa’s 
reluctantly proposed REFiT has not been off to a promising start. After continual delays, the 
tariff price was reduced before the signing of a single power purchase agreement, resulting in an 
extremely negative environment for potential renewable energy investors and developers. As a 
result, policy to enable renewable energy in South Africa has been wholly ineffective and stifled 
by Eskom’s unwillingness to add renewable energy to the overall energy mix and by their lack of 
interest in using CDM to support energy efficiency measures. 
Proactive Engagement 
An active engagement by key governmental and private sector stakeholders is also necessary to 
fully leverage CDM potential. The DNA should play a dual role as regulator and facilitator of the 
market. As this analysis has shown, proactive outreach to all potential stakeholders is a necessary 
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South Africa awareness and understanding of the opportunities of CDM by key public and 
private sector decision makers at the ‘Board’ level is necessary to exploit CDM opportunities. 
Capacity building for engaging with CDM was effectively developed throughout China at both 
the local and national levels, supported by domestic and international funding. This is a relevant 
lesson for South Africa, as increased awareness and capacity by decision-makers is important to 
maximise CDM utilisation. While the South African DNA has been running CDM promotion 
workshops since 2006, the DNA acknowledges low participation from the key decision-makers 
that own the assets eligible for CDM projects, resulting in a communication gap that can only be 
bridged through combined efforts with “other government ministries, trade groups and industry 
associations” (Interview with L Chauke, 28 October 2009). This also presents a potential conflict 
of interest as the DNA assumes the dual role of promoter and regulator.  
Additionally, the importance of the national CDM specific regulations has a significant 
impact on CDM utilisation. The Chinese government and industry decision-makers quickly 
recognised the national interest implications of CDM and developed a policy structure to nurture 
the nascent industry within the unique business, political and regulatory environment. CDM 
regulation, including majority local ownership, the tiered tax structure and the CER price floor, 
is designed to protect the domestic market, with a view to foster capacity and promote 
sustainable development, as defined and controlled by the Chinese government.  
  While it can be argued that the Chinese CDM regulation was beneficial at the beginning 
to develop a robust market that protects local interests, it is increasingly being viewed as an 
impediment to further market participation, especially in the face of uncertainty after the current 
commitment period concludes at the end of 2012. Capacity building for engaging with CDM was 
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highlights the need for policy-makers to be continually engaged with the evolving CDM market 
in order to continually align and adjust regulation to fully exploit the potential incentives of 
CDM to their benefit. To conclude, the Chinese and South African CDM experiences highlight 
the need for systematic engagement to create a vibrant environment for CDM to thrive in host 
countries. CDM project potential and technical capacity to work through the intricacies of CDM 
is not sufficient to harness its full potential. 
Conducive Business Environment 
As the CDM is a MBI, a conducive business setting is required for successful implementation. 
This further elucidates our previous point that development drives CDM, not the other way 
around. Considering the up-front investment required for CDM, ability to source and unilaterally 
finance underlying project funding is a key determinant to implementing CDM projects. China’s 
rapid expansion has been facilitated by the availability of debt and equity, while funding in South 
Africa has not been as readily available.  
The difficulty of attracting investment in South Africa is also further complicated by the 
high IRR required in all sectors by project investors as compared to China. As an example, the 
benchmark project IRR for a typical Chinese wind project is set at 8% (He & Morse, 2010), 
while the benchmark project IRR for a South African renewable energy project is estimated by 
NERSA, to be over 12%. This contributes to increasing the overall project costs and has makes 
South African renewable energy projects commercially unviable in the absence of financial 
incentives, when compared to perceived pricing of coal based electricity in South Africa.  
Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the post-2012 climate change regime has on-
going adverse implications for all countries developing CDM projects because there is little 
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ends. This uncertainty is causing loss of confidence in the CDM market throughout the world, 
and is affecting both South Africa and China. As a result, overall CDM investment is likely to 
slow in the near future until further clarity on market eligibility is provided.  
3.1.9 Conclusion 
The end of the current commitment period provides an opportunity to critically evaluate CDM 
worldwide and within CDM host countries to better understand if it is meeting its objective, and 
if not how it can be revised to better deliver emission reductions and sustainable development. 
This is also an ideal time for South Africa to reflect on its overall CDM experience in an effort to 
better streamline emission reductions and sustainable development into the overall priorities. By 
‘looking East’ to understand the drivers of China’s implementation of CDM, South Africa can 
explore its own experience to better understand how China has actively pursued emission 
reductions. At the same time, the uncertainty of the post 2012 market provides China the 
opportunity to adjust their approach to mitigating climate change and possibly chart their own 
domestic approach.  
This China and South Africa comparison illustrates the CDM’s limitations and cautions 
that its benefits should not be overstated. This study highlights that the CDM is a tool to support 
emission reductions but for its effective implementation a supporting national policy and a 











  92 
3.2  Paper 2: Market-Based Incentives in South Africa and Zambia: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Clean Development Mechanism 
3.2.1 Introduction 
MBIs have been widely recognised to maximise net environmental gains and be the least costly 
option for achieving pollution reduction goals (Aldy & Stavins, 2012). This belief has garnered 
such widespread support that the Kyoto Protocol, the main international agreement to address 
climate change ratified by 190 countries, is based upon market-based mechanisms dedicated to 
“stimulate green investment and help Parties meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way” 
(UNFCCC, 1997).  
The literature regarding MBIs has been primarily focused on developed countries with a 
high level of statehood and sufficient regulatory enforcement capacity. The assumption that often 
underpins MBI research is that adequate government structures are in place to enforce the 
underlying environmental policy driving the market-based approaches (Sandor et al., 2002; 
Stavins, 2002). The intent of this research note is to better understand the relevance of addressing 
global environmental change by exploring the South African and Zambian experience with the 
CDM. The CDM provides a practical opportunity to research MBIs because it provides financial 
subsidies to developing country projects in return for the abatement of carbon emissions aligned 
to the host countries sustainable development priorities. Furthermore, in theory, all rational firms 
will take advantage of “profitable opportunities for innovation”, including an abatement subsidy 
such as the CDM (Porter & Linde, 1995, p. 99). However, within the realities of Africa this has 
not occurred due to numerous multi-level complexities (Arens et al., 2011).  
Despite the initial high expectations for the CDM (Jotzo & Michaelowa, 2002), it has had 
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projects (China 42.9%, India 24.2%) and carbon credits (China 54.8%, India 15.0%) (Fenhann et 
al., 2012). In comparison Africa has only 2.8% of the CDM pipeline and 3.9% of the anticipated 
carbon credits (Fenhann et al., 2012). Within the literature this is often attributed to a host of 
issues such as lack of local capabilities, limited number of attractive large-scale projects and a 
poor investment climate (Lütken & Michaelowa, 2008). This is despite the 2001 Marrakech 
Accords, which define the modalities and procedures for the CDM, explicitly stating “the need to 
promote equitable geographic distribution of CDM project activities at regional and sub regional 
levels’’ (UNFCCC, 2001, p. 20).  
In order to better understand the underlying reasons why the CDM has not been fully 
leveraged in Africa, case studies were conducted for South Africa and Zambia. These two 
countries are at differing stages of development and draw out idiosyncratic and shared issues 
affecting the use of the CDM in Africa. Zambia is an LDC, as measured by income, human 
capital status and economic vulnerability criterion (UN-OHRLLS, 2012). South Africa is a 
member of the BASIC countries, and considered an emerging middle-income nation. 
Four recurring considerations influencing CDM utilisation in Africa have been identified 
in the CDM literature, each with implications at the international, national and local level (Arens 
& Kreibich, 2011; Bowen & Fankhauser, 2011; Karani & Gantsho, 2007). The first is awareness, 
second is eligibility to participate, third is capacity and fourth is access to finance. The remainder 
of this article explores each of these considerations within the context of the South African and 
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3.2.2 South African CDM Experience 
South Africa is the leading African country with regard to the number of CDM projects, hosting 
64 of the 217 African CDM projects (Fenhann et al., 2012). However when viewed in the global 
context, South Africa hosts only 0.8% of the overall CDM pipeline projects, making it a laggard 
when compared to other emerging economies, particularly China, that has better harnessed the 
potential of the CDM (Fay et al., 2012).  
Awareness 
In South Africa, there tends to be a general lack of public awareness and overall education 
regarding the CDM (Du Toit, 2009, p. 54). The overall complexity of the CDM market has been 
a hurdle to CDM engagement in South Africa (Little et al., 2007). The long approval process and 
concerns regarding if a project will be registered also contributes to hesitancy of potential project 
owners to engage the mechanism. Even though the South African Designated National Authority 
(i.e. government regulator responsible for CDM) has been active in promoting the CDM, other 
relevant government agencies have not been active in promoting the CDM in South Africa, a 
scenario that has slowed the uptake of CDM projects in the country. 
Based on the complexity and uncertainties inherent to the CDM process, the South 
African private sector has been hesitant to engage with CDM (Little et al., 2007). This has been 
combined with limited binding regulatory pressure to reduce emissions, resulting in an 
unwillingness to make sustentative investment in the CDM (NEPAD, 2009).  
Capacity  
CDM projects are not easy to implement, requiring significant expertise to reach registration and 
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evolving, requiring up-to-date knowledge of regular CDM EB rulings. While other countries in 
Africa have few if any local groups with the expertise to successfully develop a CDM project, 
South Africa has a core group of CDM service providers. This includes both local consultancies 
and international organisations with the technical expertise to develop projects in South Africa.  
Hindering further CDM utilisation is the potential project owner. They often lack the 
ability to identify quality opportunities and corresponding benefits, resulting in little uptake of 
potential CDM projects. As a result, few project champions for the CDM have emerged, 
particularly when faced with more pressing business priorities. As a result, the critical mass 
required to propel the CDM market forward has not emerged.  
Eligibility 
A main eligibility concern going forward for South Africa is the European regulation restricting 
projects registered post 2012 from being eligible for the EU ETS. While South African projects 
will still be eligible to generate CDM or voluntary market credits, they will not be eligible for the 
compliance based EU ETS unless the project is registered before the end of 2012. This has 
created further uncertainty for project developers and owners because the EU ETS is the primary 
market for selling CDM emission reductions. As a result, being restricted from accessing the EU 
ETS will significantly hinder potential projects from moving forward with the CDM process post 
2012.  
Historically, one of the main eligibility constraints for South Africa has been at the 
national level. The economy is in large part based on electricity produced with an extremely high 
grid emissions factor. This creates an opportunity for renewable energy projects connecting to 
the national grid to generate one of the highest carbon credits per kWh of electricity in the world. 
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provides an ideal baseline scenario for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects, creating 
significant potential for CDM projects (Du Toit, 2009, p. 49). However, in order to take 
advantage, independent power producers need a stable planning horizon, binding power purchase 
agreements and regulatory frameworks in place that provide an adequate return to make 
renewable projects feasible (von Flotow & Friebe, 2011). Without these assurances on the 
project’s financial metrics, renewable energy projects cannot be developed, which also result in a 
missed opportunity for leveraging the CDM.  
The ability of renewable energy developers to secure an off-take agreement in South 
Africa has been limited, which historically has stalled renewable energy projects. However this 
situation has recently changed. The first round of negotiations regarding power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) for wind project IPPs was announced in December 2011 as part of a 
competitive bidding process, which allows qualified renewable energy projects to bid for above 
market tariff rates. As a result, renewable energy projects are now under development in South 
Africa and applying for CDM credits (DNA RSA, 2011).  
Finance 
There are numerous issues pertaining to underlying project finance required to develop a CDM 
project that adversely affects participation. The uncertainty surrounding the CDM market, 
including fluctuating market prices and uncertainty of the Kyoto Protocol, has created a situation 
whereby the upfront expense to access the CDM is a major deterrent to moving projects forward. 
The high cost of validation is also a major bottleneck to CDM projects. Project developers 
interviewed view the process to get a project registered as a recurrent problem in South Africa 
due to cost and availability. Expense for developing the required documents to access the CDM, 
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$50,000USD, with validation costs estimated as high as $70,000 depending on project type 
(Econ Pöyry, 2010, p. 6). Furthermore, if an existing methodology to access the CDM cannot be 
leveraged, the cost and time required to develop a new methodology is a prohibitive factor that 
limits the flexibility of the CDM.  
The income from carbon credits is usually not sufficient to cover the overall project costs. 
As a result, there is a need for additional up-front and on-going funding. Leveraging future 
revenue from the carbon credits to access better terms for either project equity or debt can be a 
beneficial aspect of CDM. However the prevailing uncertainty in the carbon market makes most 
financial institutions reluctant to leverage future carbon revenue. As a result, CDM financing 
becomes an afterthought that can only be leveraged after underlying project finance is organised, 
which brings into question additionallity of the project, which is the key eligibility requirement 
of CDM projects.  
3.2.3 Zambian CDM Experience 
To date, Zambia has benefited very little from CDM. Only 20 CDM project idea notes have been 
submitted to the Zambian government as of 2010, with only one having been registered (DNA 
Zambia, 2010). Zambia has not been able to fully harness the CDM due to myriad of inter-linked 
issues. Similar to South Africa, the obstacles involving awareness, capacity, eligibility and 
finance have individually and collectively hindered the CDM uptake in Zambia.  
Awareness 
The CDM’s complex nature makes communicating the potential opportunity very difficult. In 
Zambia, there is a low general awareness of the CDM and a corresponding reluctance to engage 
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Mitigating climate change is viewed as important but not urgent when compared to the myriad of 
development challenges facing the country. As a result, there is an overall low level of 
understanding of CDM potential. Furthermore, disconnect between projects presented to the 
Zambian government and subsequent follow through to registration indicates that the project 
sponsors may not fully understand the rigour of the CDM process. There have been numerous 
public and private sector CDM awareness building and training initiatives in Zambia, however 
these have not translated into actual projects, as key decision makers with the resources to push a 
project forward have typically not been involved.  
Capacity  
The CDM is extremely difficult to implement due to a high level of administrative and 
informational requirements. Local technical expertise is required for all aspects of developing 
and managing a CDM project. The current technical capacity within Zambia to conform to CDM 
methodologies, procedures and scientific analysis is limited to a few individuals. There is a need 
for more local capacity to identify potential projects, match the project to an appropriate 
methodology, specify the technical requirements, prepare the necessary documentation and 
facilitate the project through the CDM process. Due to a lack practical implementation in 
Zambia, these skills have yet to emerge locally.  
Eligibility 
In order to maintain environmental integrity of offset credits, CDM has taken a rigid approach to 
approving projects at the expense of flexibility and accessibility. The lack of flexibility has 
resulted in significant eligibility restrictions for Zambia that has political, equity and ethical 










  99 
by both the CDM guidelines (e.g. grid connected renewable) and the EU ETS (e.g. land-based 
projects).  
Grid-connected renewable energy projects in Zambia have not been able to take 
advantage of carbon markets because of the low GEF baseline. In contrast to South Africa’s high 
dependency on coal, Zambia’s power production comes primarily from hydro, which results in a 
low emissions per kWh produced, which substantially reduces the number of credits for a grid 
connected renewable energy project. This in effect serves as a punishment to countries that have 
developed clean power producers like hydro as opposed countries with a high GEF derived from 
‘dirty’ fossil fuel based power production. This negatively impacts opportunities for renewable 
energy or grid connected energy efficiency projects in Zambia. A regional baseline is an option 
to address this constraint but has not yet been utilised.  
  The EU ETS scheme does not allow land-use projects to be used as offsets. This is a 
serious detriment to the applicability of CDM to Zambia, because a significant percentage of 
Zambia’s emissions are a result of land use change. This is further restricted at the national level 
in Zambia due to specific guidelines within afforestation and reforestation projects that have 
result in a limited definition of a forest, thereby potentially excluding promising land-use 
projects.  
Finance 
Financing a CDM project is often referred to as the major constraint to the CDM, particularly in 
Zambia. CDM projects are expensive and require an additional financial commitment on top of 
the project’s operating budget. As discussed previously, extremely high and variable transaction 
costs of CDM is a deterrent to its utilisation. This coupled with the overall uncertainly around the 
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While financing the CDM process is always a major constraint, underlying project 
finance emerges as an even more pressing problem for sustainable development projects. Despite 
the intent of the CDM to generate ‘green investment’ from industrialised to developing nations, 
it has been found that the underlying finance from CDM projects primarily comes from the host 
country. A study of the first 628 registered CDM projects found that only 48 indicated in the 
PDD any involvement in the financing by industrialised country parties (Lütken, 2008, p. 2). 
This has serious ramifications for Africa because access to finance is often in short supply and 
therefore relies on foreign investment for CDM projects, which has historically diverted 
investment to lower cost emission reduction projects in Asia or South America (Jotzo & 
Michaelowa, 2002). Furthermore, if investment funding is available, it often comes at an 
exorbitant cost of capital to compensate for the risks associated with the local business and 
political environment. As a result, potential CDM eligible projects are often sidelined because of 
inability to access funding, even with the added benefit of a future revenue stream from the 
carbon markets.  
Compounding this problem is the cash flow issue. Carbon credits are often purchased at 
issuance or at a deep discount if the buyer takes on additional risk and pays up front prior to 
issuance. While in theory carbon credits can be a future revenue stream that can enhance a 
project’s commercial prospects, it is often a small portion of the overall capital expenditure and 
paid ex-post. This causes a cash flow problem for developing a project because a majority of 
project costs are up-front and the timing of payment for carbon credits is often two to three years 
after the project begins. This greatly minimises the benefit of the CDM to viable projects that are 
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3.2.4 Conclusion and Recommendations  
The CDM lacks clarity but not complexity, resulting in a low level of participation. The 
complexities associated with the CDM are driven from the top down, flowing from the 
international climate regime to national government to the local participants as illustrated in 
Table 3.3.  
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level to share lessons learned. At the national level, government agencies need to align 
development objectives with the opportunity of the CDM whenever possible. Lastly, a more 
proactive role by the local private sector and industry associations is needed to ensure the 
opportunity of CDM is fully understood.  
Capacity has proven to be a large constraint in Africa. This is viewed as a lack of local 
capabilities and interest, especially in the case of large companies with operations in Africa. This 
concerns both and international stakeholders and the host countries. The CDM Executive Board 
also needs to do a better job of understanding African specific constraints and develop innovative 
ways to overcome what is lacking. One such opportunity is to simplify the CDM process, 
including all methodologies, benchmarks and baselines. This approach may require additional 
checks to ensure the integrity of the emission reductions generated, but could reduce duplication 
and increase overall cost effectiveness. At the national level, alignment of government 
sustainable development goals with private sector capacity to engage with the CDM could also 
motivate greater participation.  
Lack of flexibility at the international level weighs heavily on the national and local 
perspectives. The limited scope for land-use projects in the CDM raises an overarching equity 
question as land-use change is claimed to account for 20% of global emissions (Collier et al., 
2008). Considering small-scale farmers in Africa are likely to be most severely impacted by 
climate change (IPCC, 2007), provision for land-use change projects are needed to adequately 
address the drivers of climate change in Africa. Furthermore, the requirement to use national 
baselines for grid-connected electricity does not recognise the fact that carbon emissions have 
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generate their power from carbon intensive sources to also share in the potential benefit from 
carbon finance.  
Lastly, lack of access to finance has had longstanding negative implications for Africa. 
The high cost of developing CDM projects is well known and presents a significant barrier for 
accessing carbon markets. Underlying project finance is extremely difficult to secure in Africa 
due to high levels of risk. The CDM has not galvanised significant investment from the 
industrialised world to developing countries as intended, therefore the onus is often on the host 
country to provide the up-front financing before carbon credits can be developed and issued. 
Considering Africa has limited opportunities to access commercial finance, it follows that CDM 
projects have been stifled by a lack of project finance.  
The CDM, as demonstrated by the South Africa and Zambia experiences, shows the need 
for market-based mechanisms to overcome challenges concerning awareness, capacity, eligibility 
and finance. Going forward, experiences from the missed opportunity of CDM in Africa provide 
valuable lessons to improve the design of incentives for addressing global environmental change 
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3.3  Paper 3: Market-Based Incentives in Developing Countries: Geographical Dispersion, 
Antecedents and Implications of the Clean Development Mechanism 
3.3.1 Introduction  
Aldy and Stavins’ article in Science titled ‘Climate Negotiators Create an Opportunity for 
Scholars’ urgently calls for “innovative proposals for future international climate-policy 
architecture” that will engage both developed and developing countries to contribute to emission 
reductions (2012, p. 1044). To develop innovative proposals that are effective and efficient for 
developing countries, it is first necessary to fully understand the implementation experience of 
the existing global climate agreement, the Kyoto Protocol. All developing countries that have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol are in theory equally eligible to participate in the project based offset 
mechanism known as the CDM. In reality, utilisation of the CDM across the developing world 
has been highly varied. In this article we attempt to better understand the underlying economic 
and non-economic factors that affect CDM utilisation via a rigourous quantitative analysis. We 
attempt to contribute to Aldy and Stavins’ call for innovative approaches to reduce emissions by 
providing insight into the relationship between market incentives and the underlying country 
context of developing countries.  
 There has been a significant amount of literature regarding the CDM beginning before 
the 2001 Marrakech Accords defined the modalities and procedures for the CDM. Initially the 
CDM literature debated the role of developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol (Ellerman, 
Jacoby, and Decaux, 1998; Criqui and Viguier, 2000; Springer, 2003), predicted how it would 
perform (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002; Michaelowa et al., 2000; Zhang, 2004; Streck, 2004) and 
evaluated possible CDM investment risks (Oleschak and Springer, 2007; Laurikka and Springer, 
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analysis largely focused on how the CDM was emerging (Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007; Ellis et al., 
2007; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007; Fay et al., 2012), evaluating the role of sustainable 
development (Sutter and Parreño, 2007; Olsen, 2007; Pearson, 2007) and assessing the 
geographic distribution of the CDM and its drivers (Boyd et al., 2009; Byigero, Clancy, and 
Skutsch, 2010; Jung, 2006). Recently the CDM literature has explored ways to revise the CDM 
for the post-2012 commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (Kolk and Mulder, 2011; 
Newell, 2012; Boyd et al., 2009).  
While a majority of the CDM literature has been qualitative, there have also been limited 
attempts at using econometric modeling to determine what host country factors are likely to 
attract CDM projects. Dinar et al. (2008) and Dolsak and Bowerman (2007) explore international 
cooperation dynamics in an effort to predict FDI into CDM projects. Wang and Firestone (2009) 
use linear regression to highlight that the CDM favours large, emerging economies with ample 
opportunity to generate low cost emission reductions. Flues (2010) also uses regression analysis 
to explore the overall CDM distribution and concludes “economic development and growth, 
fossil fuel, and renewable energy generation, as well as links to developed countries and 
institutional quality positively affect the number of projects hosted” (p.1).  
What is missing from the literature is a levelised comparison of the countries that have 
leveraged the CDM. The above mentioned literature has all explored the CDM on an absolute 
basis which we view as lacking because it treats all developing countries the same. For example, 
an absolute comparison between China and Lesotho is obviously inadequate because of the sheer 
differences in scale. While using econometric modeling on an absolute basis may be necessary to 
predict which countries are likely to attract CDM projects in the near term, it is not sufficient to 
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This article attempts to provide quantitative evidence regarding the antecedents necessary 
for efficient and effective incentives to reduce emissions in developing countries based on the 
CDM experience. We analyse CDM implementation since its inception in 2005 by exploring 
which host country antecedents favour CDM implementation on a levelised basis. A quantitative 
analysis is employed to provide a diagnostic on the regional spatial patterns of the CDM and then 
investigate the relationship between CDM usage and macro indicators at the country level. We 
aim to provide policy makers, practitioners, academics and climate change negotiators rigourous, 
empirical evidence on how market incentives have performed in developing economies and 
identifying the antecedents that enable the CDM to be leveraged.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section provides a brief 
introduction to the CDM as a market incentive. Section 3.3.3 outlines the approach taken to this 
research and the data used to perform the analysis. Section 3.3.4 presents the research findings 
and discusses implications. The final section provides a summary and draws conclusions.  
3.3.2 Clean Development Mechanism as a Market-Based Incentive 
Environmental policies and mechanisms supporting MBIs are often recommended to maximise 
net environmental gains while minimising costs (Coase, 1960; Sandor, Bettelheim and 
Swingland, 2002; Stavins, 2002). Acceptance of MBIs as a preferred approach for environmental 
protection has garnered such widespread support that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the main 
international agreement to address climate change, is based on market mechanisms (Figueres and 
Streck, 2009). This assigns a market price to emissions that creates an incentive to emit less, 
either through efficiencies or offsets (Yeoh, 2008, p. 190). An underlying assumption associated 
with MBIs is that adequate governance and business structures are in place to facilitate market 
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widely varying abilities to develop and enforce commonly binding rules (Börzel and Risse, 
2010).  
The CDM allows developing countries to participate in the Kyoto Protocol by hosting 
projects that produce emission offsets for sale to developed countries with emission reduction 
commitments. It is intended to create a win-win situation for developed and developing countries 
via the dual purpose of: 1) allowing developed countries to purchase project-based greenhouse 
gas emission reduction credits from developing countries to meet their binding obligations in an 
efficient manner; and 2) assisting developing countries “in achieving sustainable development 
and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention”, i.e. the stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (UNFCCC, 1997). The implicit purpose of the 
CDM is for developed countries, acknowledged as the historical drivers of climate change, to 
financially incentivise developing countries to voluntarily reduce their carbon emissions beyond 
business as usual scenarios.  
3.3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Method 
We next explore how countries’ socio-economic and governance characteristics relate to CDM 
utilisation. Firstly, CDM usage is compared at the regional level to look at the state of the CDM 
geographic dispersion. The 2001 Marrakech Accords define the modalities and procedures which 
emphasise “the need to promote equitable geographic distribution of CDM project activities at 
regional and sub regional levels’’ (UNFCCC 2001, p. 20). In reality the spatial dispersion of 
CDM projects across the developing world is uneven so we explore the precise status of this 
inequity. Secondly, four hypotheses are tested using multivariate regression, each exploring the 
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method is designed to provide a lens into how developing countries’ characteristics and contexts 
relate to the performance of MBIs.  
A challenge in this research has been to identify appropriate and valid macro indicators. 
Available indicators and data sets often provide only approximations for the underlying 
conceptual macro-level country characteristics of interest to us. A second limitation is that the 
research is a cross-sectional analysis and thus is not able to capture the continually evolving, 
dynamic nature of the market. 
Data 
CDM Data Points: CDM statistics from the ‘UNEP Risoe CDM Pipeline Analysis and Database’ 
as of April 1, 2011 are analysed. The dataset consists of 6,059 projects active in the CDM 
pipeline, representing an estimated 811 million credits per year (Fenhann et al., 2011). This 
analysis timeframe is characterised by equal eligibility for developing countries to sell their 
issued emission reductions to the EU ETS. Future regulation will only accept credits from 
projects registered in LDC post-2012, which is likely to have a significant impact on the 
dispersion of projects. 
Geographic Groupings: To evaluate the regional dispersion of CDM projects, both the number 
of CDM projects and total emission reductions are evaluated in regional groupings, as well as 
crosscutting categories. The following regions and categories include Europe and Central Asia, 
Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, 
East Asia & Pacific, LDC, African LDCs and Asian LDCs.  
LDCs have been included as categories because they are considered to be laggards in 
implementing CDM projects. At the outset of the CDM, it was predicted that LDCs would not 
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years’ experience suggests this to be the case (Arens and Kreibich 2011; Okubo and Michaelowa 
2010).  
Country Data: As of April 2011 there were 126 CDM eligible countries as defined by having a 
functioning approval body called the designated national authority. Not having the country 
approval body renders the CDM inaccessible so countries without one have been removed from 
the data set.  
We are concerned with understanding developing countries, therefore CDM eligible 
countries at a relatively advanced stage of economic development act as outliers for this study 
and were removed from the regression analysis. Any country with a nominal GDP per capita 
over $12,000 USD in year 2010 is removed (Lütken 2011). As a result 16 countries
5
 with 144 
Projects (2.38% of CDM pipeline total) and over 27 million annual credits (3.41% of total 
credits) have been excluded (Fenhann et al. 2011). This leaves a 110-country dataset for the 
analysis.  
There are 48 total LDCs
6
 of which 38 have a country approval body and 20 have at least 
one project (Fenhann et al. 2011). 13 of the 33 LDCs in Africa host 43 projects (0.71% of total 
CDM pipeline projects) generating an anticipated 3.3 million credits per year (0.42% of total 
credits) (ibid). Seven of the 14 LDCs in Asia host 26 projects (0.43% total) and produce an 
estimated 7.1 million credits per year (0.88% total) (ibid). Haiti is the only LDC in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region and has not hosted any projects as of April 2011. 
Control Variables: The diagnostic compares CDM usage by the regions with nominal GDP, FDI 
and greenhouse gas emissions, as measured by carbon dioxide equivalent (including all fossil 
fuel based emissions per the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, 2007 – referred to as 
                                                        
5
 These countries include Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Israel, 
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CO2E). These variables are then included in the regression analysis as control variables. CDM 
projects are privately funded and predicted to be hosted in countries where complementary assets 
and resources are in place (Huang and Barker, 2009; Jung, 2006; Niederberger and Saner, 2005; 
Byigero, Clancy, and Skutsch, 2010). FDI flows and GDP are used as control variables to 
normalise the economic variance of CDM eligible countries and mitigate the possibility of 
endogenous bias.  
Countries with high levels of emissions are often considered to possess ‘low hanging 
fruit’ opportunities for relatively inexpensive carbon credits (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002; 
Okubo and Michaelowa, 2010). While most acknowledge the CDM has not been equitably 
distributed, Lütken (2011) has recently claimed that even though LDCs have been slow to 
initially leverage the CDM, there is increasingly equitable CDM usage when comparing the 
number of projects relative to a host country’s fossil fuel based emissions. Therefore, a proxy for 
large-scale fossil fuel based emissions is included as a control variable.  
3.3.4 Empirical Analysis and Findings 
Preliminary Findings 
Comparing an emerging economy to an LDC is impractical on an absolute basis. Developing 
countries have widely varying populations, economies and carbon emissions. Therefore, to 
analyse the geographic dispersion of the CDM, we evaluate on a levelised basis. To understand if 
levelised CDM dispersion has been equitable, comparing it to population is regarded as the most 
important variable because the “location of emissions of greenhouse gases has no effect on the 
global distribution of damages” (Stavins, 1997, p. 7).  
Table 3.4 uses descriptive statistics to show which regions have done well and which 
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projects by population, GDP, FDI and CO2E. First, we analyse the availability of CDM projects 
at the global level. There are 1.15 projects available for every million people in the developing 
world, 0.39 projects for every billion dollar of economic activity, 0.03 projects per million in 
FDI and 0.45 projects per million tons of CO2E. Across all measures, East Asia and Pacific 
emerges as the primary beneficiaries of the CDM as it has higher allocation of projects compared 
to global averages. South Asia has performed well in attracting CDM projects based on GDP or 
FDI or CO2E. Latin America and Caribbean also does well on the basis of population and level 
of CO2E.  
A careful analysis reveals that South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and East Asia 
and Pacific regions have more projects on the basis of CO2E. However, GDP and FDI criteria 
also show that South Asia and East Asia and Pacific regions have done well. Latin America and 
Caribbean and East Asia and Pacific perform better in terms of population. East Asia and Pacific, 
dominated by China, emerges as the clear CDM winner with all variables scoring higher than the 
global measure. South Asia, led by India, is a leading region when levelising by GDP, FDI and 
CO2E, but falls behind the global per capita mark. Latin America and Caribbean, led by Brazil, 
performs extremely well on a per capita and per emission basis, but significantly falls below the 
global mark when levelised by GDP or FDI. Europe and Central Asia’s usage scores slightly 
below the global average in all measures. Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East & North Africa 
significantly lag behind across all measures. LDC significantly lags behind in all but CDM 
projects by CO2E, which is close to the global average. Surprisingly, African LDC projects by 
CO2E are higher than the global average.  
Table 3.5 further investigates the dispersion of CDM by levelising the estimated annual 










  112 
CO2eE. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the impact of varying project sizes, 
specifically if there is an unequal dispersion of projects producing significant amounts of 
emission reductions, specifically industrial gas projects (e.g. HFC, PFC, N2O) that make up less 
than 2% of the project pipeline until 2012 but account for 27% of the expected emission 
(Fenhann et al., 2011). As compared to overall global scores, Table 3.5 demonstrates East Asia 
and Pacific and Europe and Central Asia as the main emission reduction beneficiaries, with Latin 
America and Caribbean and South Asia doing fairly well. Latin America and Caribbean fairs 
above the global averages by population and CO2E. South Asia has done well by GDP, FDI, and 
CO2E. Again, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East & North Africa significantly lag behind in all 
measures. LDC has close results to global average in terms of projects by CO2E but significantly 
lags behind in all other measures.  
Of particular note, East Asia and Pacific emerges even stronger in the levelised emission 
reduction comparison than in the project comparison of Table 3.4. This is primarily due to the 
hosting of a large number of industrial gas projects in China. Overall, the variation in Table 3.5 
as compared to Table 3.4 demonstrates that the average CDM project size as measured by annual 
estimated emission reductions is not equal across the regions.  
Table 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate that overall LDCs receive low scores on a per capita, GDP 
and FDI basis. This indicates that the CDM has not been equitably dispersed on a levelised basis. 
As stated above, when comparing the number of CDM projects to emission levels the overall 
LDC score rises to near parity with the global score. Considering LDCs are in part selected by 
low-income and economic vulnerability criterion, it follows that LDCs energy usage is less 
carbon intensive (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011). This highlights the overall underdevelopment 
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Levelising CDM usage by emissions of LDCs does not tell a complete story because the 
commonly used Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center measurement only includes 
emissions from fossil fuel sources (Boden, Marland, and Andres, 2007) and does not include 
land use change and forestry. This is significant because land use change, primarily as a result of 
deforestation, represents an estimated 33% of the total emission profile in developing countries, 
but rises to represent 62% of total emissions in LDCs (Baumert, Herzog, and Pershing, 2005). As 
a result, levelised analysis of CDM dispersion by emissions produces distorted results unless the 
underlying measurement is able to capture the emissions from land use change in LDCs.  
Table 3.6 provides a summary of statistics for selected variables influencing CDM 
projects. The average CDM project per capita is very low (0.001). Similar to CDM projects per 
capita, the average emission reduction per capita is low (0.140). Among potential determinants, 
the average for Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is 52.07 while the average for HDI is 
0.55. The average GDP per capita is US$3,707.82 equivalent, however, it ranges from US$160 
to US$9,714. This suggests the data includes projects across the range of developing countries, 
from the least developed to emerging economies. The average of gross fixed capital formation 
per capita (GFCF) per capita, FDI per capita, and CO2E per capita is US$777.25, US$92.76, and 
2.07, respectively. Overall, Table 3.6 shows the rich variation in the characteristics of the CDM 
projects.  
Variables 
In line with what has been presented in CDM literature on an absolute basis, this research 
indicates that the CDM has not been equitably dispersed on a levelised basis either. To better 
understand what drives this inequity, the remainder of the article explores how national level 
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findings. The following sets of variables explore CDM usage parameters at the macro level using 
multi-variant regression analysis. 
Business Climate and Financial Capacity: Business environment measured by the 2011 World 
Bank/IFC Ease of Doing Business (EDB) composite score (2010) and World Development 
Indicator reported GFCF (2010). Any market mechanism is dependent upon an enabling business 
environment and access to finance, and the CDM is no exception. The business and economic 
environment is an important factor in determining the host country level of risk for CDM 
projects (Oleschak & Springer, 2007). The EDB indicator provides an aggregated ranking on 
ease of doing business. It is a composite figure covering nine indicator areas comprised of 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a 
business (World Bank and IFC, 2010). GFCF demonstrates how much is invested in a country 
rather than consumed. Research has shown that a majority of CDM projects are unilaterally 
funded, demonstrating the need for host country financing capabilities (Lütken, 2008). The 
GFCF is intended to serve as an approximation of domestic finance available to fund CDM 
projects. Hence, we test the following: 
H1: A country that has good business and economic climate is more likely to have successful 
CDM projects  
Governance and Political Stability: Corruption and political stability as measured by the World 
Bank’s WGI and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political instability index (PII). The host 
country governance, level of corruption and institutional capacity is commonly thought to be a 
determinant of CDM. Research has identified host country risk and governance, affecting CDM 
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implementation (Newell, Jenner, and Baker, 2009; Newell, 2008; Nhamo, 2006). WGI is used in 
the regression analysis as a proxy of governance. WGI is an aggregate indicator of several 
hundred variables in the following categories: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). Furthermore, political risk is 
commonly known to decrease investment and increase cost of capital, intuitively reducing the 
likelihood of CDM engagement (Jung, 2006; Oleschak and Springer, 2007). PII is used as the 
proxy for political risk of the host countries. It also measures economic distress and underlying 
vulnerability to unrest, aggregating into an index score (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011). 
Based on above, we test the following: 
H2: A CDM project is more likely to be implemented in a host country that has good governance 
and political stability 
Environmental Concerns: High levels of environmental and climate risk are hypothesised to 
create an awareness and incentive to proactively address the cause (Nussbaumer, 2009). 
Environmental indicators measured by the Yale Center of Environmental Law and Policy’s EPI 
and climate risks measured by the Center for Global Development’s climate driver index (CDI) 
are measured to test this hypothesis. EPI ranks national environmental results by measuring 
public health and ecosystem vitality across 25 indicators (Emerson et al., 2010). CDI develops 
risk indicators to measure and compare countries vulnerability to three climate issues: weather-
related disasters, sea-level rise, and loss of agricultural productivity (Wheeler, 2011).  
The CDM is a mechanism that gives monetary value to emission reductions, 
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high Carbon Dioxide Intensity (CO2I) theoretically have significant potential for CDM projects 
that take advantage of opportunities for efficiency gains. Therefore, we test the following: 
H3: A country facing threats from environmental pollution and climate risk will prioritise a 
response to addressing the risk, including leveraging the CDM 
Human Development and Competencies: A country overall level of development signals its 
ability to prioritise discretionary action such as engaging with the CDM. If a country is lacking 
the resources to meet the basic needs of its citizens, it will be disadvantaged in sharing equitable 
benefits of a complex market mechanism (Fay et al., 2012; Boyd et al., 2009; McGowan, 2008). 
The United Nations Development Programme’s HDI is used as the proxy. HDI is an aggregate 
score based on life expectancy, education index as defined by mean years of schooling and 
expected years of schooling and gross national income at purchasing power parity per capita 
(UNDP, 2010). This raises the following hypothesis to test: 
H4: Countries at a higher level of development are able to prioritise taking action on climate 
change and under-developed countries must focus their limited resources on service 
delivery of more pressing basic needs  
Multicollinearity 
Next, Table 3.7 illustrates the correlation statistic of each variable. A high correlation between 
variables could affect the estimates quality, resulting in misleading interpretations. We apply a 
plus or minus 0.700 correlation threshold in order to avoid multicollinearity issues (Farrar and 
Glauber, 1967). The threshold is exceeded only between EDB and WGI therefore overall the 
indicators are deemed to be unique and stable.  
CDM project per capita is positively related to GFCF per capita (0.311), EPI (0.313), 
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correlation with the CDM project per capita. As expected, PII, CDI, and EDB has negative 
correlation with the CDM projects.  
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
To estimate the dependency parameters influencing CDM usage and to test the above 
hypotheses, a pooled regression analysis is employed. Host country utilisation (as defined by 
CDM projects per capita) is the dependent variable; selected country macro indicators are 
independent variables. To better understand the dispersion and utilisation of CDM projects, 
country specific control variables of GDP, FDI, and CO2E per capita are included in the 
regression model. The pooled regression model is as follows: 
  
 
Where Yi is CDM projects per capita. Zk is a vector of k potential determinants of the CDM 
projects. k includes the eight potential determinants of the four hypotheses: EDB, GFCF, WGI, 
PII, EPI, CDI, CO2I and HDI. Cj is a vector of control variables i.e. GDP, FDI and CO2E. 
Table 3.8 presents the regression results for eight models. The coefficients of the 
variables and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are presented for each model. The expected sign for 
each variable are indicated in the second column of the Table 3.8. The sign for GDP per capita 
and FDI per capita can be positive or negative. The bold numbers indicate statistical significance, 
while the * indicates the level of significance (1% =***, 5% =**, 10% =*). Model 1 explores the 
relationship of CDM project per capita to EDB and control variables. A higher EDB suggests a 
weak business condition for the country. The regression results show that CDM project per 
capita is negatively and significantly related to EDB (-0.381). Model 2 shows the positive and 
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a positive impact on the number of CDM projects. We find that EDB and GFCF are influencing 
factors in the selection of countries to host CDM projects. The findings suggest that business and 
economic conditions have positive influence on the CDM projects as hypothesised.  
The quality of governance and political stability is anticipated to have a positive impact 
on the business environment. Model 3 confirms this relationship as WGI (0.472) is positively 
and significantly related to CDM projects. The results for political instability do not show a 
significant relationship with the CDM projects. Hence, model 3 and 4 suggest that good 
governance and political stability encourage CDM projects as indicated in hypothesis 2.  
Models 5, 6 and 7 test the environment and climate vectors. As expected, EPI has 
positive and significant coefficient (0.320) on CDM project implementation, while CDI has 
negative and significant coefficient (-0.186). Surprisingly, CO2I is not found to be an influencing 
factor for CDM projects. Overall, the results suggest that CDM projects move to the countries 
that are being affected by environmental issues.  
Model 8 tests hypothesis 4. The results show that HDI has a strong and positive 
coefficient (0.691) with the implementation of CDM projects. The estimate (coefficient 0.691) 
and significance level (t-statistics 6.91) for HDI is the highest among all potential determinants. 
This suggests that HDI is an important determinant in hosting CDM projects. Including all other 
significant determinants in Model 9 further tests the power of HDI. The results show HDI retains 
a positive and significant relationship with CDM projects, as demonstrated by an increased 
coefficient of HDI (0.793) at the 1% significance level (t-statistics 4.03)
7
.  
 Regression Robustness 
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Further testing the robustness of the results, we include all determinants for each hypothesis in a 
single regression model. Table 3.9 presents the results for each hypothesis tested in separate 
models. The results clearly identify the significant factor in each model. Hypothesis 1 shows 
EDB (-0.384) and GFCF (0.570) to be significant factors when regressed together in the same 
model. As expected hypothesis 2 shows continued significance of WGI (0.213) and insignificant 
results for PII. Hypothesis 3 results suggest EPI (0.270) to be the dominant factor, with 
insignificant results for CDI and CO2 intensity. Hypothesis 4 model results remain the same as 
reported in Table 3.8.  
The above regression results indicate that HDI has the most economic and significant 
value for the implementation of CDM projects. Now it is imperative to test the presence of HDI 
with other significant, influencing factors. Hence, HDI is interacted with the significant variables 
obtained from above regressions. This provides analysis of the moderating effect of other 
variables on HDI.  
Table 3.10 presents the results for the interaction variables with respect to HDI. Model 1 
and 2 use significant variables associated with hypothesis 1. Though the interaction terms are not 
significant in both models, HDI is positively and significantly related to CDM projects. Model 3 
represents the interaction terms for the significant variable of hypothesis 2. The interaction term 
WGI with HDI is positive and significant (0.237). HDI is also positive and highly significant, 
indicating that WGI is also an important influence on CDM projects. Similarly, as environmental 
concerns suggested in hypothesis 3, model 4 shows a positive and significant result for 
interaction term EPI with HDI. The model excludes HDI to avoid multicollinearity issue. Model 
5 uses the significant variable CDI with HDI as the interaction term. The results show that HDI 
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that while other significant factors have a moderating effect on HDI, it retains a significant 
influence throughout each model.  
3.3.5 Conclusion 
The initial CDM assumption that all host countries will equitably exploit economic incentives 
proves inaccurate when moving across the developing world. This article’s analysis demonstrates 
that Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and LDCs are laggards in nearly all 
categories when analysing CDM dispersion on a levelised basis. The HDI emerges as the most 
important factor suggesting that CDM applicable countries need to reach a minimum level of 
development in order to foster an environment conducive to CDM implementation. Countries 
that are unable to provide a minimum service level around basic needs are unlikely to mobilise 
resources for reducing emissions when faced with competing priorities and interests. Meeting 
basic needs is an immediate concern of developing countries, while reducing emissions below 
business as usual is not likely to be considered a priority. The result is that it is difficult to 
prioritise and enforce emission reductions over competing interests that are viewed as more 
important by when faced with limited resources and capacity to meet the basic needs of the 
country.  
The findings of this article suggest that without having achieved a minimum threshold of 
development, even the most economically advantageous incentive will not be fully maximised. 
This suggests that the one-size-fits all approach of the CDM is problematic if equity across all 
participating countries is desirable. In summation, in order to answer Aldy and Stavins’ call for 
proposals to reduce emissions in developing countries, the host country level of development 
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Appendices 
Table 3.4: CDM Geographical Dispersion by Number of Projects 
This table describes the geographical dispersion of CDM projects globally and region wise. The projects are 
presented by number of projects per million populations, per billion dollar gross domestic products, per million 
dollar foreign direct investment, per million ton CO2 emissions. 
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Least Developed Country in Asia 0.10 0.18 0.02 0.30 
     
Note:  (1) World Bank Statistics, Population, Total, 2010  
(2) Gross Domestic Product, Current USD, 2009  
(3) Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, Current USD, 2009  
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Table 3.5: CDM Geographical Dispersion by Carbon Emission Reductions 
This table describes the geographical dispersion of projects based on carbon emission reductions globally and region 
wise. The projects are presented by number of projects per million populations, per billion dollar gross domestic 
products, per million dollar foreign direct investment, per million ton CO2 Emissions.  
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Least Developed Country in Asia 0.03 49 0.25 82 
     
Note:  (1) World Bank Statistics, Population, Total, 2010  
(2) Gross Domestic Product, Current USD, 2009 
(3) Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows, Current USD, 2009 
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics of CDM Project Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables examined subsequently as determinants of CDM projects. CDM Projects and CER are the CDM projects by 
country population. Carbon Dioxide Intensity by the Country – Emission by Oil Equivalent Energy Use is the CDM Projects divided by fossil fuel emissions as 
reported by Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center. Political Instability Index is used as the proxy for political risk of the host countries measuring 
economic distress and underlying vulnerability to unrest, aggregating into an index score. Climate Driver Index is a barometer of risk indicators to measure and 
compare countries vulnerability to three climate issues: weather-related disasters, sea-level rise, and loss of agricultural productivity. Environmental Performance 
Index indicates national environmental results by measuring public health and ecosystem vitality across 25 indicators. World Governance Indicator is the 
aggregate indicator of several hundred variables in the following categories: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. World Bank / IFC Ease of Doing Business by Country is the aggregated 
ranking based on a composite figure covering nine indicator areas comprised of starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. Human Development Index is the aggregate 
score based on life expectancy, education index as defined by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling and gross national income at purchasing 
power parity per capita. Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Capita demonstrates how much is invested in a country per capita rather than consumed. Gross 
Domestic Product per Capita is the dollar income per capita of a country. Foreign Direct Investment per Capita is the foreign direct investment per capita in the 
country. Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita is the proxy for large-scale fossil fuel based emissions of a country. 
 
Variables N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
       
Clean Development Mechanism Projects per Capita 110 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.006 
       
Certified Emission Reduction per Capita 110 0.140 0.024 0.645 0.000 7.000 
       
Carbon Dioxide Intensity by the Country – Emission by Oil 
Equivalent Energy Use 
78 1.970 1.962 0.970 0.000 4.000 
       
Political Instability Index 110 5.946 6.600 1.984 0.000 8.800 
       
Climate Driver Index 109 25.620 24.165 17.139 -9.000 100.000 
       
Environmental Performance Index 109 52.067 54.400 16.841 0.000 86.400 
       
World Governance Indicator 109 -0.459 -0.440 0.692 -2.280 1.580 
       
World Bank / IFC Ease of Doing Business by Country 104 111.190 116.500 45.425 12.000 183.000 
       
Human Development Index  101 0.546 0.589 0.154 0.140 0.815 
       
Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Capita 104 777.25 458.82 1056.40 13.00 8750.00 
       
Gross Domestic Product per Capita 109 3707.82 2067.58 7195.88 160.00 9714.00 
       
Foreign Direct Investment per Capita 109 92.76 32.85 177.11 -242.00 980.00 
       
Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita 106 2.070 1.000 3.618 0.001 33.000 
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Table 3.7: Correlation Matrix of CDM Project Variables 
























































Mechanism Projects per 
Capita  
1.000            
Carbon Dioxide Intensity by 
the Country – Emission by 
Oil Equivalent Energy Use  
0.236 1.000           
Political Instability Index  
 
-0.032 -0.125 1.000          
Climate Driver Index  
 
-0.237 -0.176 -0.036 1.000         
Environmental Performance 
Index  
0.313 0.246 0.053 -0.352 1.000        
World Governance Indicator  0.47 0.208 -0.117 -0.168 0.203 1.000       
World Bank / IFC Ease of 
Doing Business by Country  
-0.409 -0.434 0.178 0.251 -0.265 -0.734 1.000      
Human Development Index  
 
0.543 0.666 -0.172 -0.498 0.599 0.54 -0.628 1.000     
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation per Capita  
0.311 0.366 -0.216 -0.264 0.189 0.397 -0.39 0.576 1.000    
Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita  
0.172 0.26 -0.177 -0.223 0.238 0.153 -0.356 0.513 0.662 1.000   
Foreign Direct Investment 
per Capita in the Country  
0.146 0.248 -0.295 -0.115 -0.142 0.408 -0.262 0.406 0.268 0.098 1.000  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
per Capita  
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Table 3.8: Multivariate Analysis for Potential Determinants of CDM Projects 
This table presents results of the analysis of CDM project per capita and its potential determinants. It reports the estimates of the pooled OLS regression. The regression 
models present the effect of macroeconomic variables on CDM projects after controlling for economic factors. We use economic factors such as Gross Domestic Product 
per Capita, Foreign Direct Investment per Capita, and Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita. The variables are defined in Table 3.6 legend. The estimates of regression 
models are reported in the upper part. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Variables CDM Project per Capita as Dependent Variable 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 All 
 Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
           
World Bank / IFC Ease of Doing Business by Country - -0.381***        0.033 
  (-3.62)        (0.22) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Capita +  0.561**       0.358* 
   (2.60)       (1.70) 
World Governance Indicator +   0.472***      0.217 
    (4.84)      (1.46) 
Political Instability Index -    0.045      
     (0.44)      
Environmental Performance Index  +     0.320***    -0.202 
      (3.33)    (-1.53) 
Climate Driver Index -      -0.186*   0.035 
       (-1.88)   (0.37) 
Carbon Dioxide Intensity by the Country – Emission by 
Oil Equivalent Energy Use 
 
+       0.164 
  
        (1.27)   
Human Development Index  +        0.691*** 0.793*** 
         (6.07) (4.03) 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita No 0.005 -0.013 0.076 0.070 -0.014 0.050 0.077 -0.124 -0.139 
  (0.04) (-0.10) (0.65) (0.54) (-0.12) (0.39) (0.51) (-1.05) (-1.13) 
Foreign Direct Investment per Capita No 0.045 0.001 -0.055 0.150 0.190** 0.180 0.096 -0.122 -0.357*** 
  (0.46) (0.01) (-0.57) (1.48) (2.02) (1.23) (0.82) (-1.27) (-2.84) 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita - 0.041 -0.283 0.044 0.144 0.139 0.105 0.065 -0.071 -0.401** 
  (0.33) (-1.37) (0.38) (1.12) (1.13) (0.82) (0.40) (-0.60) (-2.00) 
Intercept   0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
  (4.98) (3.45) (6.50) (0.96) (-1.56) (3.87) (0.81) (-4.46) (-1.82) 
           Adjusted R
2
  0.17 0.12 0.24 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.32 0.41 
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Table 3.9: Factors Affecting the CDM Projects 
This table reports the estimates of the pooled OLS regression of factors affecting the CDM projects after controlling for economic factors. We use economic 
factors such as Gross Domestic Product per Capita, Foreign Direct Investment per Capita, and Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita. The variables are defined in 
Table 3.6 legend. The estimates of regression models are reported in the upper part. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Variables CDM Project per Capita as Dependent Variable 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
 Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
World Bank / IFC Ease of Doing Business by Country - -0.384    
  (-3.79)    
Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Capita + 0.570    
  (2.82)    
World Governance Indicator +  0.213***   
   (4.80)   
Political Instability Index -  0.030   
   (0.33)   
Environmental Performance Index  +   0.270**  
    (2.14)  
Climate Driver Index -   -0.090  
    (-0.74)  
Carbon Dioxide Intensity by the Country – Emission by Oil 
Equivalent Energy Use 
 
+   0.081  
    (0.62)  
Human Development Index  +    0.619*** 
     (6.07) 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita No -0.075 0.079 -0.004 -0.124 
  (-0.61) (0.67) (-0.02) (-1.05) 
Foreign Direct Investment per Capita No -0.094 -0.046 0.153 -0.122 
  (-0.89) (-0.46) (1.28) (-1.27) 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita - -0.392** 0.047 0.084 -0.071 
  (-1.99) (0.39) (0.53) (-0.60) 
Intercept   0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (4.89) (2.51) (-0.62) (-4.46) 
      Adjusted R
2
  0.24 0.24 0.16 0.32 
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Table 3.10: The Effect of the Human Development with Other Determinants on CDM Projects 
This table reports the estimates of the pooled OLS regression of the effect of the human development interacting with other determinants on CDM projects after 
controlling for economic factors. We use economic factors such as Gross Domestic Product per Capita, Foreign Direct Investment per Capita, and Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions per Capita. The variables are defined in Table 3.6 legend. The estimates of regression models are reported in the upper part. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Variables CDM Project per Capita as Dependent Variable 
 Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
       
World Bank / IFC Ease of Doing Business by Country * Human 
Development Index of the Country 
 
-0.119     
  (-1.13)     
Gross Fixed Capital Formation per Capita * Human Development 
Index of the Country 
 
 -0.040    
   (-0.31)    
World Governance Indicator * Human Development Index of the 
Country 
 
  0.327   
    (3.87)   
Environmental Performance Index * Human Development Index of 
the Country 
 
   0.327***  
     (3.87)  
Climate Driver Index * Human Development Index of the Country      -0.023 
      (-0.26) 
Human Development Index  + 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.644***  0.695*** 
  (6.23) (4.79) (6.02)  (6.02) 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita No -0.142 -0.132 -0.176 0.123 -0.130 
  (-1.21) (-1.09) (-1.59) (0.99) (-1.08) 
Foreign Direct Investment per Capita No -0.160 -0.128 -0.193** 0.139 -0.128 
  (-1.61) (-1.31) (-2.12) (1.50) (-1.29) 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita _ -0.073 -0.061 -0.030 -0.026 -0.072 
  (-0.62) (-0.50) (-0.27) (-0.20) (-0.60) 
Intercept   -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-4.00) (-3.88) (-3.56) (-0.80) (-4.25) 
       Adjusted R
2
  0.34 0.32 0.42 0.20 0.32 
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3.4  Paper 4: An Index-Based Model for Determining the Investment Benchmark of 
Renewable Energy Projects in South Africa 
3.4.1 Introduction 
In order to effectively mitigate climate change, alternatives to fossil fuel based energy sources 
need to be cost competitive. There has been progress towards increasing renewable energy from 
its modest contribution to the overall global energy supply. The ‘Renewables 2011 Global Status 
Report’ highlights that in 2010 an estimated 19.4% (16.1% hydro & 3.3 other renewables) of 
electricity consumption was supplied by renewable energy with nearly half the added electricity 
capacity of approximately 194 gigawatts (39 GW Wind, 30 GW Hydro, 17 GW Solar 
photovoltaic) coming from renewable sources (Janet & Martinot, 2011). The contribution of 
renewable energy toward added capacity is particularly important because worldwide demand 
for energy continues to increase, particularly from emerging economies such as South Africa.  
In order to avoid locking-in traditional fossil fuel systems, alternative energy sources must 
become a major contributor to meet future energy demand of developing economies. The 21st 
century global centres of growth have also shifted, which has important implications for the 
geographical focus of renewable energy deployment. The “developed countries” are no longer 
the drivers as “non-OECD countries account for 90% of population growth, 70% of the increase 
in economic output and 90% of the energy demand growth over the period from 2010-2035” 
(IEA, 2011). In order to shift from the traditional fossil fuel based power systems to renewable 
energy, the underlying local financial drivers must be fully understood if renewable energy such 
as wind and solar are to play a major role in the provision of electricity in emerging economies.  
Many investors face difficulty in assessing proper return in relatively new sectors like 
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development opportunities. The required rate of return to investors in large-scale power projects 
varies significantly country by country, reflecting the differing risk profiles. The aim of this 
paper is to introduce an index-based model capable of estimating the rate of return required for 
the equity investors of renewable energy projects in South Africa.  
A recent survey exploring investor’s preferences for different framework conditions for 
investments in wind farms in emerging countries concluded that: 
“Investors want to reduce political investment risks (framework conditions) as 
much as possible. An increased risk in comparison to an ideal scenario can cause 
investors to hold back their investment or at least raise their return expectations 
correspondingly in order to compensate for the increased risk.” (von Flotow & 
Friebe, 2011, p. 7) 
In today’s globalized world, financial markets observe the optimal level of asset allocation and 
returns based on risk inherent in the underlying economies. Whether public or private investors, 
they need to have a maximum possible return on their investment given the finite resources. In 
developing countries like South Africa, an arbitrary choice of discount rate
8
 or cost of capital for 
renewable energy project evaluations has the potential to negatively affect the design of financial 
incentives and consequently investor interest.  
Our paper provides a simple and concise model to estimate the cost of capital for 
renewable energy projects. We use the CAPM approach to propose an index-based model 
(Sharpe, 1964). The proposed model makes a fair estimate of the required discount rate using 
financial markets observation. It is parsimonious and captures common macroeconomic factors. 
It aims to contribute to a better and transparent process for required discount rate for the 
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investors and the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM additionality determination. More specifically, it 
provides a simple and effective mechanism to calculate the discount rate required for South 
African renewable energy projects.  
3.4.2 Background 
In August 2011, South Africa announced a phased competitive bidding tender for renewable 
energy IPPs to decide long-term PPAs. This process, commonly referred to as renewable energy 
bidding, requires renewable energy developers to bid a tariff price for electricity generated, 
requiring each project seeking a PPA to be price competitive while also meeting the required 
return to equity investors. This was a shift from the anticipated REFiT announced in 2009, which 
had set an attractive tariff price for renewable technology, thus providing a reasonable required 
return to attract project developers and investors. However, the 2011 cancellation of REFiT in 
favour of the REIPPP process has reduced certainty that projects will receive a sufficient tariff 
rate to meet the investment return demanded by investors. This presents a challenge to renewable 
energy developers because their projects are not certain to be provided a PPA, increasing the risk 
profile even further.  
South African renewable energy projects are also eligible to apply for CDM financing. At 
the high level, CDM is designed to stimulate “sustainable development and emission reductions” 
in developing countries (UNFCCC, 1997). The CDM is intended to provide financial incentive 
for emission reduction projects that would otherwise not be able to deliver a return high enough 
to compensate for the inherent project and local risk. This is necessary because the barriers to 
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At the practical level, CDM provides financial incentive to projects in developing 
countries that reduce carbon emissions over the business as usual scenario. As of September 
2011, renewable energy projects make up 64% of the 6,724 projects in the CDM pipeline 
globally (Fenhann et al., 2011). CDM has been little used in South Africa, to date only 21 
projects have been registered, of which only nine of the registered projects have issued credits 
(Designated National Authority South Africa, 2012; Fay et al., 2012). In order to access the 
CDM, projects must become registered through a multi-step process that requires an investment, 
barrier, or common practice analysis to prove additionality, with investment analysis being the 
most commonly used approach (UNFCCC, 2008). Simply stated, this asks if the project is 
feasible or not without the carbon revenue.  
An investment benchmark analysis is used to determine if a project is worth pursuing in 
comparison to other opportunities. Similarly, for renewable energy projects to be registered 
under the CDM, project or equity IRR is compared to an appropriate and independently verified 
benchmark IRR (UNFCCC, 2011). As few projects are financed without equity investors, the 
required minimum rate of return on equity for the developers usually determines the viability of 
the project. However, the CDM methodology panel in its 50
th
 meeting reported, “there is no 
consistency in the process of estimating the minimum equity rate of return to implement the 
project” (annex 8, page 1). As a result, developers use several methods such as CAPM, 
government mandated method, weighted average cost of capital, bank rates, etc. Considering the 
importance that equity IRR plays in deciding the overall financial viability of a project, a 
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3.4.3 Renewable Energy Projects – Internal Rate of Return 
Renewable energy projects compete for capital with all firms and particularly utilities and 
infrastructure related firms. Further, these projects in developing countries are largely dependent 
on external or global financing for equity investment. Global capital, particularly private money, 
has become a potential resource for developing countries. However, investors prefer investing in 
countries with manageable country and political risks
9
. They will only invest in high risk projects 
if they get a high IRR compared to low risk investment options. For example, an investor in a 
renewable energy project in Europe or North America might be content with an IRR of 6% while 
he may ask for a significant premium over and above that for a project in South Africa.  
A project presents its own set of inherent risks. In theory, a project is taken up when its 
IRR exceeds the minimum acceptable rate of return or cost of capital. Hence, the IRR is a 
persuasive measure of acceptable rate of return for a project. In other terms, it is the discount rate 
to evaluate the desirability of a project.  
A well-adapted renewable energy tariff scheme requires an acceptable rate of return to 
project investors. If investors do not find an attractive enough rate of return from renewable 
energy projects, they will move to other regimes to seek their remuneration. Allowing for a 
reasonable rate of return to the investors is a central feature of any initiative to promote 
renewable energy. Therefore, a benchmark IRR is important because it will help determine the 
minimum tariff required from the utility over a set period.  
                                                        
9
 Aggregate market risk premium has been used to derive the expected rate of return. The aggregate risk premium is 
associated with the development of equity markets, legal institutions, and securities regulation (La Porta, Lopez-de-
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3.4.4 CAPM Discussion 
Finance literature follows CAPM to compute the cost of equity that is the ex-post return (Sharpe, 
1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966). The evidence suggests that the ex-post returns are an 
imprecise proxy for expected cost of equity. Such models can provide imprecise ex-ante cost of 
equity, particularly for long gestation projects. Furthermore, finance literature (Roll, 1977; Fama 
and French, 1997) criticizes using such models to estimate proxy for the cost of equity. As an 
alternative, ex-ante rate of return for cost of equity using the discounted cash flow method is 
proposed. However, there is little consensus throughout the financial and accounting literature, 
with numerous models proposed (Claus and Thomas, 1998; Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 
2001; Easton, 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005). The key differences of the various 
models are the underlying assumptions, including long-term forecasts earnings, growth rates, 
dividend payout ratio, amongst others. Unfortunately, the cost-of-capital estimates derived from 
ex-ante return on capital from these models have been unsatisfactory due to their assumptions 
and inputs.  
Bruner et al. (1998) researched the leading firms identified in a report ‘Creating World 
Class Financial Management: Strategies of 50 Leading Companies’ for their excellence in 
strategic financial management. They conclude that these firms prefer CAPM to estimate the cost 
of equity. Kaplan and Peterson (1998) suggest that the CAPM has a strong theoretical foundation 
and simplicity, one of the reasons for its widespread use in practice. However, CAPM is 
criticized due to its simplified assumptions and to a certain extent for relying on wrong 
assumptions, calling into question the utility of the model (Fama and French, 1997). A key 
assumption in the CAPM model is that all assets are traded and accessible to all investors. In 
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model makes a small deviation in the assumption, the expected return estimation can move far 
beyond the actual return. However, even with its weaknesses, the CAPM provides investors with 
useful and influential concepts for analyzing required return on investments. It is the position of 
the authors that CAPM criticism can be in large part addressed by inducting full-information 
industry beta into the model.  
CAPM is widely used to estimate the cost of equity (Graham and Harvey, 2001), 
allowing managers to obtain a cutoff IRR for project analysis. There are numerous variants of the 
CAPM. The basic CAPM is a univariate equation for estimating the risk-adjusted cost of equity 
capital. Further, it values any kind of investment such as a project that uses a discounted cash 
flow with a risk-adjusted discount rate. It is consistent with the appropriate public utility 
regulatory and economic standards. The basic CAPM is as follows: 
R = Rf + β*(Rm - Rf)        (1) 
where R denotes the discount rate or cost of equity capital; Rf is the risk free rate; Rm is the 
expected return on the market and β is the beta of the cash flows or stock being valued. A market 
risk premium is estimated from (Rm - Rf) where the term β*(Rm - Rf) is the additional return for 
the firm. The beta (β) is an important measure of risk that adjusts the discount rate. It represents 
the volatility in a firm’s stock price in relation to the rest of the market.  
CAPM has several underlying assumptions including how to implement risk-free rate of 
return measurement, beta measurement, appropriate market proxy, and data observations in 
project evaluation. Beta is usually estimated from historical prices of the security. The absence of 
historical price information for a new project type can create problems with estimating and using 
betas for cost of capital. Other concerns are levered or unlevered beta measurement, size effect 
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However, in terms of the appropriate economic standards, the CAPM produces return estimates 
that meet investors’ opportunity costs and satisfy the demands of the risk/return trade-off.  
3.4.5 Proposed Index-Based Model – Investment Benchmark  
The cost of capital is notoriously difficult to measure and it is based on the operations risk of a 
project. In renewable energy project, equity investors have to consider many factors including 
the economic, political, legal, and industry conditions. The proposed model is an index-based 
model where the rate of return on a broad index of securities acts as a valid proxy for common 
macroeconomic factors. The broad index return represents the market observations based on the 
enduring economic relationships between elements of the real economy. Therefore, a more 
systematic and consistent benchmark IRR can be estimated using an index-based model.  
The broad index return provides the cumulative assessment of investors about their 
expected return from the country’s economy. Practitioners routinely use the market / index total 
returns to estimate expected returns on investments or cost of equity. The cost of equity tends to 
differ from the required minimum rate of return on equity. In a long-term project, the market 
sensitivity (beta) shows a tendency to evolve toward 1 over time. Thus, long-term projects avoid 
the need of estimating beta measurement. However, it is important to understand the risk 
attributes specific to the project and its industry. In the case of the South African renewable 
sector, where market data is not available for a long period of time, it is necessary to include a 
new industry risk in the index-based model.  
In an investment decision, investors ask for additional compensation for the equity 
compared with the debt. Basically, investors look an equity risk premium that is the 
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renewable projects in South Africa where IPPs currently represent an insignificant percentage of 
the overall energy supply industry, it is important for the investors to extrapolate the risk 
premium on the renewable energy projects based on equity risk premium of the entire market. 
These projects have long gestation periods requiring a similar time period of the risk free rate to 
be used for the benchmark. Yield to maturity (YTM) in the secondary market on a long-term 
government bond or bond index can be used. The model requires index-based data inputs that are 
largely objective and can be easily relied upon. The proposed index model to estimate the cost of 
capital for renewable energy projects is proposed as follows:  
E(Re) = YTM on a Long Term Government Bond + Equity Risk Premium  
+ New Industry Risk Premium    (2) 
The equation is the bond-yield plus risk premium for equity and industry in estimating the 
expected return on equity. Adding variables such as size or liquidity, even ones that may appear 
significant, sometimes can be hazardous to forecast precision. A parsimonious model that is 
stingy about inclusion of variables is often superior (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2009). Too many 
variables introduce errors on the precision of coefficient estimates and precision of forecasting. 
The above model has the clear practical advantage on both counts. Following CAPM 
assumption, the proposed index-based model allows the investors to be compensated in two 
ways: time value of money and risk. The model estimates are market driven and, therefore, an 
objective consensus of all investors in the financial market. 
YTM on a Long Term Government Bond 
In this case, “long term” is associated 10 years. For a long gestation project, valuation analysts 
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of a renewable energy project is often 10+ years, the 10-year bond YTM should be used in the 
equation.  
Equity Risk Premium 
The equity risk premium is commonly viewed as the extra return needed to induce investors to 
put money in the equity of a company compared to the safe government bonds. Following basic 
economic principles, economic risk taking is rewarded with extra return. The equity risk 
premium can be used in three perspectives. First, from the investors’ point of view, it is the 
excess expected return of equities over bonds. Second, from the firms’ point view, the equity risk 
premium helps in estimating the cost of capital and subsequently the weighted average cost of 
capital. Third, from the valuation point of view, the premium figures into a discount rate that is 
used in calculating the present value. The equity risk premium is the same from all three 
perspectives, except for some potential market imperfection adjustments, such as taxes and 
transaction costs.  
New Industry Risk Estimation 
New industry risk is represented by industry beta that is calculated for a group of firms in the 
same industry. Industry risk premium is the excess return that investors expect from the industry. 
Ibbotson Associates full-i formation beta estimation process (Barad and McDowell, 2002) is 
used to compute the industry risk premium as presented in equation:  
IRPi = (RIi x ERP) – ERP       (3) 
Where IRPi indicates the expected industry risk premium for industry i; RIi is the risk index (full 
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3.4.6 Use of Index-Based Model for Benchmark Rate of Renewable Energy Projects  
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) provides three benchmark interest rate indices to asset 
managers and investors to assess their portfolio performance. These indices are the total return 
indices that accurately measure the performance of the bond market over time. Based on market 
capitalization and liquidity, the All Bond Index (ALBI), consists of the top 20 listed bonds. The 
Government Bond Index (GOVI) represents the South Africa bonds of the ALBI in which the 
South African Reserve Bank obliges the Primary Dealers to make a market. The Other Bond 
Index (OTHI) comprises the remainder of the bonds in the ALBI. The interest rate market data 
on these three indices are presented in Table 3.11 of the annexure.  
Renewable energy projects in South Africa are in a nascent stage. It is difficult to derive 
expected return or equity risk premium for a single project. However, the country has reasonably 
developed capital markets where equities and bonds have been traded in the secondary market 
for a considerable period of time. Hassan and Biljon (2010) examine 105 years data to determine 
the equity premium in South Africa. They compute equity premium over bonds and bills for 
yearly-realised premium in 3, 5, 10 and 20 years moving averages. They find that the equity 
premium has been positive in all time horizons. It varies 7.7% to 9.3% over bonds and bills. 
Table 3.12 of annexure presents the equity premium in South Africa as reported by Hassan and 
Biljon (2010). Geometric averages incorporate compounding effects. Hence, Geometric mean of 
equity risk premium is preferred in the proposed model to estimate benchmark IRR. 
Equation 3 suggests new industry risk in the proposed market model. Grid connected 
renewable energy projects are new to South Africa therefore it is difficult to obtain industry beta 
for this sector. It is important to find a reasonable substitution to estimate the new industry risk 
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traded funds (ETFs) that invest in alternative or clean energy firms through the Johannesburg 
stock exchange. Since new industry risk premium is a key variable in estimating the cost of 
capital, we are concerned about using beta of international ETFs or mutual funds as differences 
in the market sensitivity could affect the results. To address this concern, Harvey (1995) suggests 
that it is common in international studies to use the U.S. Treasury bill as a proxy for the risk-free 
rate in all countries by converting the variables in dollar terms. This approach essentially allows 
the market sensitivity as reflected in the beta coefficient to be used across countries. It is of 
course possible that the betas of local funds would differ. Therefore, we address this concern by 
using the average beta of 1.69 from the top ten alternative energy ETFs as the proxy of new 
industry risk premium, as illustrated in Table 3.13 of annexure. 
Benchmark Equity IRR Estimation 
To calculate the cost of capital or a benchmark IRR, the market data should be used for at least 
10-year period instruments considering the life span of renewable energy projects. Investors in 
South African renewable energy projects would expect the following return on their investments. 
E(Re)  = YTM on GOVI Index + 10-Year Equity Risk Premium  
+ New Industry Risk Premium  
New Industry Risk Premium  = (RI x ERP) – ERP 
  = (1.69*7.29%) - 7.29% 
  = 5.03% 
E(Re)  = 10.64% + 7.29% + 5.03% 
= 22.96% 
The index-based model suggests that given the market level expectation in South Africa, current 
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Is the Level of Expected Return (22.96%) in South Africa Justifiable?  
To test the index-based model expected return, we look at the market data of stock market 
performance, return on equity for all traded firms, prime lending, and risk free rates for the 
period 2002 to 2010. Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) / JSE All-Share Index represents 
the market performance. It includes 99% of the full market capital value of all ordinary securities 
listed on the JSE. All firm data show stocks traded on the South African stock market. Prime 
lending rate is the interest rate charged by the banks to their most creditworthy customers. The 
rate is approximately the same amongst major banks.  
The returns on index and interest rates are obtained from publicly available sources. 
South African companies’ data is obtained from Damodaran online website.
10
 The database 
includes all listed firms on the JSE that have a market capitalization more than USD 5 million. 
Overall, we find 280 firms in the data file. The Damodaran database provides the return on 
equity (RoE) of the firms.  
Table 3.14 of the annexure presents the annual market returns; RoE for all firms weighted 
average by firm value and market capitalization, prime lending, and risk free rates. The market 
returns as represented by the FTSE / JSE All-Share Index show that the return fluctuates from -
23.20% to 47.30% during the period 2002 to 2010. The average RoE for all publicly traded firms 
in South Africa provide an indication that the proposed index model provides a reasonable 
estimation for RoE or cost of capital. Column 3 and 4 present the average RoE for all firms 
weighted average by firm value and market capitalization. The average RoE for all firms 
weighted by firm value varies from 22.83% (year 2009) to 31.76% (year 2005). Similarly, the 
average RoE for market capitalisation-weighted firms is between 25.40% (year 2007) to 31.88% 
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(year 2005). We find a clear understanding that during 2002 to 2010, the investors have 
generally had returns of 25% or above on their capital. Thus, we find that the index-based model 
result correlates the actual returns on equity for the investors. While these analyses suggest that 
our findings are quite vigorous and not spurious, we acknowledge that some concerns about 
measurement error remain. 
Table 3.14 of the annexure further supports our model estimation via the average annual 
prime lending and risk free rates during the same period. Prime lending rate is as low as 9.50% 
and as high as 15.50%. Similarly, the low and high-risk free rate is 6.42% and 11.17%, 
respectively. Table 3.15 of the annexure presents the longer duration average market returns and 
prime-lending rate over different investment horizons. 
3.4.7 Conclusion 
To attract capital, projects must compensate investors based on time value of money and risk. An 
arbitrary choice of discount rate for the project can limit investor interest and adversely affect the 
ability of South African renewable energy projects to leverage the CDM. To mitigate this 
potential problem, we propose an index-based model that makes a fair estimate of equity IRR 
using financial markets observation. The index-based model is parsimonious and it captures the 
common macroeconomic factors. More specifically, it provides a simple and effective 
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ANNEXES 
 
Table 3.11: Johannesburg Stock Exchange Interest Rate Market Data  
 
The interest rate indices traded in on the board of the JSE are reported as on July 01, 2011. It includes all bond 
index, government bond index, and other bond index. 
 
Interest Rate Index Total Return Year on Year on 7/01/2011 
ALBI Index 10.78% 
GOVI Index 10.64% 
OTHI Index 11.63% 
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Table 3.12: Equity Premium over Different Investment Horizons in South Africa 
 
Equity premium is the excess return that the overall stock market provides over a risk-free rate. This excess 
return is to compensate the investors for taking on the relatively higher risk of the equity market. Hassan and 
Biljon (2010) illustrate the geometric and arithmetic means over bond and bills for different investment 
horizons. 
 
Year Return Equity Premium (%) over 
Bond 
Equity Premium (%) over 
Bills 
Yearly  
Geometric Mean  5.37% 6.17% 
Arithmetic Mean  7.08% 8.22% 
3-year 
Geometric Mean  6.36% 7.24% 
Arithmetic Mean  6.89% 7.92% 
5-year 
Geometric Mean  6.68% 7.62% 
Arithmetic Mean  6.97% 7.96% 
10-year 
Geometric Mean  7.29% 8.15% 
Arithmetic Mean  7.43% 8.30% 
20-year 
Geometric Mean  8.14% 8.94% 
Arithmetic Mean  8.19% 9.00% 
 
Source: South African Journal of Economics 
The above table was reported in the article “The Equity Premium and Risk-free Rate Puzzles in a 
Turbulent Economy: Evidence from 105 Years of Data from South Africa by Shakil Hassan and 
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Table 3.13: Beta of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) of Clean Energy Investments 
 
The Stock Exchange provides vehicles for the investors to invest in alternative energy investments opportunity 
through Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). The ETFs track a specified Alternative Energy Index. The table 
reports the beta of clean energy ETFs as of July 2012. 
 
Clean Energy Exchange Traded Funds Beta 
  
S&P Global Clean Energy Index (ICLN) 1.96 
PowerShares WilderHill Clean Energy (PBW) 1.71 
PowerShares Global Wind Energy Portfolio (PWND) 1.49 
PowerShares Cleantech Portfolio (PZD) 1.43 
Powershares Wilderhill Progressive Energy Portfolio (PUW) 1.43 
Van Eck Global Alternative Energy (GEX) 1.66 
Winslow Green Growth Inv (WGGFX) 1.42 
First Trust Global Wind Energy (FAN) 1.50 
Van Eck Global Solar Energy (KWT) 2.11 
Guggenheim Global Solar (TAN) 2.20 
Average Beta 1.69 
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Table 3.14: Annual Index Return, Average Return on Equity, Prime Lending and Risk 
Free Rate in South Africa 
 
The JSE index indicates the annual returns. The average return on equity for all firms is computed using 
weighted average firm value and market capitalization. Prime lending and risk free rates are the average 



















2002 -8.10% 26.21% 26.51% 15.50% 11.17% 
2003 16.10% 28.03% 30.92% 13.40% 10.65% 
2004 25.40% 27.36% 28.42% 11.00% 7.53% 
2005 47.30% 31.76% 31.88% 10.50% 6.90% 
2006 41.20% 26.86% 25.92% 11.75% 7.34% 
2007 19.20% 25.19% 25.40% 13.75% 9.11% 
2008 -23.20% 28.91% 29.89% 15.17% 10.81% 
2009 32.10% 22.83% 25.78% 12.10% 7.86% 
2010 19.00% 25.57% 27.17% 9.50% 6.42% 
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Table 3.15: Average Index Return and Prime Lending Rate in South Africa 
 
The geometric and arithmetic means for index returns are computed from its annual index returns for 12 years, 
10 years, and 5 years, respectively. Similarly, geometric and arithmetic means are reported for the prime-
lending rate for the same period. 
 
Particulars Return 1999-2010 2001-2010 2006-2010 
FTSE/JSE Africa All 
Share Index Return 
Geometric Mean 14.62% 17.86% 15.23% 
Arithmetic Mean 18.52% 19.81% 17.66% 
Prime Lending Rate 
Geometric Mean 12.84% 12.73% 12.30% 
Arithmetic Mean 12.99% 12.90% 12.45% 
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3.5  Paper 5: Renewable Energy Incentives across Varying Levels of Statehood 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Climate change governance includes contributing toward mitigating GHG emissions in order to 
maintain a stable climate as an essential public good. This paper explores the mitigation aspect of 
climate change governance by assessing MBIs that promote renewable energy. This research 
illustrates the central role that statehood plays in renewable energy development, specifically 
with regard to financing considerations that are generally considered separately from socio-
political factors. The private sector IPP is often dependent on the state to provide and maintain 
financial incentive over the lifetime of the project to ensure a sufficient return on investment for 
its renewable energy projects. Conversely, the state is dependent on the IPP to deliver clean 
energy to the country’s electricity supply at the lowest possible cost in order to maximise use of 
limited governmental resources. However, in developing countries, MBIs need to also provide 
investors with a return commensurate to the risk associated with a lower level of statehood, thus 
serving as the functional equivalent to the state’s shadow of hierarchy (Börzel and Risse 2010).  
The objective of this paper is to identify how financial considerations affect deployment 
of renewable energy in developing countries. This research analyses the cost of capital required 
for the renewable energy projects to establish a quantifiable proxy of the risk profile that is, in 
large part, determined by the countries’ level of statehood. In order to purposefully build the 
theory, case studies of South Africa and Germany were drawn from a non-random theoretical 
sampling (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). The case studies focus on the 
various contextual features influencing project finance, as illustrated in hypothetical wind farm 
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renewable energy. Germany and South Africa also differ significantly with regard to their degree 
of statehood and level of socio-economic development. South Africa is an emerging economy 
with a nascent wind energy sector, while Germany is a developed country with an advanced 
wind energy industry. Data has been collected through literature review, document analysis and 
interviews with renewable energy sector stakeholders in Germany and South Africa.  
In the remainder of this paper, the background of renewable energy MBIs and 
considerations for renewable energy in developing countries is discussed. Next, a comparative 
analysis of hypothetical wind energy projects in South Africa and Germany is explored with the 
cost of capital resulting from variance in host country level of statehood being emphasised. 
Lastly, international and national policies to adapt MBI design to the host country level of 
statehood are discussed.  
3.5.2 Renewable Energy Incentive Background  
Limiting the long-term average temperature increase to 2°Celsius, commonly correlated with 
CO2 ppm of 450, has been established as the consensus mitigation target to maintain a stable 
climate (Pachauri and Reisinger, 2007; IEA, 2008; IEA, 2011). Unfortunately, by not fully 
accounting for the negative externalities to the environment, carbon intensive power generation 
benefits from artificially low tariff prices that in part help to create a cost advantage over 
renewable based electricity generation (Menanteau et al. 2003; Dinica 2006). As a result, it is 
anticipated that the global emissions trajectory will go well beyond the target 450 scenario.  
The World Energy Outlook 2011 sounds an alarm with the following prediction, “If 
stringent new action is not forthcoming by 2017, the energy-related infrastructure in place will 
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illustrates the urgent need to increase renewable energy in the overall electricity supply. 
However this is easier said than done because a main cause of the looming lock-in challenge is 
that renewables are historically not perceived to be cost competitive when compared with fossil 
fuel based electricity generation (Arent et al., 2011; Haas et al., 2004).  
 Recently there has been progress towards increasing renewable energy’s contribution to 
the overall global energy supply. In 2010 an estimated 19.4 per cent (16.1 per cent hydro and 3.3 
per cent other renewables) of overall electricity consumption was supplied by renewable energy, 
with nearly half the 2010 added electricity capacity of approximately 194 gigawatts (39 GW 
Wind, 30 GW Hydro, 17 GW Solar photovoltaic) coming from renewable sources (Janet and 
Martinot, 2011). The contribution of renewables toward added capacity is particularly important 
because worldwide demand for energy continues to increase, particularly from emerging 
economies such as China, India and South Africa.  
In order to avoid locking in traditional fossil fuel systems, alternative energy sources 
must become a major contributor to meet the future energy demand of developing economies. 
The 21
st
 century global centres of growth have shifted, which has important implications for the 
geographical focus of renewable energy MBIs. The OECD countries are no longer the drivers as 
“non-OECD countries account for 90 per cent of the energy demand growth over the period from 
2010-2035” (IEA, 2011). Such growth trends highlight the need for effective renewable energy 
promotion policies that address the challenges inherent to developing countries with limited 
statehood. 
While the potential of MBIs to deliver cost-effective environmental policies has been 
widely recognised by policymakers, the focus of MBI theory has largely been placed on OECD 
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research exists on the applicability of MBIs in areas of limited statehood, particularly developing 
countries where the state capacity to fully implement and enforce policy mandates is often 
lacking due to their limited ability to effectively implement and enforce policy (Börzel and 
Risse, 2010). As pointed out by Börzel et al. (2010), even in South Africa where legal standards 
and regulation are quite advanced, capacity for implementation and compliance is often lacking.  
To overcome the challenges to renewable energy deployment, a policy shift supported by 
effective incentive mechanisms is needed to catalyse a rapid transition toward renewable energy 
sources (Christensen et al., 2006). A number of approaches have been implemented to promote 
renewable energy, each requiring significant involvement from the state. The ongoing debate 
over what approach is the most successful and effective focuses on price driven versus demand 
driven strategies (Haas et al., 2004). Price driven strategies are characterised by the state setting a 
price that is intended to reduce uncertainty and attract IPPs. The best known mechanism is the 
REFiT, whereby the government sets premium tariff prices through long-term contracts for 
electricity from renewable energy generated by IPPs (Huang and Wu, 2011). On the other side of 
the debate is the demand driven approach. Within this strategy the state sets an objective to be 
reached, typically through quotas on electricity suppliers through a system of tradable green 
certificates (Menanteau et al., 2003). 
Fixed price REFiTs have been effectively used to exceed renewable energy targets in 
Germany (Janet and Martinot, 2011). However they have been criticised on the basis of not 
being cost efficient (Frondel et al., 2010; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Krewitt and Nitsch, 2003). 
To address this, the German Renewable Energy Sources Act is periodically reviewed and REFiT 
tariffs revised to align with the maturing renewable industry and decreasing installation costs. A 
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abandoned in favour of a competitive bidding process whereby REFiT prices are determined 
through a staged competitive bidding process that began in August 2011.  
Furthermore, an enabling environment must be created within local, national or 
international structures that can generate sufficient incentive for IPPs to engage at a project level 
(Dunkerley, 1995). Such incentives for promoting renewable energy should “offer a reasonable 
risk-return ratio to investors and … minimise the total costs for society” (von Flotow and Friebe 
2011, p.9). To effectively address both these requirements, MBIs develop in a co-evolutionary 
manner. The IPP’s need for financial incentive and the state’s willingness and ability to subsidise 
is what makes possible the co-evolutionary relationship. The desired outcome is a well-designed 
MBI emerging through co-evolutionary interactions between IPPs and the state, which culminate 
in incentives set to entice private sector participation at the lowest cost to society.  
The players within government will, at a minimum, include the department of energy, the 
state energy regulator, the utility that supplies and/or distributes the electricity via the power grid 
(or multiple utility companies when deregulation has occurred) and the local municipal 
government. On the other hand, the renewable energy private sector includes a range of 
organisations that come together to form or support IPPs, such as project developer, equipment 
manufacturers, debt and equity providers and the landowners. Figure 3.3 is a high-level 
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Figure 3.3: Co-Evolution of Renewable Energy Incentive Design 
 
 
The IPP is dependent on the state to ensure a sufficient return on investment for its 
renewable energy projects, and the state is dependent on the IPP to deliver clean energy to the 
country’s electricity supply. Due to limited resources in developing countries, any additional 
costs associated with promoting renewable energy must be fully understood and evaluated within 
the context of all other immediate development challenges facing the host country.  
The private sector is primarily concerned with achieving their expected rate of return for 
the project, which is based on the underlying risk profile of the venture. It has also been 
acknowledged that non-economic factors (i.e. administrative hurdles, grid access procedures, 
non-transparency) influence decision making by project developers (Lüthi and Prässler, 2011). 
However, assuming sufficient natural resources exist and authorisation is feasible, the main 
concern of the business organisation is an acceptable financial return in line with the risk profile 










  153 
established by the state and is incentivised to actively engage with defining the rules and 
regulation that result in an attractive MBI (Toke, 2007; Dinica, 2006).  
3.5.3 Considerations of Renewable Energy Promotion in Areas of Limited Statehood 
Effective MBIs in developing countries must be cognisant of the host country level of statehood 
and the corresponding perceived risk. In developing countries, MBIs act in part as the functional 
equivalent to the shadow of hierarchy cast by the state (Börzel and Risse, 2010). MBIs are 
required to bridge the cost differential between traditional fuel sources and renewables, and 
provide assurance that IPPs will receive a financial return that corresponds with the host 
countries’ risk. 
 The financial support to the tariff price is a result of the current tariff price differential 
between fossil fuel based power generation and renewable energy. The key challenge is to 
determine a price per kWh that can provide an appropriate private sector return on investment. 
The desired outcome is a tariff price that represents the lowest possible cost of renewable energy 
but is still attractive to IPPs. Key considerations include: What is the differential cost between 
renewable energy cost and the current tariff rate? Who will pay the differential between the 
existing electricity price and the cost of renewable energy? What is the price sensitivity of the 
end electricity consumer? These questions have different answers depending on the country’s 
context and level of statehood. Within South Africa, even though climate change threatens to 
have a disproportionally negative impact on Africa (Stern, 2007; Parry, 2009), paying higher 
costs for electricity is often viewed as unacceptable considering the numerous and more urgent 
development challenges facing the country (Fay et al., 2012; Vorster et al., 2011).  
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versus reward analysis is invoked, with level of statehood as a key determinant of risk. Moving 
from developed to developing countries has significant overall cost implications because 
investors demand an increased IRR
11
 in areas with a lower level of statehood. Renewable energy 
projects are highly dependent on financing terms, with the IRR in large part determined by the 
risk associated with anticipated cash flows (Wiser and Pickle, 1998). This means that IPPs must 
have confidence that the host country government will honour contractual obligations and 
continually fund the subsidy over the long term.  
 Global capital has become a potential resource for developing countries and power projects 
are often dependent on global financing for investment. Investors prefer investing in countries 
with manageable country and political risks. They will only invest in higher risk projects and 
countries if they receive a higher return compared to lower risk investment options in developed 
countries. The viability of any renewable energy project is determined by its ability to achieve a 
financial return in excess of the perceived risk associated with the project. IPPs decide on 
projects based on their potential to achieve the equity IRR that is determined by the risk profile 
of the project and host country.  
 A recent survey conducted by von Flotow and Friebe (2011) exploring investor’s 
preferences for different framework conditions for investments in wind parks in emerging and 
developing countries concluded that: 
“Investors want to reduce political investment risks (framework conditions) as 
much as possible. An increased risk in comparison to an ideal scenario can cause 
investors to hold back their investment or at least raise their return expectations 
                                                        
11












  155 
correspondingly in order to compensate for the increased risk.” (p.19) 
This runs counter to the need for the governance system to minimise the overall cost of 
electricity. As a result, it becomes more difficult to make a compelling financial case for 
promoting renewable energy in developing countries and underscores the importance of effective 
MBI design. Next, a comparison between Germany and South Africa is presented to highlight 
how perceived level of statehood affects the financing of renewable projects. 
3.5.4 Germany and South Africa Wind Energy Projects in Comparative Analysis 
There are wide variations in the cost of wind energy projects across countries in large part due to 
level of statehood (Schwabe et al., 2011). In an effort to elucidate these profound differences, a 
comparative analysis of wind energy in Germany and South Africa is provided. First, the 
expected IRR benchmark is estimated for South Africa and Germany. Then using the estimated 
IRR benchmarks, the tariff price required to meet this investment hurdle is modelled using 
hypothetical wind farms in both countries.  
Estimating the cost of capital for renewable energy projects is subjective, with little 
consensus on the preferred approach. The main options for estimating cost of capital are to use: 
1) historical market data (ex-post) using the CAPM; 2) estimate future cash flows (ex-ante) to 
determine rate of return of equity using the discounted cash flow method. For the purpose of this 
analysis, CAPM using historic market data is selected. This method is used because it 
incorporates the risk attributes specific to the country, project and industry. South Africa and 
Germany both have well functioning financial systems with decades of reliable market data to 
draw upon. Furthermore, research has shown this approach is preferred in practice. Bruner et al. 
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Management: Strategies of 50 Leading Companies’ for their excellence in strategic financial 
management. They conclude that these firms prefer CAPM to estimate the cost of equity. 
Furthermore, Kaplan and Peterson (1998) suggest that the CAPM has a strong theoretical 
foundation and simplicity, one of the reasons for its widespread use in practice.  
In the case of renewable energy projects, equity investors have to consider many factors 
including the economic, political, legal, and industry conditions of the host country. The 
proposed model to estimate required IRR is a market-based model where the return on a broad 
index of securities acts as a valid proxy for these common macroeconomic factors. This 
represents the market observations based on the enduring economic relationships between 
elements of the real economy, which can be viewed as an approximate measure of statehood. 
Specifically, the market proxies used for estimating the equity IRR are the YTM on long-term 
government bonds and the equity risk premium.  
Furthermore, wind power is new to South Africa. The first ever round of negotiations for 
power purchase agreements for renewable IPPs were announced in December 2011 as part of the 
competitive bidding process. The lack of South African experience with wind power causes 
further uncertainty for investors relating to the wind resource, construction, operations, and 
maintenance of turbines. As a result a new industry risk premium is applied by investors to 
compensate for the nascent stage of the wind power sector in South Africa. However, over time 
as South Africa gains experience wind power, the new industry variable will decrease to zero.  
The CAPM approach to estimate the equity IRR for renewable energy projects has been 
developed in previous work by Fay and Kumar (2011). The model allows the investors to be 
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therefore, an objective consensus of all investors in the financial market. The proposed model to 
estimate the cost of capital for renewable energy projects is as follows: 
Expected return on equity E(Re) = YTM on a long term government bond + 
equity risk premium + new industry risk premium 
Applying the model to South Africa as of January 2012 yields an expected rate of return 
of 20.77 per cent: 
South African E(Re) = 8.45% + 7.29% + 5.03% = 20.77% 
The YTM on the Long Term Government Bond rate of 8.45 per cent is reported from the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s GOVI Index as of 3 January 2012. The 10-year equity risk 
premium of 7.29 per cent is taken from Hassan and Van Biljon’s analysis (2010). The new 




By comparison, Germany, with a higher perceived level of statehood and a more 
advanced wind sector than South Africa, benefits from a much lower expected rate of return at 
7.30 per cent: 
Germany E(Re) = 1.90% + 5.40% + 0% = 7.30% 
The YTM on the long-term government bond rate of 1.90 per cent is from 3 January 2012 and is 
based on the German government backed 10-year bond (Bloomberg 2012). The equity risk 
premium of 5.40 per cent is estimated via an in-depth survey approach performed by Fernandez, 
Aguirreamalloa and Corres (2011). Germany has one of the most developed renewable energy 
                                                        
12 IRPi = (RIi x ERP) – ERP; where IRPi indicates the expected industry risk premium for industry i; RIi is the risk 
index (full information industry i beta) estimated using the top ten alternative energy exchange-traded funds as the 
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sectors in the world. It is a leader in the manufacture of wind turbines and had over 27.2 GW of 
wind operating at the end of 2010 (Janet and Martinot, 2011, p. 20). Due to the advanced state of 
the wind sector in Germany, the new industry risk premium of zero is applied. 
The IRR benchmarks demonstrate a significant difference between cost of capital in 
Germany and South Africa. Germany, with a high level of statehood and an advanced wind 
energy sector, benefits from a low cost of capital for the wind projects. Conversely, South Africa 
has a lower level of statehood that is combined with a nascent wind energy sector, resulting in a 
higher perceived risk, that in turn demands a higher cost of capital.  
Next, the effect of cost of capital on the overall tariff price is explored for Germany and 
South Africa. A financial model is developed for hypothetical 100 megawatt (MW) wind farms 
in both countries in order to estimate the tariff price required to meet the projects expected return 
on equity. Hypothetical wind farms, as opposed to actual wind farms, were modelled because of 
the competitive nature of the on-going REIPPP process in South Africa. The purpose of this 
analysis is to illustrate the overall price (as measured by required tariff) variation between 
comparable renewable power generation projects. Table 3.16 provides a summary of the key 
variables input into the financial model for the hypothetical South African and German wind 
farms. Indicative quotes from actual operating and maintenance service providers are used 
uniformly across both projects. All other uniform assumptions are wind industry norms or 
estimates from best available data. The lifespan of both projects is 20 years. The key variable 
inputs are capital expenditure per MW wind installed, capacity factor, consumer price index 
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Table 3.16: Hypothetical Wind Farm Financial Modelling Assumptions 
Technical South Africa Germany Unit 
Wind Turbine Capacity 2.5 2.5 MW 
Turbines 40 40 Turbines 
Total Capacity 100.0 100.0 MW 
Wind Capacity Factor 27.17% 25.80% % 
Estimated annual net generation  238,009   226,008  MWh 
Operating Value Value Unit 
O&M cost annual (indexed by inflation)  29.66   29.66  Million Rand 
 Socio-Economic Development Fee 2.1% 0.0% % Revenue 
Annual escalation in Tariff  (CPI) 5.0% 2.3% % Increase 
Inflation (CPI) 5.0% 2.3% % 
Land Rental Fee 1.5% 1.5% % Revenue 
Salvage Value 5% 5% %  of turbine cost 
Financial Value Value Unit 
Capital Expenditure R 1,473.71 R 1,399.16 Million Rand 
Debt 70.00% 70.00% % 
Equity 30.00% 30.00% % 
Equity IRR 20.77% 7.30% % 
Interest rate – Debt 9.00% 3.58% % 
Loan repayment tenure  15   15  Years 
Tax rate 28.00% 28.00% % 
Exchange Rate 1 Rand 10 Euro Rand to Euro 
 
 For the South African model, the Standard Bank benchmark of US$2,000,000 per MW 
installed is used to estimate the cost of building wind farms in South Africa (Standard Bank, 
2011). The 9 per cent interest rate used is the South African prime-lending rate as of January 
2012, and the CPI is the 2011 average of 5 per cent (Statistics South Africa, 2012). The potential 
wind resource uses a capacity factor of 27.17 per cent as estimated by a capacity study that 
relates to the first 2000 MW of installed wind capacity in South Africa (Werner et al., 2011). 
While capital expenditure outlays have varied over the years by project, an average 
German specific benchmark of €1,373,000 per MW installed, determined by the International 
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Bundesbank, using the rate that the domestic banks in Germany charge on euro-denominated 
loans to non-financial corporations domiciled in the Euro area as of November 2011. The 
inflation rate used is Germany’s 2011 average CPI of 2.32 per cent (CPI, 2011). The estimated 
average capacity factor for Germany is 25.8 per cent, based on 2008 wind farm performance 
results (Schwabe et al., 2011) 
The above analysis results in a rough estimation of the inflation indexed tariff rate 
necessary over a 20-year period for IPPs to engage in South Africa and Germany. A tariff rate of 
€6.3c per kWh is necessary to meet the expected return on equity of 7.30 per cent in Germany, 
while a tariff rate of €9.7c is necessary to meet the expected return on equity of 20.77 per cent in 
South Africa. This represents a 54 per cent higher cost to generate wind energy in South Africa. 
Such a profound price differential, even with the better-anticipated wind resource in South 
Africa, underscores the implications of the host country risk on financing. The financial 
engineering of renewable energy projects further compounds the difficulties because of the 
substantial up front capital needed and the long-term repayment based on the power purchase 
agreement. As a result, cost of capital plays a larger role in the viability of renewable energy 
projects in countries with higher levels of limited statehood, and any incentive mechanism must 
understand and address each country’s specific cost of capital situation. 
From the perspective of the state, it is important to understand the cost differential 
between renewable energy and the current tariff price. Even though direct comparisons of IPP 
generation costs and existing tariffs from national utilities are difficult to fully discern (Eberhard 
and Gratwick, 2011), they are useful for providing a basic understanding of the price differential 
when including new energy sources to an incumbent system. Table 3.17 compares the 
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and the on-shore wind tariff rate offered in both countries. What emerges from the German case 
is that the retail price of €26.7c is significantly higher than the estimated cost of €6.3c for wind 
energy generation. This is not a straight comparison because the overall tariffs in Germany are 
comprised of numerous taxes and charges; therefore exact cost of generation can only be 
estimated. For example, an analysis of the 2005 electricity tariff in Germany found that 60 per 
cent of the tariff contributed to electricity generation, transmission and marketing; 10 per cent to 
a concession charge and the remaining 30 per cent toward taxes (Wenzel, 2006).  
Table 3.17: Tariff Pricing Comparison 
Country Estimated Wind 
Generation Cost 
Household 
Tariff kWh  
Wind Energy Pricing 
Germany 6.3c
13
  26.7c * 5c – 9c *** 
South Africa 9.7c  6.07c **  11.5c **** 
Euro cent denominated 
* June 2011 retail household end-user with consumption of 3 500 kWh/year,  
source: http://www.energy.eu/ 
** 2012/2013 standard average price, Source: http://www.eskom.co.za/c/53/tariffs-and-charges/ 
*** Estimated German REFiT pricing 2011, Source: http://www.energy.eu/#Feedin  
**** Maximum bid allowed under REIPPP for on-shore wind energy is 115c ZAR 
 
To estimate the actual cost of electricity generation for Germany, the average base price 
for electricity on the European Power Exchange Spot market for Germany/Austria was €51.12 
per MW hour in 2011, which corresponds to approximately €5.1c per kWh (EPEX Spot, 2012). 
The REFiT pricing used in Germany shows that the estimated generation cost for 2011 electricity 
in the German grid network is only slightly above the hypothetical cost for wind power and at 
the low end of the German REFiT. This implies that wind energy in Germany is getting close to 
being cost competitive versus traditional generation.  
In direct contrast, the South African state has fewer options available to promote 
renewable energy because the gap in price differential between wind and the retail electricity 
                                                        
13










  162 
price is significant. ESKOM, the monopolistic South African utility, currently provides 
electricity to households at a retail price of approximately €6.07c (NERSA, 2012). This tariff 
price includes increases over the past three years of approximately 25 per cent in 2010 and 2011 
and 16 per cent in 2012 (ESKOM, 2011). However, even with these increases, the cost of 
generating coal-based power using South Africa’s legacy infrastructure is still comparatively 
inexpensive (Pegels, 2010). This presents a challenge to fund the differential between the current 
tariff and the estimated €9.7c to generate wind energy in South Africa.  
Another important consideration that underpins this analysis is the willingness and ability 
of the end electricity consumer to absorb higher costs for electricity. As is the case with most 
developing countries, South Africa has high levels of poverty and inequality, resulting in 
substantial price sensitivity for a large part of the population to tariff price increases. 
Compounding the problem is that the government has limited resources and must prioritise the 
most immediate needs such as health and education, to name a few. Subsidy funding for 
renewable energy, as a result, is secondary because the country faces a host of developmental 
challenges that are perceived as more important and immediate than climate change (Winkler 
and Marquand, 2009). On the other hand, Germany has a much higher electricity price and a 
populace less sensitive to price increases. There has also been a consistent willingness to buy 
renewable energy at a higher price by the German consumer (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006), 
providing much more flexibility and support for renewables in Germany.  
3.5.5 Discussion: MBI Policy in Areas of Limited Statehood  
The energy sector is dynamic and constantly changing, with a number of trends supporting 
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been decreasing each year as technology improves and greater scale is achieved. Furthermore, 
renewables generally reduce the overall volatility of energy project pricing structures because 
there is no fuel costs. Wind energy investors have relatively certain knowledge of the lifetime 
cost of the plant from the outset because installed costs and mean wind speed are known, and 
there are low variable costs, zero fuel cost, and no carbon emission costs (Schwabe et al., 2011).  
 On the other hand, underlying fuel costs of traditional energy sources (i.e. coal, oil, gas, 
nuclear) are highly variable and increasing because they are subject to the world market and the 
increasing demand for energy. The cost differential between renewables and fossil fuel based 
electricity is also highly country specific, because both renewable energy potential and 
availability of fossil fuels differ from country to country. Furthermore, developing countries are 
often characterised by dominant state-owned utilities that are “rarely exposed to market costs of 
capital” (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011, p.5542). This manifests in widely varying price 
differentials between the current electricity tariff offered by incumbent national utilities and the 
price required by IPPs to profitably provide electricity from renewable sources.  
For renewable energy in developing countries to reach the scale required to meet the 450 
scenario, MBI design must carefully consider cost of capital and the potential role of incentives 
in decreasing project risk. By doing so, MBIs will increase their cost-efficiency and shorten the 
timeframe until renewable electricity generation reaches parity with traditional energy systems. 
This will require innovative approaches to incentivise both the state and IPPs.  
Recommendations include implementing mechanisms that provide below market rate 
loans and loan guarantees to the IPP in order to reduce risk and drive down the cost of capital. 
The host countries’ level of statehood could be the determining factor if the mechanism is 
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statehood would then benefit from an international mechanism, which could draw down the 
project’s host country risk. Precedent exists for such mechanisms at the national level. For 
example, the German government has successfully provided below market rate loans to support 
its renewable energy sector. As early as the 1990s, wind energy plants and PV roof systems were 
eligible for soft loans with an interest rate reduction of 4.5 per cent as compared to standard 
loans (Paolo, 2006; Rosaria Di Nucci et al., 2007). In 1999, Germany introduced the market 
incentive programme for smaller scale renewable energy systems that provided direct investment 
subsidies and soft loans with long term repayment conditions and partial debt forgiveness if 
certain conditions were met (Bechberger and Reiche, 2004). In 2011, South African government 
even began exploring such options through an initiative called South African Renewables 
Initiative (SARI), a collaboration with global donors and foreign governments to explore 
innovative funding mechanisms to lower the cost of renewable energy deployment (Creamer, 
2011). However, as of 2013, no activity of note has advanced as a result of SARI. 
Another recommendation is to address the tariff price differential with mechanisms 
specifically designed to leverage the table cost of wind energy versus the increasingly volatile 
fossil fuel based electricity costs. Theoretically, an international financing mechanism could 
engage directly with South Africa to provide immediate financial support to meet the 
incremental tariff price difference for wind energy. The business as usual tariff price could be 
marked to the predominant fuel source used in the host country, for example coal in South 
Africa. If designed effectively, opportunity may exist for funds to be repaid if and when wind 
energy becomes cheaper than coal based electricity generation. In theory, the country that 
receives the initial financial payment to cover the present day negative tariff price differential 
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could be used as the benchmark to assess the traditional cost of power. This approach could 
allow developing countries to immediately benefit from inclusion of renewable energy without 
having to absorb the present day higher cost. This is a reverse lock-in strategy because South 
Africa would secure the power it needs to grow the economy via renewable energy at the same 
cost of coal-based generation.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the expected tariff pricing in South Africa versus an estimated wind 
energy tariff from 2012 to 2032. This demonstrates the potential competitiveness of wind 
generation over the long term. The South African overall tariff price is based on Eskom’s multi-
year tariff pricing proposal till 2018 (de Lange, 2012), then reverting to a historical average of 
CPI from 1997 to 2012 of 5.79 per cent per annum (Eskom, 2012). The wind energy tariff is 
stable as it is set by the competitive bidding guidance from NERSA at 4.2 per cent (DoE RSA, 
2011) and assumes a 14 per cent mark-up to the estimated generation costs to include 
distribution and marketing (Wenzel, 2006).  
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This incentive mechanism is a long-term, speculative proposition dependent on the variable cost 
of fossil fuel based electricity versus the stable cost of wind energy. While risky from a purely 
financial perspective, such an approach could be a cost efficient and effective way for the 
international climate change regime to promote the global public good of reducing carbon 
emissions. Such a mechanism offers a sustainable alternative to fossil fuel based power 
generation, while at the same time supporting climate smart development because it does not 
require the host country government to divert its limited resources to finance the more expensive 
current day cost of renewable energy.  
3.5.6 Conclusion 
In order to meet the challenge posed by climate change, the current dependence on fossil fuel 
based electricity generation needs to undergo dramatic transformation in the immediate future or 
risk locking in carbon intensive power installations that will push the world past the 450 ppm 
threshold. This calls for bold climate change governance, whereby both the public and private 
sector must effectively work together through a co-evolutionary framework to establish and 
implement effective incentives for renewable energy that are customised to the host countries 
level of statehood.  
Global climate change governance needs to place special focus on developing countries, 
which are the future demand centres for electricity. To do so, challenges that are inherent to areas 
of limited statehood need to be better understood and addressed. MBI approaches from the 
developed world may not work well in developing countries because host country contexts are 
different. The host country level of statehood is a key determinant of any renewable energy 
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as compared to Germany, irrespective of the new industry risk. This in turn influences the cost of 
capital. The result is renewable energy is significantly more expensive in the developing world 
than in OECD countries, expanding the tariff price differential and hindering the state’s ability to 
prioritise the large-scale promotion of renewables. To overcome this challenge, international and 
national MBIs are needed to reduce the required cost of capital arising from developing countries 
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4.0 Discussion 
This section summarises how the empirical papers collectively make a theoretical contribution. 
The empirical papers are discussed to draw out the broader implications for the research and 
practice of market-based environmental policy. The intent of this thesis was to explore what 
constitutes an effective host country environment for MBIs in developing countries, and 
specifically, but not exclusively, investigate the role of the state. Based on the collective findings 
of the empirical papers, this section discusses the overall theoretical contribution of this thesis 
and recommends opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of MBIs in 
developing countries. 
4.1  Key Theoretical Contributions 
The following overarching research question is explored throughout the thesis: How does the 
host country context affect MBIs in developing countries? Two key theoretical contributions are 
drawn from the empirical papers that further the knowledge of MBIs in developing countries. 
The first relates to precisely what host country variables affect MBIs in developing countries, 
including prioritisation by the state, private sector support structures and private sector financial 
requirements. The second is the ability to generalise MBIs across developing countries, with a 
specific focus on cost of capital.  
4.1.1 Host Country Considerations 
Investigating MBIs within developing countries is a relatively new area of inquiry, as is 
exploring MBIs within the context of limited statehood. The five papers, individually and 
collectively, contribute to the literature summarised in Section 2. Most notable is how the papers 
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underlying political, technical, legal and economic environment. The research in this thesis 
provides further precision to Stavins’ finding by identifying which aspects of the host country 
contextual environment are particularly important and how they influence the efficiency and 
effectiveness of MBIs in developing countries. The three key considerations identified by the 
papers are: 1) prioritisation by the state; 2) supporting structures and policies that generate 
awareness and build capabilities to enable private sector participation; and 3) access to finance, 
with a specific focus on cost of capital.   
Prioritisation by of the State 
The effectiveness of an MBI is likely to increase if it is considered a priority by the host country 
state. However, as explained previously, it is very difficult for developing countries to prioritise 
subsidies only focused on emission reductions. The qualitative findings of paper 1 and 2 
highlight that low carbon development in developing countries is ideal in theory but not 
considered a top priority by the state in reality when compared to all other pressing 
developmental needs. Paper 3 highlights a statistically significant relationship between CDM 
utilisation, and human development and governance indicators which implies that the lower the 
level of statehood the less likely the state will be able to focus on and prioritise MBIs. Paper 5 
highlights that it may not be politically acceptable to pay a premium for renewable energy in 
South Africa when compared to other pressing needs such has health, education and equality. 
Papers 4 and 5 make clear that low carbon activities in developing countries face greater 
challenges than within developed countries because the overall cost increases as the level of 
statehood decreases, placing further demands on already limited resources. The resulting 
implication is that for MBIs to be effective in developing countries, they need to be capable of 
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renewable energy in China is part of the country’s overall development strategy (e.g. China 
Renewable Energy Law) and it corresponds to a significant uptake of the CDM. On the other 
hand, South Africa has been slow to implement the REIPPP programme or other renewable 
energy promotion activities, resulting in little uptake of CDM.  
Support Structures 
In addition to being aligned to the developmental priorities of the host country, MBIs also need 
to be aligned to the interests and capabilities of the private sector. Transforming a country’s 
development approach from carbon intensive to low carbon requires an overall enabling 
environment equal to this momentous task. Relating to the literature on governance in areas of 
limited statehood, my analysis has shown that for MBIs to be effective, the private sector cannot 
replace the role of the state. Lacking a strong shadow of hierarchy to enforce public good 
provision by the private sector, developing countries require an integrated approach that 
reinforces private sector participation throughout all relevant facets of policy and enabling 
environment.   
The CDM and renewable energy promotion provide practical examples to explore the 
role of the state versus that of the private sector in achieving a desired environmental outcome 
within developing countries. The majority of the regulatory oversight and subsidy financing of 
the CDM is provided outside developing countries through the UNFCCC, while the regulatory 
structure of renewable energy promotion is the responsibility of the host country. What I found 
in both cases is that the state plays a key role, whether it be actively promoting the MBI to the 
private sector as in the case of the CDM or fully regulating and administering the MBI as in the 
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Governance structures, provided by the state or an international entity, need to evaluate 
all obstacles to low carbon development that are inherent to the host country and take steps to 
remove or mitigate them. Simply establishing a MBI without considering the enabling private 
sector environment in developing countries significantly reduces the probability that the 
mechanism will be effective or efficient. Papers 1 and 2 point out that the CDM eligibility and 
regulation determined by the UNFCCC are often viewed as a major hurdle to engaging the 
CDM, particularly in SSA. Paper 2 highlights how MBI considerations need to be evaluated 
across multiple levels, including the international, national and local perspective if it is to 
achieve the intended results because the common challenges related to awareness, capacity, 
eligibility and finance impact countries differently depending on their level of statehood. Of 
interest is how this relates back to Sidgwick’s (1887) conclusion that “no one could appropriate 
and sell improvements in climate” (p. 407). Paper 1 and 2 describe how, 125 years after 
Sidgwick’s statement, the CDM attempts to appropriate and sell climate improvements, and 
details the numerous difficulties inherent to the quantification and trade of emission reductions. 
Papers 4 and 5 demonstrate a co-evolutionary framework between the public and private 
sector that is required if IPPs are to participate in increasing the amount of renewable energy in a 
country’s overall energy mix. These papers show how the current state of renewable energy 
requires subsidy to compete with the prevailing fossil fuel based energy systems, thus adding to 
the total fiscal burden when compared to the business as usual approach.  
Collectively the first three papers demonstrate how voluntary agreements (i.e. Kyoto 
Protocol and the CDM) mandated by the UNFCCC attempt to engage both the state and private 
sector to incentivise contributions to the public good (emission reductions above business as 
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by the UNFCCC), the CDM requires systematic private sector support measures in the host 
country. Paper 1 also points out how China has developed an environment that reinforces the 
utilisation of the CDM, as opposed to simply leaving it to market forces. Active engagement and 
policy alignment by the state have resulted in China fully leveraging the CDM opportunity. For 
example, institutional (e.g. CDM Project Management Centre and Provincial CDM Centres) 
support structures by the Chinese state have contributed to its high utilisation. Alternatively, less 
engagement to provide coordinated support from South Africa and Zambia respectively has 
resulted in a corresponding under-utilisation of the CDM.  
Financial Considerations 
Access to finance, with a specific focus on the overall cost of capital, and its relationship to the 
host country context is identified as a significant consideration for MBIs in developing countries. 
Papers 1 and 2 broadly highlight the importance of cost of capital to CDM projects in China, 
South Africa and Zambia.  
Papers 4 and 5 expand the research by examining the relationship between the state and 
the private sector regarding renewable energy promotion with a focus on determining a kWh 
price for renewable energy that maximises societal benefit (i.e. the lowest possible price) but 
attractive private sector IPPs (i.e. high enough to achieve private sector IRR requirements). More 
specifically, paper 4 demonstrates in detail the causal relationship between the host country 
context and the cost of capital by proposing an index-based model for determining the required 
equity IRR for renewable energy projects in South Africa. Paper 5 then takes this a step further 
to show how the perception of developing countries impacts the overall cost of renewable 
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electricity, using the example of wind-based electricity in South Africa and Germany to highlight 
how host country context impacts the overall cost.  
The comparison to Germany demonstrates precisely how cost of capital is a key variable 
in the overall cost of producing renewable energy. The analysis of papers 4 and 5 further 
demonstrates how MBIs are part and parcel to their host country context, and how the perceived 
higher risk of a developing country can significantly increase the cost of wind energy in South 
Africa on an absolute basis when compared to Germany. This implies that the host country 
context can be part of the problem that drives costs up if it cannot inspire confidence to private 
sector investors and developers.  
4.1.2 Generalisation of MBIs 
An overarching contribution, which follows the analysis of specific host country considerations, 
is that broad generalisation across all developing countries for MBIs proves insufficient. An 
important contribution is that it is not just about identifying the key underlying factors supporting 
MBIs, but also understanding when and how important each of these factors are within the local 
context in which they are situated. 
This thesis has demonstrated that MBIs need be responsive to the host country level of 
development, developmental priorities, capabilities and financial considerations. These 
considerations are inter-linked and are important host country considerations for MBIs in 
developing countries. MBIs, as pointed out as early as the 1950’s by Meade, are highly 
dependent upon the pollutant they are trying to reduce and the underlying setting it is based. 
Reducing global GHG emissions through incentives is an extremely complex endeavour that 
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country. The collective research of this thesis demonstrates that the overall host country context, 
not only the regulatory capability of the host country, is a significant determinant of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of MBIs in developing countries. The result is that MBI approaches 
are unlikely to be uniform across developing countries and that flexibility in MBI approach is 
necessary to meet the needs of all developing countries.  
4.2  Policy Recommendations to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of MBIs 
Aldy and Stavins (2012b) call for scholars to contribute transformative proposals to address 
global climate change, highlighting, “research must address how developed and developing 
countries can both contribute to emission reductions” (p.1043). They further emphasise that 
research must play a role in informing future climate policy to effectively and efficiently 
facilitate meaningful emission reductions “while meeting the UNFCCC’s principle of 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (Aldy & Stavins, 2012b, p. 1044). 
Inherent in this call for transformative proposals is the need to expand beyond the geographical 
confines of developed countries that have characterised market-based environmental policy 
research to developing countries. The research in this thesis, through the individual and 
collective contribution of the five empirical papers, has taken up this challenge by exploring how 
host country context impacts MBIs. The remainder of this section highlights two key 
recommendations relevant for future climate policy decision makers.  
 The first recommendation is drawn from the principle that to engage the private sector in 
the provision of public good, a market return is necessary in exchange for their expertise and 
involvement. In developing countries, the lack of consolidated statehood can erode confidence 
that the state will be able to sustain incentive commitments that are necessary to attract private 
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risk that must be compensated for with additional return to the private sector. The 
recommendation is that MBIs for developing countries be focused not just on the host countries’ 
regulatory capabilities, but also on broader considerations regarding level of development, 
including capacity, access to finance and prioritisation.  
An example pertinent to developing countries with limited state or private sector 
capabilities is to select, in collaboration with relevant state actors, a specific low carbon activity 
that supports the overall development strategy of the country, then provide a standard suite of 
support services to the business organisations that meets a basic eligibility criteria that are 
designed to build the local private sectors capabilities to implement the activity (e.g. capacity 
building, networking, training, etc.) Furthermore, as recommended in paper 5, access to finance 
challenges in developing countries could be addressed by making available subsidised below 
market rate loans and loan guarantees to the eligible business organisation in order to reduce risk 
and drive down the cost of capital. The host countries’ level of statehood could be the 
determining factor if the mechanism is managed by the international climate regime or the 
national government. Developing countries with particularly low levels of statehood would then 
benefit from an international mechanism that draws down the host country risk and increases the 
feasibility of implementing low carbon activities. 
 The second recommendation to the decision makers of future climate policy is to include 
instruments that specifically address the obstacles that hinder the leveraging of MBIs in 
developing countries. This refers to mitigating or eliminating the factors that drive overall MBI 
costs up, including political risk and non-payment risk. To make clear, perceived risks inherent 
to developing countries make low carbon development more difficult than in developed 
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technology continues to improve and decrease in price, implementation will remain constrained 
by the risk and uncertainty associated with a developing country context. As proposed in paper 5, 
risk and uncertainty could be mitigated by international transfers from an international 
mechanism (i.e. developed countries to developing countries) that focuses on funding the cost 
differential between low carbon and carbon intensive approaches. This has the potential to 
reduce the perceived high non-payment risk in developing countries, which contributes to 
driving up a business organisations cost of capital. Therefore, it is recommended to focus MBIs 
not only on the specific low carbon activities, but also on the actual host country risks that drive 
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5.0  Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
If a stable climate is to be maintained, the need for low carbon development capable of 
meaningful emission reductions over the business as usual scenario is necessary in both the 
developed and developing world. This is a vexing problem because the dependence on fossil fuel 
based development that has enabled societal gains is now considered to be a leading cause of 
global climate instability. To address climate change, a new development approach is needed 
that is capable of producing the same societal advancements but without the accompanying 
negative environmental externalities.  
Climate change is not only a problem to be addressed by the developed countries, but 
also by developing countries that are emerging to increase their standard of living and are now 
significantly contributing to GHG emissions. An immediate switch to a low carbon development 
model is needed if the 450-ppm scenario is to be achieved. This thesis has explored the role of 
MBIs facilitating this transition in developing countries. 
The overall intent of this thesis has been to identify and explain how specific host country 
considerations affect MBIs in developing countries. This thesis has built upon the literature on 
market-based environmental policy and governance in areas of limited statehood to explore the 
role of both the state and the private sector. The thesis has focused on approaches to address 
global climate change by investigating practical examples of MBIs in developing countries. The 
experience with MBIs in SSA is compared within the continent (South Africa and Zambia) and 
contrasted outside the continent with countries that have fully leveraged the CDM (China) and 
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in developing countries a regulatory structure capable of administering an MBI is a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient condition for efficient and effective MBIs. Other key variables in 
addition to state regulatory capabilities include prioritisation, additional support structures to 
increase capabilities to take advantage of MBIs and access to finance.  
The findings highlight the importance of understanding the host country context and 
aligning it with the specific market mechanism. MBIs are policy instruments reliant upon a host 
country environment, and therefore engagement by the state to align priorities and reduce 
uncertainty and risk is necessary to enable private sector engagement, regardless if the MBI is 
internationally or nationally mandated. As highlighted by Meade (1952), promoting low carbon 
development is likely to be a net addition to the overall financial burden of society and will thus 
require subsidy. As a result, MBI design needs to be effective and efficient in order to maximise 
limited resources for societal benefit and entice the necessary actors to participate. This is 
important particularly for the governance of both renewable energy promotion and the future 
conceptualisation of the CDM, if they are to play a significant role in promoting low carbon 
development in developing countries. 
An understanding of how cost of capital impacts an MBI has been shown to be important 
for understanding the relationship between the MBI and the host country. If low carbon 
development is deemed politically, technically and administratively feasible, mechanisms should 
extend beyond the MBI specific regulation to mitigate the host country risks that increase the 
overall cost and uncertainty in developing countries. This will help make low carbon 
development more cost competitive with carbon intensive approaches, and hopefully assist 
developing countries advance their developmental objectives of today without sacrificing a 
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5.2 Future Research Opportunities  
The findings of this thesis give rise to opportunities for future research that would be valuable for 
MBI research and for future climate policy. In line with the finding that MBIs cannot always be 
broadly generalised across the developing world, further research to refine what is acceptable 
and practical within differing host country contexts is necessary. For example, further research 
on determining the optimal level of MBI complexity based on the specific host countries level of 
development is necessary. Also, research on the effectiveness of support structures to increase 
the capacity of the private sector in developing countries with regard to MBIs could help to make 
MBIs more applicable in developing countries. 
As low carbon technologies become more cost competitive on an absolute basis with 
fossil fuel based technology, the opportunity for MBIs to promote low carbon development will 
become increasingly relevant in developing countries. This research has demonstrated the 
significant impact of host country considerations on MBIs in developing countries. This shows 
the need for further research, for example, on specific ways to mitigate the risk and uncertainty 
associated with cost of capital in developing countries. To conclude, this thesis points to the need 
for further research on how to better structure both internationally and nationally mandated MBI 
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